Co-managing complex social-ecological systems in Tanzania : the case of Lake Jipe wetland by Mahonge, C.P.I.
Co-managing complex 
social-ecological systems 
in Tanzania
The case of Lake Jipe wetland
Christopher P.I. Mahonge
Co-managing complex social-
ecological systems in Tanzania
The case of Lake Jipe wetland
Christopher P.I. Mahonge
Thesis committee
Thesis supervisor
Prof. dr. ir. A.P.J Mol
Professor of Environmental Policy, Wageningen University
Thesis co-supervisor
Dr. Simon R. Bush
Assistant Professor, Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University
Other members
Prof. dr. J.W.M. van Dijk, Wageningen University
Prof. dr. P.K.T. Munishi, Sokoine University of Agriculture, Tanzania
Prof. dr. A. Niehof, Wageningen University
Dr. E. Turnhout, Wageningen University
This research was conducted under the auspices of the WIMEK Graduate School
Co-managing complex social-
ecological systems in Tanzania
The case of Lake Jipe wetland
Christopher P.I. Mahonge
Thesis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor
at Wageningen University
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus
Prof. dr. M.J. Kropff
in the presence of the
Thesis committee appointed by the Academic Board
to be defended in public
on Friday 22 October 2010
at 4 p.m. in the Aula.
Christopher P.I. Mahonge
Co-managing complex social-ecological systems in Tanzania: The case of Lake Jipe 
wetland/ Wageningen: Wageningen University
PhD Thesis Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands (2010)
ISBN: 978-90-8585-652-8
ISBN: 978-90-8686-151-4


Preface
Wetlands are important areas in Tanzania. They contain a diversity of natural resources, diversity of 
fauna and flora, and invaluable habitats for these life forms. Although, in the past, these areas were 
considered wastelands, the increase in population, and decline in production of terrestrial areas, 
due to among other factors drought, have led people to migrate to these areas and encroachment 
and conversion of wetlands to economic activities to optimize fertile and moist soils for agricultural 
production, and water and pastoral resources for livestock keeping, among others. However, 
although the wetlands support the people, i.e. by enabling food production, providing pastures 
for livestock, water for agriculture, livestock and domestic consumption, fishing etc., these uses, 
if not appropriately conducted, threaten the sustainability of the biodiversity and realization of 
long-term socio-economic benefits.
In Tanzania, the degradation of natural resources in wetland areas has led to efforts aimed 
at sustainable use and management of the wetland resources. The preliminary efforts, however, 
were monopolised by the government, which through its command and control management 
approaches imposed sanctions to enforce the local community to comply with its top-down 
policies. Problems were witnessed in the implementation of these initiatives. For instance, due 
to the lack of a central wetland policy, different sectors intervened at Lake Jipe with different and 
often contradictory sectorally-based objectives and interests. While one sector may emphasize the 
conservation of a particular resource, another sector may emphasize its use without integrating 
environmental concerns. This has exacerbated environmental deterioration instead of curbing it. 
Although this sectoral perspective persists, in the recent years, the government has recognised that 
the rural livelihoods and wetland resources are inseparable, and therefore has gradually integrated 
the local people in the management processes. This shift has been contributed by, among others 
things, inadequacy in terms of financial and human resources to centralize the control of the vast 
and diverse wetland resources areas.
Formal natural resources management policies now advocate the integration of local people 
in the management of natural resources. Nevertheless, there is an endemic lack of knowledge 
on how to put society-wetland collaboration into practice or how to measure the success of 
such collaborations in terms of sustainable management. This is particularly the case for the 
wetland at the centre of this thesis - Lake Jipe. This study aimed to investigate the possibility 
for co-management between the government and the wetland dependent people for sustainable 
management of Lake Jipe. The findings from this study may enable us to propose improvements 
to government-community collaborations for sustainable management of this lake, as well as 
wetlands further afield in Tanzania and East Africa.
This thesis would not have been possible without assistance, advice, constructive criticism and 
collaborations from various individuals and organizations. I would like to express my gratitude 
to The Netherlands Academy of Arts and sciences (KNAW), and the Wageningen University for 
financially enabling this study.
I extend my sincere thanks to my Promoter Prof. Dr. Ir. Arthur P.J. Mol, and my Co-Promoter 
Dr. S. Bush, both of Environmental Policy Group (ENP), for their invaluable advise, guidance, 
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encouragement, tolerance, and constructive criticisms from the start to the accomplishment of 
this thesis. I really appreciate their work and value their role beyond expression.
I also would like to thank my supervisor in Tanzania Prof. P.T.K. Munishi of the Faculty of 
Forestry and Nature Conservation of Sokoine University of Agriculture. He assisted me with the 
formulation of original idea on wetlands management, and has likewise assisted me with advice 
on data collection during the field research in Tanzania.
I extend my thanks to other Staff of Environmental Policy Group for their assistance at 
various stages and levels. Prof. Dr. Ir. Spaargaren and Dr. Ir. Peter Oosterveer for providing me 
with insights into social theory, and Dr. Ir. Jan P.M. van Tatenhove for his two courses on Multi 
Level Governance and Policy Evaluation. They were ready to clarify various issues pertaining to 
the mentioned subjects at any time, during and after the courses. Thanks to Corry Rothuizen 
for her administrative and logistic arrangements and support during the whole time I spent at 
Wageningen University. Really, I appreciate her readily assistance, guidance, and support through 
the entire time I was in Wageningen.
I cannot conclude my thanks without mentioning the following. I appreciate the assistance 
of Dorien Korbee for translating the summary of my thesis into Dutch. My office roommates: 
Elizabert Sargant, Lenny Putman, Jorrit Nijhuis, Hilde Toonen and Dorien Korbee, I thank them 
for their company, cooperation, and directions at various stages of the PhD research journey. 
Other friends namely Jingyi Han, Judith van Leeuwen, Michiel de Krom, Hoi van Pham and Dries 
Hegger, I have enjoyed their company especially during the PhD dinners.
I appreciate the support and encouragement of my wife Damarice, and my daughter Victoria 
during the research period and when away from Tanzania, for their understanding. Likewise, I 
should thank my parents, brothers, and sister for supporting my family while I was away.
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Map of Tanzania
Chapter 1.  
Introduction
1.1 Wetland management in Tanzania
Wetlands can be defined as areas of marsh, fen, peat land or water, whether natural and/or artificial, 
permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including 
areas of marine water, the depth of which at low tide does not exceed 6 meters (Matthews, 1993). 
In Tanzania, wetlands cover over seven percent of the country’s surface area (Masudi, Mashauri, 
Mayo, & Mbwette, 2001). Based on the Ramsar Convention definition, Tanzania wetlands are 
classified into three categories according to their origin and land physiography: coastal wetlands, 
rift valley systems wetlands, and wetlands of the highland drainage basins. The major wetlands in 
the country include Rufiji river basin, Ruvu river basin, Wami river basin, Sigi river basin, Umba 
river basin, Pangani river basin (Lake Jipe integrated), Msangasi river basin, Lake Victoria basin, 
Malagalasi muyovosi basin, Kilombero, Ruaha, Usangu plains and Ruvuma and Southern river 
basin.
Wetlands in Tanzania integrate a diversity of biological and socio-economic interests. Biological 
interests entail provision of support to fauna and flora, some of which are endemic to this wetland 
area (Twong’o & Sikoyo, 2001). Socio-economic interests include the use of different natural 
resources for household consumption, irrigation, hydropower generation, fishing, agriculture, 
animal husbandry, etc. (Bootsma & Hecky, 1993). Due to prolonged drought in some areas, the 
wetlands in Tanzania have become areas where people obtain their livelihood during these critical 
times. These livelihood practices include agriculture, livestock grazing, and fishing (Masija, 2000; 
Salum, 2007). However, inappropriate exploitation (FAO, 1998; Masija, 2000; MNRT, 2003), 
uncoordinated institutions (Harril, 2002), and pollution (Kassenga, 1997; Shemdoe & Mwanyoka, 
2006) contribute to the degradation of the country’s wetlands.
Unsustainable human activities carried out at the catchments areas of the wetlands endanger 
the sustainability of wetlands in Tanzania. Such activities include livestock keeping, household 
waste disposal, sand mining, fertilizer and agro-chemical application. These activities generate 
waste and silt that is deposited into water catchments due to ineffective control and disposal 
institutions and mechanisms (Kassenga, 1997; Shemdoe & Mwanyoka, 2006). When the waste 
and silts are deposited in wetlands such as lakes, they may affect the water quality in these systems. 
These changes may favour development of undesired vegetations. Moreover, they may block water 
streams resulting in decreased water volumes and flows in the downstream areas of wetlands 
(Shemdoe & Mwanyoka, 2006).
Since wetlands in Tanzania comprise multiple natural resources that are interrelated, disturbance 
of one natural resource may results in negative effects on other resources. Some parts of wetlands in 
Tanzania lack certain services at particular seasons due to unsustainable exploitation of resources 
for other services. For example, water scarcity occurs during the dry seasons, because part of the 
wetland uses large amounts of water for agriculture thereby degrading water catchment areas 
(Shemdoe & Mwanyoka, 2006). Consequently, these unsustainable exploitations lead to the 
deterioration of both ecological and socio-economic potentials wetlands can offer (Harrill, 2002).
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In addition to unsustainable and conflicting human practices, poorly designed, implemented 
and coordinated institutional arrangements (such as policies, legislation, partnerships, codes etc.) 
endanger the sustainability of wetlands in Tanzania. For example, whereas some natural resources 
such as mangrove vegetation along the waters of the wetlands are governed by natural resources 
protection authorities and institutions, industry and trade authorities have the mandate to issue 
licences for the economic use of wetlands. This results in exploitation of natural resources areas 
for non-conservation activities (Harril, 2002). Besides contributing to the degradation of natural 
resources in the wetlands, poor (sectoral) policies and legislation result in conflicts between and 
among various sectors (Salum, 2007).
Some efforts have been implemented to reduce environmental degradation for the wetlands 
in Tanzania. For example, the National Environment Management Council (NEMC) of Tanzania 
started the national wetland conservation and management programme in Tanzania in 1990, in 
collaboration with World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN). These efforts gained momentum during the wetland conservation conference 
by Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) in 1991, which urged each member 
state to formulate its wetland management programme (FAO, 1998). Among the important aims 
of these programmes, is the integration of the local community in the management of wetland 
resources. It is believed that such integration may improve sustainable use and management of 
wetland resources (Salum, 2007). Although international institutions have assisted in increasing 
the national capacity for wetland protection, national laws and policies have not been formulated 
(Kassenga, 1997), and the rationale for the government’s failure to formulate these laws and 
policies is unclear (ibid.).
1.2 Managing Lake Jipe wetland
Lake Jipe is a typical Tanzanian wetland. It is not only important for biological diversity but also 
for socio-economic development. It is a biodiversity rich ecosystem with water-birds including 
Lesser Jacana, Purple Gallimule, Squacco Heron, Black Heron, African Darter, African Skimmer 
and fish species namely endemic Tilapia, Oreochromis jipe and sardine, Rastrineobola argentea. 
Lake Jipe is also a habitat for crocodile and hippos (MNRT, 2004; Twong’o & Sikoyo, 2001). Socio-
economically, the wetland provides livelihood support to the people of Tanzania and Kenya (IUCN, 
2000). On the Tanzanian side, more than 120,000 people live around Lake Jipe (MNRT, 2004). 
Diversity of interests exist among local users including water for irrigation farming, domestic 
consumption, livestock use, and fishing. Further, the lake is one of sub-catchments of Nyumba 
ya Mungu dam and Pangani river which generate hydroelectric power.
Since the 1970s the environmental status of Lake Jipe has been under scrutiny. This attention 
increased from the 1990s onwards when the environmental status of Lake Jipe seemed to deteriorate 
more seriously and rapidly. Two serious issues regarding environmental problems at Lake Jipe 
that attracted much national and international environmental attention are the rapid expansion 
of the waterweeds and therefore increased reduction of the surface area of the lake (IUCN, 2000; 
TANESCO, 2000), and the drying of the lake which was acute in 2005 (MNRT, 2004). Although 
much attention was directed to environmental problems of Lake Jipe in the 1990s, degradation 
of Lake Jipe started in the 1970s when the local people began to experience decreased fishery 
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resources as waterweeds extended over a wide surface area of the lake. The deterioration of Lake 
Jipe is mainly attributed to the increase of waterweeds and hence the reduction of the surface 
area of the lake by the community stakeholders. But unsustainable fishing methods, intensive 
crops farming and livestock management practices have also significantly contributed to the 
deterioration of natural resources and Lake Jipe wetland as a whole.
Until recently, strategies to address and combat environmental problems at Lake Jipe wetland 
have hardly focused on human activities in this wetland. In the past years, some research was 
done on how to eradicate waterweeds using chemical procedures (Gaudet, 1975; Lyatuu, 1981), 
though to-date such research initiatives have not produced solutions to the waterweeds problems 
due to among others the fear that chemical application could be hazardous to the fish, humans 
and wildlife that depend on this lake. This research largely ignored the interactions between 
economic activities and ecological functions. In other words, humans around the lake were 
viewed as external entities. This was even more true when involving inhabitants of the wetlands 
in formulating and implementing solutions to wetland degradation. It can be concluded that local 
people were viewed as not being able to make a significant contribution to the definition and 
implementation of solutions for Lake Jipe’s degradation. Technical strategies and mechanisms 
introduced by governmental authorities were regarded appropriate for providing solutions to 
these resource degradation problems. More recently, this has proven to be impractical and the 
inclusion of the local resource users in defining solutions and real conservation and management 
work is now considered imperative (MNRT, 2004).
As a result, strategies which integrate local communities and inhabitants in problem solving 
strategies came into being. The government and its agencies now consider participation of local 
communities (natural resource users) vital in the management of natural resources. In 2004, 
the government of Tanzania through the Tanzania Ramsar Administrative Authority, and with 
financial support from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), initiated 
an awareness raising strategy (2005-2007) for inhabitants around the wetland, and of additional 
relevant stakeholders outside the lake region. The aim of the strategy was to elaborate and sensitize 
stakeholders on their roles, rights and responsibilities in conservation and sustainable use of 
Lake Jipe resources (MNRT, 2004). This shift from centralized natural resources management to 
more collaborative and integrated natural resources management assumes that when users are 
integrated in the management process there is a greater likelihood of not only achieving solution 
to the present environmental problems but also of having sustainable management process. But 
sustainability of the management of natural resources and wetland cannot be guaranteed and 
ascertained by just integrating community actors in management initiatives. Tradeoffs between 
conservation and social-economic interests, poor capacity in terms of necessary resources and skills 
of communities, and the institutional and organizational shortcomings of governmental authorities 
and communities are among the often identified reasons for natural resources degradation at Lake 
Jipe, even under a more participatory wetland management.
1.3 Studying wetlands as social-ecological systems
This thesis investigates possibilities for co-management between the multiple governmental and 
community entities for sustainable management of Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania. In this study 
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wetlands are seen as social-ecological systems. The term social-ecological system (SES) is used to 
connote a system that views and integrates humans as part of an ecosystem, that is, humans-in-
nature. The integration of social and ecological systems is based on an argument that these two 
systems are interdependent and hence cannot be treated independently if sustainable management 
of the ecosystem is to be attained (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Before the evolution of this view, humans 
were regarded as being external entities to ecosystems (e.g. Likens, 1992; Pomeroy, 1988). These 
views ignored linkages, which exist in practice between humans and natural systems. These 
linkages are imperative for understanding positive and/or negative impacts on ecosystems due 
to human and nature interactions (Berkes & Folke, 1998).
Social-ecological systems are made of complex and adaptive social and ecological elements in 
which ecological components provide feedback and social actors respond to these feedbacks, in 
order to make the social-ecological systems provide social and environmental interests sustainably 
(Olsson & Folke, 2004). The approach I take in studying co-management possibilities of social-
ecological systems deviates on two points from the majority of social-ecological system approaches. 
Studies on co-management of social-ecological systems have focused in general on single natural 
resources management systems (Pinkerton, 1994; Pinto da Silva, 2004; Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy, 
Sverdrup-Jensen, & Raakjaer-Nielsen, 1995; Singleton, 2000). In practice, social-ecological 
systems often comprise multiple and different but interrelated natural resources management 
systems, which not only influence one another but also influence the social-ecological system as 
a whole. Similarly, in most cases co-management studies have addressed government-community 
collaboration in a singular fashion, whereby both the government and the community are viewed 
as monolithic units (Pinkerton, 1994; Pomeroy, 1995; Singleton, 2000).
In this thesis, a social-ecological system is viewed as a system that comprises multiple natural 
resources systems and multiple governmental and community entities and interactions. Hence, this 
study aims to include these complexities in social-ecological systems. Lake Jipe social-ecological 
system therefore is viewed as comprising multiple interactions of multiple social and natural 
units and systems. Therefore, I consider it vital to include interactions between downstream 
to upstream geographic areas and other spatial linkages, to include different scales from local 
to international, and to include multiple natural resource disturbances, multiple actors within 
both government and community and multiple institutions for managing these disturbances and 
conflicting interests. Only through including these linkages I will be able to understand problems 
with sustainable management of Lake Jipe wetland. For example, inappropriate farming practices 
on the upstream areas may pollute water and degrade fisheries resources on the downstream. 
Analyses that are confined within sectoral boundaries of one natural resource run the risk of 
misunderstanding linkages that affect sustainability of the natural resources systems individually 
and the social-ecological system as a whole.
Including cross-sectoral, cross-scale and actor diversities that exist in social-ecological systems 
also contributes to new theoretical schemes and knowledge on natural resources co-management. 
It will also have consequences for the recommendations on mechanisms and strategies that can be 
promoted and/or adopted for sustainable management of the multiple natural resources systems 
and the social-ecological system as a whole. In that sense, Lake Jipe wetland is a case study for 
developing new approaches to study complex social-ecological systems. In the following section, 
the thesis objectives and research questions will be given.
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1.4 Thesis objectives and research questions
At Lake Jipe, and also more widely in Tanzania, there appears to be a change from simplistic state 
centred natural resources management approaches to natural resources governance regimes in 
which multiple governmental agencies and community entities collaborate and interact in the 
management process. As these governance approaches evolve, there is a need to understand their 
roles and effects on the sustainable management of Lake Jipe social-ecological system. There has 
not been any study carried out on how interactions and collaborations between the diversity 
of social actors (both within the community and the government) and the various ecological 
resources (fisheries, land and water) impact on and affect natural resources management of the 
Lake Jipe. This thesis aims to fill this gap. In doing so this study challenges and extends the existing 
theoretical knowledge on natural resources governance, as well as providing recommendations for 
the further improvement of wetland (co-)management at Lake Jipe and more widely in Tanzania.
The central aim of this research is, therefore, to investigate co-management arrangements on 
multiple natural resources, involving multiple governmental and community entities for sustainable 
management of Lake Jipe social-ecological system. In order to achieve this central objective, this 
research addresses the following research questions:
1. How do government and community collaborate and interact in managing natural resources 
in livestock production, agriculture, and fisheries, and how do their interactions influence 
natural resources management?
2. What co-management arrangements emerge from interactions between governmental and 
community institutions and actors around livestock, agriculture and fisheries?
3. How do the different co-management arrangements relate, interact and influence one another, 
and what are the implications of their relationships and interactions on managing Lake Jipe 
social-ecological system as a whole?
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into six chapters.
Chapter two introduces the theoretical framework around which the thesis is based. Theories 
on co-management of natural resources between the government and the local community are 
used as a starting point to build a conceptual model for analyzing natural resource co-management 
at Lake Jipe. In this chapter, three concepts – namely arrangements, institutions, and actors – are 
used for analyzing co-management arrangements at Jipe social-ecological system. In addition, 
the institutional dimensions of co-management arrangements – empowerment, conflict, scale, 
participation, heterogeneity, property rights, and leadership – are reviewed. Following this chapter, 
an introduction on lake Jipe (the study area) including a methodology and data collection is given.
Chapter three provides an historical overview of the institutional changes in natural resources 
management in Tanzania. Different eras of natural resources use and management, and of 
interactions between governmental and community institutions and actors, are examined. These 
eras entail pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. This chapter also introduces the current 
government natural resources administrative structure in Tanzania.
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Chapters four, five and six present the three empirical cases of this thesis. Chapter four analyzes 
collaborations and interactions between and among the governmental and community institutions 
and actors in managing and mediating conflicts in fisheries management at Lake Jipe. Interactions 
among and between governmental actors and resident and non-residents fishers are analyzed. 
Consequently, this chapter identifies and evaluates co-management arrangement in fisheries 
management involving the governmental, community and hybrid institutions and actors.
Chapter five analyzes collaborations and interactions between and among the governmental, 
non-governmental, and community institutions and actors in the use of natural resources in 
agriculture. It highlights the collaboration of multiple and diverse institutions and actors in 
agricultural resource management and conflict mediation. This chapter likewise identifies and 
evaluates co-management arrangement emerging in the use of natural resources for agriculture.
Chapter six analyzes collaborations and interactions between and among governmental and 
community institutions and actors in the use of natural resources for livestock production. It 
highlights interactions between the ethnic institutions and actors and between these actors 
and the governmental institutions and actors in the use and management of pastoral resources. 
This chapter ends with identifying and evaluating co-management arrangements between the 
governmental and community institutions and actors in the management of natural resources 
in livestock production.
Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusions of this thesis. An answer to the question how 
governmental and community institutions and actors co-manage natural resources at Lake Jipe 
social-ecological system is given. First, the summary of findings from the three empirical cases 
is outlined, and then the three co-management arrangements are compared to unveil similarities 
and differences, collaborations and conflicts and incompatibilities in the use and management 
of natural resources at Lake Jipe. Finally, the conclusion is given highlighting the implications 
of the findings from Lake Jipe to natural resources management in Tanzania as a whole, and its 
contribution to co-management theory.
Chapter 2.  
Co-management of natural resources between the government 
and the local community
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to analyse natural resource management as a joint effort of the 
government and the local community at Lake Jipe in Tanzania. Specifically, it analyses relationships 
between the government and the local people in the management of natural resources for 
agricultural production, livestock production and fisheries management. The aim of this chapter is 
to develop a theoretical framework for the co-management of natural resources that is instrumental 
in analysing the interactions between multiple governmental entities and multiple community 
entities in the management of multiple natural resource systems in one social-ecological context, 
Lake Jipe. This chapter introduces the complexity of sustainably managing social-ecological systems 
and the role of co-management arrangements, institutions and actors.
Studies on the co-management of natural resources involving the government and the local 
community have been conducted in a simplistic fashion such that the government and the local 
people are viewed as single entities (Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997; Pomeroy, 1998; 
Pomeroy, Katon, & Harkes, 2001; Sen & Nielsen, 1996). In the same way, social-ecological systems 
have been regarded as one unit. In practice, the government is comprised of multiple agencies 
and the community of multiple actors; what looks like one system consists of various entities 
(various social-ecological systems within one system) (Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy, 1998; Singleton, 
2000). To conceptualise co-management as comprised of a unitary government and a unitary 
local community is increasingly becoming unrealistic. Co-management under such a simplistic 
conceptualisation falls short of genuine reflection and fails to address issues stemming from 
internal politics in the community due to the existence of different and sometimes contrasting 
interests associated with various user groups. By the same token, because the government is 
made of different agencies/units (e.g. agricultural, livestock, and fisheries), conceptualising the 
government as unitary is liable to cause a failure to accommodate contrasting interests and politics 
as arise in the interactions among these diverse government units. Similarly, if one regards a social-
ecological system as one unit, one is likely to misunderstand the diversities and complexities in 
social-ecological systems.
In this thesis, I am going to unpack the co-management arrangement into three parts whereby 
the government and local community relationships in the management of lake Jipe wetlands are 
studied in terms of agricultural production, livestock production and fisheries management.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2, an overview of the evolution of natural 
resources management is given. This is based on the rationale that co-management arrangements 
that exist today are a result of developments that have occurred in the field of natural resources 
management. It is, therefore, worthwhile to cultivate an evolutionary picture of natural resource 
management. In the discussion on the evolution of natural resources management, three approaches 
are discussed: classical, neo-liberal and populist approaches. Because this thesis addresses the co-
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management of natural resources between the government and the local people – in other words, 
relationships between the two levels of management of natural resources – the focus is on the 
relationships between the government and the local people. Specifically, in these approaches, I 
look at how the two levels have participated in resource management and how the government 
relates the local community to its natural resources (environment) and vice versa. I also review the 
strengths and weaknesses surrounding these approaches to the management of natural resources. 
Section 2.3 introduces the rationale for co-management arrangements involving the governmental 
and community levels. In this section, conflict as one of main issues surrounding resource co-
management is introduced. Section 2.4 defines analytical concepts, namely arrangements, 
institutions, actors and co-management relevant for analysing the collaborative management of 
natural resources in the Lake Jipe social-ecological environment. In section 2.5, I use the following 
institutional dimensions – empowerment, conflict, scale, participation, heterogeneity, property 
rights, and leadership – to analyse the role of institutions in governing the relevant actors in the co-
management of natural resources. This section concludes by introducing the complexity of the lake 
Jipe social ecological system whereby one system demands three co-management arrangements.
2.2 Evolution of natural resources management
Until colonial times, common pool management systems in traditional communities existed. 
The management of natural resources was based on clan-oriented arrangements. Rights, rules, 
conventions, obligations and sanctions accompanied these traditional management systems 
(Adjewodah & Beier, 2004; Opoku-Ankomah, Ampomah, & Somé, 2006). In Africa, for example, 
natural resources such as land were held under the tutelage and stewardship of chiefs and clan 
leaders (Gwebu, 2001). The coming of colonialism marked the onset of the replacement of the 
traditional management systems (Guha, 1997). This section will review three sets of theories 
about how natural resource management has evolved since colonial times. These are the classic 
approaches, neo-liberal approaches, and populist approaches. The neo-liberal and populist 
approaches emerged parallel to each other.
2.2.1 Classical approach
The classic approach dominated from the 1950s to the 1970s. It is a top-down approach related 
to environmental management and rural development. It was developed through government-
sponsored scientific institutions and was applied through extension agents (Biot, Blaikie, Jackson, 
& Palmer-Jones, 1995; Blaikie 1996; Blaikie, Brown, Stocking, Tang, Dixon, & Sillitoe, 1997). The 
central thesis of this approach is that the use of common property by the local people results in 
the tragedy of commons (Hardin, 1968). In the following paragraphs, this approach is analysed 
to consider how local people participated in natural resource management under its dominion 
and what the relationships between the government and the local people were like. In addition, 
critiques of the classic approach will be revealed.
The classic approach views the local people as a threat to the environment. Their institutions, 
traditions, rules and norms are seen as destructive to the environment because they are non-
scientific, superstitious and illogical, and they should therefore be replaced by formal institutions. 
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At odds with conservation objectives, local people aim at maximising individual gains at the 
expense of the environment. They should be instructed by the government through technological 
and policy interventions whereby encouragement, persuasive and coercive means are employed 
to compel them to comply with the interventions (Biot et al., 1995; Blaikie, 1996; Blaikie et al., 
1997). In other words, from the classic perspective, the view exists that sustainable natural resource 
management will be achieved through the nationalisation and privatisation of the resource, not 
via community-based management regimes.
The classic approach, furthermore, reduces local people to environmentally irrational beings. 
Although these individuals degrade the environment, they do not identify its problems. Those 
who identify the environmental problems are instead the external agents (government, donors 
and researchers), and the solutions come from these external agents, whereas the local people are 
required to cooperate by implementing solutions. In other words, local knowledge is not recognised. 
Mechanisms for ensuring the cooperation of the local people range from encouragement to 
persuasion and the use of threats (Pelosikoti, 2003). The participation of local people in natural 
resource management therefore, according to the classic view, must be confined to implementing 
whatever programs the government experts tell them to.
Several critiques exist of the classic approach. Ostrom and colleagues (1999) assert that although 
the tragedy of commons undoubtedly occurs in some areas, generalisations should be avoided. 
There are cases wherein local people co-exist with natural resources for thousands of years and 
develop sustainable institutions for governing the commons. These authors have reported empirical 
cases wherein grazing lands under the intervention of the state and private management regimes 
(e.g. in China and Russia) were more degraded than grazing management regimes under a group 
of pastoralists (e.g. in Mongolia).
Ostrom (1990) posits that individuals engaged in collective action have their own mechanisms 
and institutional arrangements that have to be considered when a top-down model is imposed 
on a given resource area. The local institutional arrangements, she argues, are instrumental to 
the sound management of the resources, and a failure of collective management options occurs 
when an externally imposed intervention fails to consider these institutions. According to Ostrom, 
theoretically devised models cannot be successful in practice (in the ‘real world’) if they are 
incompatible with local institutional arrangements. In other words, Ostrom implies that new 
institutional arrangements must build on the existing institutional arrangements to be successful. 
However, building on and providing support to local institutions is not always a guarantee for 
attaining resource management objectives. There are cases where, despite the decentralisation of 
decision-making from the government to the local communities and institutions, the expected 
resource sustainability objectives have not been attained (Agrawal, 2001). This has been due to the 
existence of internal politics in a largely heterogeneous community (Le, 2004; Leach, Mearns, & 
Scoones, 1999). Other authors criticise Ostrom’s view of local institutions as being focused more 
on the internal aspects of the community and as not looking at external factors that may compel 
the community to act individually at the expense of others. Such situations include extended 
crises that may make the individuals in question adopt selfish strategies to preserve future income 
(Baland & Platteau, 1996).
Sekhar (1999) asserts that the generalisations by proponents of the classic approach that local 
institutions degrade natural resources are not always true. Citing empirical cases from India, he 
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claims that traditional institutions regulate resource use and co-exist with natural resources. Sekhar 
found that traditional institutions attach resource use to social authority and beliefs, about which 
it is believed that a lack of compliance results in misfortune. Sekhar also asserts that informal 
institutions that control resource use become more powerful based on the scarcity of a particular 
species in an ecosystem. For example, the author tells how some valuable scarce tree species 
(Dalbergia sisoo and Dendrocalamus strictus) are strictly protected by the imposition of higher 
fines by the local people. This case indicates an integration of informal institutions (restrictions) 
and market incentives (fines) to avoid the over-exploitation of endangered resources. However, 
the author reports that when the government intervenes, the resources become degraded. This, he 
claims, is because the power of traditional institutions is undermined by government intervention.
Another criticism has to do with the assertion that top-down government intervention is the 
solution to the unsustainable management of natural resources. Ostrom (1990) asserts that there are 
higher costs incurred by the government in enforcing compliance with sustainable natural resource 
practices than noted in the simplistic generalisations of the classic approach. In other words, the 
government does not have adequate resources (financial or human) to adequately supervise and 
enforce top-down natural resource management regimes. However, despite this higher transaction 
cost, some scholars (e.g. Uphoff, 1998) have shown that successful local management systems are 
usually not operating in isolation from other governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
organisations. In other words, the issue of transaction cost does not rule out the limited capacity 
of local institutions to sustain sound natural resource management alone.
Other scholars (e.g. Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990) claim that common property 
regimes are in fact instrumental in controlling access to and use of resources. They assert that 
the tragedy of the commons occurs after former communal property rights are undermined and 
changed to allow open access. Examples of undermining factors, according to these authors, are 
colonialism, overpopulation, changes in technology, and changes in the economy, such as new 
market pressures.
Along with the above critiques, in practice, there have been conflicts between the government 
and the local people over natural resource management. For example, Girot, Weitzner, and Borrás 
(1998) explain how in Costa Rica, a country of peace as they call it, the top-down management 
regimes resulted in conflict between the people and the government when local people resisted 
relocation from the national park. Similarly, experience has indicated that top-down natural 
resource management policies cannot successfully manage natural resources on their own. 
External developments, including population growth, changes in consumption patterns, and 
globalisation, which have affected the culture and markets, have rendered classic approaches 
insufficient. Under these influences, government policies need input from other stakeholders who 
may have different interests, have different perceptions, and control different types of resources. 
The top-down government policies thus have become inadequate and need to accommodate 
other perspectives and stakeholders in policy-planning processes (Fresco et al., 2005). This has 
triggered and mobilised the consideration of alternative natural resource management approaches. 
Neo-liberal and populist approaches have thus emerged.
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2.2.2 Neo-liberal approach
The neo-liberal approach, developed by the World Bank (World Bank, 1990-1995) among 
others, stressed a shift from the state-controlled management of natural resources to giving 
more power to the market (through deregulation) to create incentives for the conservation of 
the environment. Such incentives include subsidies, taxes, a market-like pricing system and the 
creation of private property right systems (Biot et al., 1995). In the following paragraphs, I analyse 
how the community partakes in natural resource management under a neo-liberal approach and 
consider the government and community relationships in contexts of economic liberalisation. 
As before, critiques of this approach will also be discussed.
The neo-liberal approach holds that the participation of the local people in biodiversity 
conservation is regulated by economic incentives such as markets, policies and institutions (Adger, 
2001). This includes the pricing of externalities resulting from the unsustainable human use and 
management of the environment. Local people are viewed as economically rational beings, each 
driven by a desire to maximise profit from the use of natural resources (Post & Snel, 2003). Local 
institutions are important insofar as they provide information that is used as a basis for making 
decisions regarding natural resource use and management. The market logic creates economic 
incentives such as taxes, subsidies, and prices. When these instruments fail, regulations are imposed 
to govern the sustainable exploitation of natural resources (ibid.).
Following the development of this approach, contrasting empirical evidence has been reported. 
On the one hand, some studies reported a constructive and important role for the market in 
resource management, which might, for example, formalise environmentally friendly traditional 
institutions or invent new ones where they did not previously exist (Gemma, 2001). Other scholars 
(Nasi et al., 2008) have indicated that in some countries, such as Malaysia, degraded resources are 
being restored through the use of regulations, publicity and education programs, the control of 
external encroachment, allowing subsistence use of natural resources and monitoring markets, 
shops and restaurants to control illegal unsustainable exploitation. This has indicated that in some 
cases, the market approach not only can control unsustainable exploitation but also can sustain 
the subsistence use of resources on the part of local users.
In contrast, other scholars (e.g. P. Ehrlich & A. Ehrlich, 1991) have reported negative influences 
of the market on natural resources. According to them, the advancement and increase of market 
channels goes hand-in-hand with the advancement of roads and transport networks linking 
and integrating the local community into larger market systems, which results in resource and 
environmental degradation (Chomitz, 1995; Nilsson & Segnestam, 2001; Young, 1994). They 
assert that as market forces become firmly established, local users are motivated to harvest much 
greater quantities of the resources because they are now exploiting resources for cash (Nilsson & 
Segnestam, 2001; Stocks, 1987) and that therefore, the combined effects due to subsistence and 
market forces hasten environmental degradation. Moreover, the market forces create and maintain 
inequalities among people whereby rich people benefit from the use of natural resources more 
than do poor people. This marginalises the poor, with further resource degradation as a result 
(D. Brown, 2003). The poor may become displaced from productive resources (e.g. land), and 
thus move to marginal fragile areas, consequently extending and exacerbating environmental 
degradation (Barbier, 1997).
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Conflicts have also been experienced in the implementation of the neo-liberal approach. Some 
researchers have reported the emanation of conflicts in the privatisation of natural resources or the 
communally or publicly owned environmental goods and services. Frakin (2001) claims that the 
formalisation of private property rights interferes with communal resource tenure arrangements. 
Such formalisation, he asserts, may create classes within the community because some individuals 
may successfully acquire a property and convert it to private investments while others may become 
propertyless. Dismantling the communal ownership arrangements transforms a social setting into 
an arena of conflict between the haves and have-nots (Kanyongolo, 2005). Besides, conflicts may 
occur not only among resource users but also between the government and resource users. Such 
can be the case when the privatisation of a natural resource results in restricted access to some 
environmental goods and services by local users (Spronk & Webber, 2007).
Several criticisms of the neo-liberal approach exist. First, it reduces local people to economically 
rational entities (Pelosikoti, 2003). The neo-liberal approach sees market-based incentives as 
ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources. That is to say, when there is a good 
market for agricultural produce, for example, the local people will be motivated to adopt sustainable 
production technologies. In other words, local people are always striving to attain maximum 
economic gains at the expense of the environment. This approach highlights that there are already 
sustainable technological options but that a clear understanding is required of disincentives to 
their adoption as seen by the local people. Additionally, this approach is criticised for its unclear 
definition of the best technological options (Blaikie et al., 1997). Second, the neo-liberal approach 
is criticised for the irrelevance of its economic incentives to the local people. The criticism is built 
on two aspects. On the one hand, there is a mismatch in benefits between the local people and 
conservationists despite the fact that the former have had the primary interaction with natural 
resources for many years. On the other hand, the neo-liberal approaches are reinventing top-
down approaches to natural resources management and are not really constructed upon norms 
of democratic participation (K. Brown, 2003).
2.2.3 Populist approaches
Populist approaches emerged in the 1980s in parallel with market approaches and following 
the failure of top-down natural resource management regimes. It integrates development and 
conservation objectives to attain sustainable development (Kumar, 2005). This concept evolved 
following the Brundtland Commission (WCED, 1987) and the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992), which argued for the integration of nature 
conservation with human needs. In other words, the approach advocates the active involvement 
and empowerment of local communities as a pre-requisite for sustainable development and natural 
resource management. The emergence of this approach was influenced by the existence of empirical 
evidence indicating that traditional resource management systems in common property regimes 
have contributed to protecting natural resources from being over-exploited and have played a 
significant role in biodiversity conservation (Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990).
Contrary to classic and neo-liberal approaches, the populist approach advocates for bottom-up 
natural resources management and values local institutions as an important element of sustainable 
natural resource management. These approaches regard local people as rational beings not only 
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from an economic point of view but also from an environmental perspective. They advocate 
bottom-up participatory planning for natural resource management (Post & Snel, 2003). The 
emphasis is on the empowerment and participation of the local people as key to sustainable 
development and conservation (Shukla, 2004). Populist approaches emphasise rights, justice, self-
determination and empowerment as crucial for attaining sustainable or long-term environmental 
management. They see local people as an appropriate focus and level for sustainable environmental 
conservation efforts (Adger, Brown, & Tompkins, 2005).
However, populist approaches are overly optimistic, providing a simplistic view of the 
community, and therefore mask the reality of the community. It is assumed that when natural 
resource initiatives fall under jurisdiction of the local community, their success is guaranteed 
(Cheong, 2004). The capacity of the local people to use natural resources on a sustainable basis 
is exaggerated (Spinage, 1998). There is also an over-simplified idea that the degradation of the 
environment by local industry is a result of the marginalisation of local people by powerful 
political, social and economic forces outside the community (Adger, 1999). Evidence nonetheless 
exists on initiatives that have failed despite their being community-based (Agarwal, 2001; Fajber, 
2005). This has led to thinking among theorists regarding the reasons for the failure of this widely 
promoted and accepted approach.
Empirical research has uncovered that the community is made up of groups of heterogeneous 
people with different interests and goals. This diversity has an impact on decision-making regarding 
natural resource management (Agarwal, 2001; Cornwall, 2000; Fajber, 2005). Such relations and 
heterogeneity among social groups are never static but instead keep on changing on both spatial 
and temporal dimensions, and they do not end at the community level but instead scale down to 
an individual household level (Cornwall, 2000). Cheong (2004) asserts that in the community, 
there are diverse groups with diverse interests and dynamic internal politics such that sometimes, 
especially in times of crisis, the community needs external support and resources. Thus, they have 
to create linkages with external institutions and actors. Biot and colleagues (1995) further argue 
that heterogeneity exists even in the knowledge possessed by social groups and individuals based 
on gender, occupation, age, social status and class. The result of this heterogeneity is conflict, 
which requires attention in natural resource management.
The populist approaches have also failed to reflect the diversity of actors with cross-scale 
relationships. Although local people are heterogeneous in various respects, such as with regard to 
income, goals, interests, ethnicity, social status etc. (and of course these elements determine the 
power relations among them and the environment), populist advocates ignore these cross-linkages 
at the level of the community (McNab, 2004; Peet & Watts 1996). Additionally, government-
community interaction, which can be useful in mediating negative linkages among resource users, 
is viewed as an avenue for marginalising the resource users and disrupting their alleged positive 
relationships with the ecosystem (Belsky, 1999). Populist proponents, therefore, suggest less 
interference by the government. This is supposed to give the people autonomy by allowing them 
to apply their local experience, wisdom, and knowledge in their interactions with the environment 
(Ascher, 1995; Douglas, 1992; Western & Wright, 1994).
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2.2.4 Strengths and weakness of classical, neo-liberal and populist approaches
The three approaches have potential and pitfalls. As regards potential, they all have to do with 
natural resources degradation and therefore are relevant in addressing environmental problems, 
although they differ in identifying the cause of environmental problems. While the classical 
approaches view local people and institutions as the source of environmental degradation, the neo-
liberal approaches assert that the problem of environmental degradation is the absence of effective 
economic incentives. On the other side, populist approaches view environmental degradation as 
resulting from interference in sound local institutions on the part of the government and private 
institutions.
All three approaches propose ways of addressing these problems, although the proposed 
solutions differ. The classic approach proposes top-down technological interventions and the 
nationalisation and privatisation of management initiatives as a solution to natural resource 
degradation – i.e. the exclusion of local people and institutions from management regimes. On 
the other hand, the neo-liberal approach considers the participation of the local people in natural 
resource management through the creation of market incentives. In other words, this approach 
reduces local people to economically rational actors. The populist approach sees the solution to 
environmental degradation as giving resource users and institutions a central role in environmental 
and natural resource management.
The three approaches also have various weaknesses. Classic approaches are limited in terms 
of human and financial resources, rendering the government incapable of adequately combating 
environmental degradation and ensuring socio-economic benefits for its people. Neo-liberal 
approaches, despite the creation of economic incentives for motivating the conservation of natural 
resources, are viewed as a top-down approach. The incentives advocated in these approaches are 
also perceived as both inadequate for and also perhaps irrelevant to the community perspective. 
The populist approach is too quick to assert that the community can manage natural resources on 
its own in a sustainable way. Research has shown that this is not always the case; some resources 
have been undermined and degraded despite the programs’ being community-centred.
The implementation of the three approaches has entailed different empirical outcomes as I 
have seen in the review above. While the approaches have positive outcomes in some places, they 
have negative consequences in other places. This implies that we cannot generalise regarding 
the success or failure of these approaches for all environmental contexts. In situations in which 
both state-centred and community-centred management regimes have not yielded the expected 
outcomes, this has led to the reformulation of approaches that integrate the community and the 
government in natural resource management. In other words, co-management approaches result 
from situations in which separate natural resource management regimes under the government 
(Gehab & Crean, 2000; Hara, Donda, & Njaya, 2002) and the community (Hachongela, Jackson, 
& Sen, 1998; Kebe, 1998) have not yielded the expected outcomes. One such obstacle is conflict 
within and between the government and the community. With co-management approaches, it is 
assumed that the strengths of each institutional actor (the government and the local community) 
complement the weaknesses of the others (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). There is, therefore, a need 
to revisit natural resource management arrangements, institutions and actors, to understand how 
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new interactions have been created. The next section now addresses issues of co-management 
and conflict.
2.3 Co-management between the government and local community
In this section, I explain the essence of co-management. A brief definition of co-management 
according to the co-management literature is given, followed by reasons for the establishment of 
co-management arrangements involving governmental and community institutions and actors. 
The critical issue highlighted in this respect is the mediation of conflicts among resource users 
in natural resource management.
For some, co-management is the sharing of power and responsibilities between the government 
and the local people (Kumar, 2005; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). For others, it may be that the 
government holds the power (decision-making) but shares management functions, entitlements 
and responsibilities among users of natural resources in a given area (Borrini-Feyerabend, Farvar, 
Nguinguiri, & Ndangang, 2000). Yet for other authors (e.g. Nielsen & Vedsmand, 1999; Sen & 
Nielsen, 1996) co-management is the sharing of responsibilities only between the government and 
the community. Co-management can also take the form of Pinkerton’s horizontal folk-managed 
systems and vertical contracting out of the state management powers model (Pinkerton, 1994). In 
this case, there is a horizontal continuum of government and community management systems. 
On one side of the continuum is a near-total state management system, whereas on the other 
side of the continuum is near-total self-management system. At the same time, as the vertical 
model advocates, the government may award rights at the community level (Pinkerton, 1994). In 
principle, therefore, co-management is the collaboration between the government and the people, 
where they may share powers, responsibilities, management functions, rights and entitlements.
Government and community natural resource management systems rarely adequately act 
alone to attain a successful natural resource management initiative. According to Gibbons (1999), 
the top-down natural resource management system is blunt and insensitive to the opportunities 
and constraints of local situations. On the other side, Cash et al. (2006) assert that the bottom-
up approach is insensitive to the contribution of actions of the local people taken to address 
large-scale environmental problems. These authors agree that neither the government nor the 
community can resolve natural resource management problems alone. One strategy for resolving 
these problems, they argue, might be the integration of the two systems – i.e. the government and 
the community. In other words, solutions can be attained through the co-management of natural 
resources involving the government and the community arrangements, institutions and actors.
Problems or challenges that exist in government or community natural resource management 
systems create driving forces for co-management. Adger et al. (2005) claim that incentives must 
be created to facilitate the creation of co-management arrangements. The authors argue that the 
local community may enter in a co-management arrangement when, for example, there exist 
historically marginalising power relations among users of natural resources. The community may 
feel marginalised by external resource users and may anticipate that forming a co-management 
agreement with the government may help in protecting its interests.
Co-management may also reduce the burden on individual actors. The community may take 
on roles formerly played by the government (e.g. the monitoring of sustainable resource use, the 
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appropriate use of harvesting gear, etc.). The government may retain the responsibility of creating 
a favourable environment for enacting the roles entrusted to the community. Such facilitative 
functions of the state could include creating conducive legislative, administrative and judiciary 
contexts (Buttel, 1998). In some cases, community instruments for conflict management might 
be weak, partial, or unable to address and manage situations with high levels of conflict. In these 
cases, the government may play an important role in fulfilling those functions that the community 
cannot (Pomeroy et al., 2001). Furthermore, the government may protect wider public goods 
such as watersheds, biodiversity and carbon sinks, as well as facilitating and regulating private 
activities (Shackleton et al., 2002).
According to Jentoft (2004), the integration of the government with the community in the 
management of natural resources is important. He argues that for any natural resource, there are 
a web of social interactions between the immediate social community around that resource and 
other stakeholders away from that area. The external stakeholders, in one way or another, depend 
on the same resource because the resource is important for the immediate community’s interests 
as well as those of the general public. The government should therefore stand for the interests of 
the general public. This, in turn, may justify the integration of the government in natural resource 
management arrangements as an alternative to leaving the community on its own to manage a 
particular natural resource.
The problem in natural resource management may be not just the degradation of natural 
resources but also the existence of conflicts among resource users. The term conflict may have 
different meanings depending on the context. In the context of natural resource management, 
conflict can be defined as a situation wherein two or more social entities or parties have incompatible 
purposes and interests and, therefore, hostile attitudes emerge or one party takes action that may 
undermine the ability of another party to address its interests and purposes (Mitchell, 1981).
Conflict may occur because of diverse behaviour, preferences, interests, and objectives among 
institutional actors (Kumar & Kant, 2007). Conflict may also stem from resource use interactions 
in which one or more users feel discontent, marginalised or unfairly treated (Christie, Buhat, 
Garces, & White, 2003a). In other words, heterogeneity in various respects may be the main cause 
of the emergence of conflict between institutional actors. In other cases, conflict occurs because 
of a weak or absent government regulatory authority (Isaac, Ruffino, & McGrath, 1998). Similarly, 
conflict may result from the violation of governing institutional arrangements (Pomeroy et al., 
2001). This conflict can cause personal violence and sometimes even armed confrontation among 
the resources users, especially when the resource involves different user categories delineated by 
geographic areas: for example, users who reside within a certain resource boundary versus outside 
users (Pomeroy et al., 2001; Isaac et al., 1998). Conflict may render unsuccessful concerted efforts 
at sustainable use of natural resource. Individual governmental and community institutions and 
actors may fail to resolve or mediate these conflict situations. Such conflict is a primary conflict 
because it occurs before co-management arrangements are devised. Co-management strategies 
involving the government and the community may be formulated to collaboratively resolve conflict 
(Hachongela et al., 1998; Jackson, Muriritirwa, Nyakahadzoi, & Sen, 1998; Kebe, 1998; Sowman, 
Beaumont, Bergh, Baharaj, & Salo 1998).
However, there is a chance of introducing conflicts while implementing co-management 
arrangements as well. This kind of conflict can be deemed a secondary conflict. Singleton (2000) 
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argues that when co-management arrangements are implemented, conflicts may emerge not only 
between the government and the community but also within and between the community users. 
She posits that although co-management in most cases constructs institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms for resolving conflicts, it might result in strengthening existing conflicts and 
even creating new ones. The newly established or modified institutional arrangements in co-
management, she argues, may marginalise some actors, especially less powerful groups or 
individuals in the community. Pomeroy et al. (2001) assert that when new institutional frameworks 
are installed, it takes time for them to become adapted to a given community, and that during this 
transition, conflicts may persist or emerge in the community. Therefore, dependable mechanisms 
for mediating potential conflicts that are acceptable to the parties involved must be available 
during this transition.
Conflict, therefore, is one of the issues that may influence the formation of co-management 
arrangements involving government and community institutions as well as actors to mediate 
such conflicts and improve sustainable and collaborative natural resource management. In such a 
situation, various governmental/community and formal/informal institutions and actors partake 
in the management of natural resources in a social-ecological environment. Because this thesis 
analyses co-management entailing multiple governmental and community entities in one social-
ecological system, some powerful tools – namely, arrangements, institutions and actors – are 
needed to analyse the interactions among these entities. In the next section, these tools will be 
defined.
2.4 Concepts for analysing co-management of natural resources
This section defines the concepts that are used in analysing co-management arrangements involving 
multiple government entities and multiple community entities in the management of multiple 
natural resource systems as part of the Lake Jipe social-ecological system. These concepts are co-
management, arrangements, institutions, and actors (Figure 2.1).
I use the following concepts – arrangements, institutions and actors – to analyse co-management 
arrangements in the Lake Jipe social-ecological system. Natural resource management systems are 
made up of various institutions that govern and mediate the practices of actors that occur within 
some arrangements, and therefore, an analysis of co-management at Lake Jipe cannot omit them. 
While these concepts regularly emerge in co-management literature, they are often confused 
with one another. In this thesis, however, these concepts are used for analysing co-management 
arrangements, and through this analysis a clear definition of these concepts will be presented.
Co-management in this thesis implies a collaboration involving formal/informal, and 
government/community institutions in which governmental and non-governmental actors 
collaborate in managing natural resources and mediating conflicts around natural resource 
management.
A co-management arrangement implies a sectoral management system (e.g. agriculture, 
livestock or fisheries). Within the arrangement, multiple governmental/community and formal/
informal institutions govern the practices of governmental and community actors in managing 
natural resources and mediating conflicts that emerge in the process. In some arrangements, non- 
governmental actors (NGO) may link and build up the capacity of government and community 
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actors. These non-governmental actors may have bridging functions horizontally at the community 
level and vertically between the government and the community institutions to enable them to 
implement sustainable management decisions and practices.
Institutions can have multiple and sometimes contrasting definitions according to the context in 
which they are implied. According to North, institutions are a ‘set of rules, compliance procedures, 
and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals’ 
(North, 1981: pp. 201-202 cited in Feeny, 1988, p. 171). Ostrom (1992) defines institutions as a 
set of rules specifically used by a set of individuals to organise repetitive or routine activities that 
produce outcomes that affect these individuals and others. North (1993) also sees institutions 
as constraints the humans devise to structure or govern their relationships. These constraints 
are formal (e.g. rules, laws and constitutions) and informal (e.g. norms, conventions, and self-
governing codes), and they include implementation and enforcement characteristics. Peters 
(1999) defines institutions as a collection of values, rules and repetitive actions that are devised 
to implement and enforce those values.
In this thesis, institutions are defined as rules, norms, conventions, and customs governing 
and linking the practices and decisions of users and enforcers of natural resource management. 
The institutions in this context can be formal, informal and hybrid (co-management) institutions. 
A formal institution implies rules, laws, and regulations devised and imposed by the government 
(national, regional, and/or local) for governing the management of natural resources at the 
community level. On the other hand, an informal institution implies unwritten rules, customs, 
conventions, norms, etc. that govern resource use practices and relevant social relations among the 
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Figure 2.1. Analytical concepts for analysing co-management of natural resources in Jipe social-
ecological environment.
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resource users. A co-management institution implies the integration of formal and informal rules 
and/or government and community actors. This also applies to resource management committees 
that are made up of government and community actors but governed by formal governmental 
rules, committees made of community actors but governed by formal governmental rules, and 
committees made of governmental and community actors and governed through the integration 
of formal and informal rules.
Actors in this thesis are defined as individuals and organisations of individuals (e.g. farmers’ 
groups) implementing various natural resource use practices and/or involved in management 
practices. Actors therefore include governmental staff at various levels – i.e. district/local and 
farmers, livestock keepers and fishers, as well as their organisations – interacting and intervening 
at various stages in the resource use process. Actors also refer to non-governmental organisations 
that undertake the role of building the capacity of governmental and community actors in 
the management of natural resources. I view them as actors that link the community and the 
government and build the capacity of co-management institutions in the enforcement of sustainable 
natural resource management rules and practices.
Institutions play an important role in governing the management of natural resources. In the 
next section, some institutional dimensions will be used to elaborate on the role of institutions 
in natural resource management.
2.5 Institutional dimensions and their role in natural resource management
With regard to natural resource management in Tanzania, some institutional dimensions are 
important to consider if one is to better understand the institutions and their roles in the co-
management of natural resources. These dimensions include empowerment, scale, participation, 
heterogeneity, property rights, and leadership (Figure 2.2). In this section, I review the literature 
on the impact of these institutional dimensions on natural resource management.
2.5.1 Empowerment
Empowerment can have various definitions in the context of natural resource management. 
Nielsen et al. (2004) define co-management as a way of providing people, as natural resource users, 
with a chance to influence their own future, cope with external impacts, compete in the use and 
management of natural resources, and address other issues related to natural resource. It gives an 
individual the ability to influence and change events, courses of action, and outcomes in his or her 
life. Empowerment occurs through coping and adapting to a given situation or environment based 
on flexible responses to various influences (Raik, 2002). In other words, empowerment enables 
the involvement of some institutions that may enable actors to positively influence sustainable 
natural resource management.
Empowerment and co-management are interdependent and reinforce each other. Raik (2002) 
terms co-management a cyclical situation in which the partners develop new skills, institutions 
and behaviours throughout the process, which results in the empowerment of the participants as 
individuals and as a community. In turn, when the acquired knowledge and skills are reinforced 
through practices, co-management is further enhanced. Empowerment has several benefits for 
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co-management. First, through empowerment, some institutions may evolve, which may reduce 
the marginalisation of resource users. For example, Pomeroy et al. (2001) argue that empowerment 
builds the capacity of individuals and groups of resources users economically and politically. 
In an economic sense, empowerment transfers access and control of natural resources from a 
few individuals to the poor majority. Through this process, they assert, the community political 
capacity will be enhanced, which is important for balancing power relations for collaborative 
natural resource management. Second, the empowerment of individuals and groups is important 
for co-management. Through this process, access to information is enhanced, desire for change 
is promoted and enhanced, capacity for controlling and managing natural resources is improved 
and environmental consciousness may be raised.
Both the government and the local community benefit from empowerment. Empowerment is 
not a zero-sum game because the actors that participate in the process gain in one way or another. 
In this process, there is two-way shared learning among actors regarding how co-management can 
improve problems related to natural resources management (Jentoft, 2004). Nielsen et al. (2004) 
posit that both the government and the local communities need changes in both mindset and 
skills in order to cooperate and that empowerment can help in achieving the change. Whereas 
the government may need to outfit its staff with new skills for collaborative management, the 
community simultaneously may need to develop some capacity to effectively partake in co-
management. Empowerment makes individuals and groups/community influence each other. 
Usually, empowered individuals may influence others in the community through interpersonal 
interactions. In this process, the community will be undergoing empowerment. On the other 
hand, community empowerment enhances the empowerment of individuals over the course of 
the implementation of collaborative practices (Jentoft, 2004). This implies that empowerment can 
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Figure 2.2. Dimensions relevant for understanding the institutions governing the co-management 
of natural resources in Tanzania.
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equip the community and individuals in the community with skills and knowledge, which enables 
them to collaborate with the government in natural resource management. However, this does 
not mean that people and government institutional actors do not have knowledge at the outset 
of co-management arrangements.
Both the local people and the government have skills and knowledge related to various issues 
of natural resource management, and the potential exists for them to enhance these invaluable 
attributes and develop new ones. The enhancement of skills and knowledge can be operationalised 
through training to increase, among other things, the knowledge and information levels of those 
participating in co-management. Training can be offered on leadership, situational analysis 
and problem-solving, consensus-building, conflict management, etc. External agents, including 
government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), may provide this training. This 
training may help the community to become aware of the resource use problem, make decisions, 
and assist in preparing the management plans (Pomeroy et al., 2001). Because of the limited 
capacity of the government in terms of financial resources and limited human resources, and 
because of the declining power and role of the government in natural resource management, NGOs 
have become an important partner of the government in empowering actors in co-management 
initiatives. They play the role of intermediary.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are an important actor in enabling empowerment 
of those who participate in the co-management of natural resources (Nielsen et al., 2004). They 
organise, finance, link and empower the community for resource management. Additionally, 
NGOs mobilise local resource users to form groups (community organisation) through which 
they conduct capacity-building training (Thompson, Sultana, & Islam, 2003). They also provide 
credit and support and link local resource users to other microfinance institutions that offer 
low-interest credit (Thompson et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 1999). They create in local users an 
awareness of the impacts of unsustainable natural resource management practices, and they assist 
them in forming institutions and techniques for sustainable natural resource management (Lim, 
2006; Thompson et al., 1999).
NGOs can be activists for the interests and rights of vulnerable groups in the community. They 
can stand up for the rights of the marginalised and subordinated (e.g. women and the poor) and 
share the benefits resulting from the management of natural resources (Thompson et al., 1999). 
NGOs also play an advocacy role for grassroots communities, facilitating their acquisition of 
access rights, and enter into contracts with the government under specified conditions. They 
bridge a gap between the government and the local community, and they play an advocacy role 
for the community (McConney et al., 2004). Such advocacy roles include, for example, facilitating 
collateral-free credit for a poor section of a community (e.g. the landless and those with no assets) 
and enabling them to initiate environmental friendly projects. The goal is to institute an equitable 
co-management arrangement between the government and the local community for the purpose of 
natural resource management (Ahmed, Capistrano, & Hossain, 1997). An NGO can also advocate 
for the rights and interests of specific local users when, for example, the government wants to 
divert particular natural resources to powerful users (e.g. external users). In such a case, the NGOs 
may pay for a lease on behalf of the local resource users, a pre-requisite set by the government for 
granting use rights (Thompson et al., 1999). They may also train the community to understand 
rules, laws, procedures, etc., and the use of these instruments to defend their interests (Umar & 
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Kankiya, 2004). This training may give the community the ability to partake in negotiations with 
the government and other actors in a co-management process.
NGOs may facilitate the formation of co-management institutions in areas where such 
arrangements do not exist (Nielsen et al., 2004). This may be useful in reducing unsustainable 
natural resource exploitation practices. NGOs may do this by establishing links with local elites 
and leaders who are influential in mobilising sustainable natural resource management (Thompson 
et al., 1999). The NGOs thus may empower the local community to be able to manage natural 
resources in a sustainable way using locally available formal and informal institutions.
NGOs can create a partnership with the government that enhances the participation of the 
community in co-management arrangements (Nielsen et al., 2004). This partnership has resulted in 
decreased transaction costs associated with the management endeavour (Lélé, 2004). Additionally, 
where the government is limited financially and in terms of human resources and may thus 
have trouble reaching many local resource users, a partnership with an NGO helps make those 
connections (Ahmed et al., 1997, Lim, 2006). The government may establish a partnership with 
an NGO for various reasons. The action can be geared towards enhancing the involvement of the 
local users in the conservation and management of natural resources. The intention can be to 
use the NGO’s experience with and knowledge of human development, training, and diversifying 
sources of livelihood to relieve a specific resource from over-exploitation. It can also be used for 
capacity-building for local users who will thus be able to partake in decision-making regarding 
natural resource management with the government (Ahmed et al., 1997). However, when there 
is distrust, a partnership between a government and an NGO can be strained. The government 
may see the NGO as a threat to its socio-political position, whereas the NGO may regard the 
government as being inefficient and corrupt (Lim, 2006).
NGOs in some areas implement functions and roles that are supposed to be covered by the 
government, especially when the latter is short on funds (Pomeroy, 1995; Figueroa, 2002). However, 
because the NGOs are similarly constrained by lack of funds, in most cases they have failed to 
undertake their co-management responsibilities adequately. Although sometimes the government 
may administratively grant the NGOs the mandate to collect user fees to meet operational costs, 
the legal implementation of these decisions has been low. This becomes a limitation on the effective 
operationalisation of NGO responsibilities (Figueroa, 2002).
Although co-management can help ensure success through a partnership between the 
government and an NGO that empowers actors in co-management arrangements, it can sometimes 
also lead to negative consequences. Pomeroy et al. (2001) see a likelihood of power imbalances 
in the community because of empowerment programmes. They caution that if empowerment is 
not carefully implemented, it may create and enhance inequalities in the community, creating 
a redistribution of power elites. In such situations, instead of reducing social stratification and 
allowing people to collaborate, empowerment can result in the marginalisation of some resource 
users in the community. This may further result in conflicts within a community and between 
the community and the government.
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2.5.2 Scale
Scale is defined as a level of geographical resolution on which decisions are thought of, worked 
on or studied (Agnew, 1997). Scale is socially constructed, and therefore, besides implying size 
and levels, it also reflects social relations. In this case, it reflects a context of social empowerment, 
disempowerment and physical environment in which social processes takes place (Howitt, 1998; 
Marston, 2000). Cash et al. (2006) define scale as spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, and institutional 
dimensions that can be used to measure or study a given phenomenon or event. These authors 
argue that two or more scales can interact or link to influence certain phenomena; thus, the term 
‘cross-scale linkages’ is used to connote such a situation.
Co-management is an example of a system that forms cross-scale linkages. Linkages that result 
from co-management are crucial for providing information used by actors (who otherwise would 
lack that information) to deal with or to organise themselves to deal with certain challenges or 
problems (Lebel, Garden, & Imamura, 2006). Cross-scale links become especially important where 
governing institutions at various organisational levels are weak (Barrett, Brandon, Gibson, & 
Gjertsen, 2001). Even when local institutions are relatively strong, they cannot enforce sustainable 
natural resource management on their own because they are embedded within larger government 
institutions and legal and policy environments. These influence the local institutions and the 
resources under question (Berkes & Seixas, 2004).
Cross-scale interactions may involve horizontal levels or vertical and horizontal levels. 
Horizontal cross-scale interactions occur among local users, such as between upstream and 
downstream users of water resources or between departmental levels in a district. Vertical 
cross-scale interactions occur between the government – e.g. at the district level – and the local 
community (Senyk, 2005). This occurs, for example, when the district authorities are involved 
in resolving conflicts among resource users at the local level. Cross-scale interactions may also 
occur on a temporal scale: for example, during certain seasons of the year (Wilson, Ahmed, Siar, 
& Kanagaratnam, 2006).
Berkes (2002) asserts that strengthening the local institutions is not by itself a guarantee of 
effective co-management arrangements. For effective co-management to happen, reconciliation 
between government (top-down) and the community (bottom-up) institutional arrangements is 
needed. For this reconciliation to occur, Berkes claims, cross-scale management systems have to 
be devised. These management systems enable horizontal institutional linkages among user groups 
and geographical areas (Jentoft, 1999), and vertical institutional linkages across local users and 
political scales outside the local area (Downie & Fenge, 2003). It is quite often impossible to find 
a resource management system without cross-scale institutional linkages and drivers at different 
scales (Berkes, 2002). Berkes (2003) and Berkes and Seixas (2004) underscore the importance of 
cross-scale institutional linkages as a way of sharing information on the status of natural resources 
and constraints to natural resource management. For them, based on cross-scale linkages between 
the government and local resource users, strategies can be devised to ban unsustainable natural 
resource use practices such as the use of unsustainable fishing gear.
The cross-scale nature of natural resource management problems implies that cross-scale 
institutional solutions are necessary to solve them. In this sense, community institutions and actors 
alone cannot adequately resolve these problems. For the same reason, centralised (state-based) 
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institutional systems alone cannot adequately provide solutions to natural resource degradation 
issues (Carson & Berkes, 2003). Berkes (2002) asserts that even for centralised natural resource 
systems, the government needs the local people – for example, it might need the knowledge and 
skills of the local users. Thus, cross-scale institutional relationships are imperative for addressing 
complex situations by pooling together government and the community institutions and resources 
(e.g. knowledge, skills, and information-sharing) (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004). In this way, 
the scholars claim, problems beyond the capacity of one actor can be collaboratively resolved.
Other scientists view cross-scale institutional relationships between the government and the 
local community from a transaction-cost point of view (Carlsson & Berkes, 2003; Solecki, 2001; 
Wilson et al., 2006). According to these researchers, cross-scale interactions can lower transaction 
costs among local resource users. They also claim that co-management arrangements create webs 
of relations and links for providing information, addressing legal issues of resource use, and 
monitoring the use and practice of resource users. These links and webs can mediate property rights 
issues and hence may result in lowering transaction costs in the use of the resources. Likewise, the 
authors claim, a cross-scale institutional relationship can be useful in resolving conflicts among the 
users of the resource. This occurs when, for example, a government involved in a co-management 
arrangement controls the right to resource appropriation on the part of local users. The likelihood 
of conflict among resource users thus is minimised, and in turn, transaction costs in terms of the 
time that might have been used in resolving these conflicts are lowered.
Olson and Folke (2001) view cross-scale institutional interactions as platforms for assessing 
the effectiveness and feasibility of formal mechanisms and instruments devised by governmental 
actors but implemented by community actors. In such interactions, the local people, entrusted 
with the enforcement of resources management rules, may provide feedback regarding issues and 
challenges encountered in the enforcement process. This collaboration of the government and the 
community is an indication that the participation of various institutional actors is important for 
addressing resource management problems because individual actors cannot adequately resolve 
resource use and management challenges.
2.5.3 Participation
Cross-scale interactions imply the participation of various actors in negotiating or addressing 
issues related to natural resource use and management. In this section, I analyse the interplay 
between co-management and participation.
The participation of formal/informal actors and government/community actors in the 
management of natural resources is essential to the sustainable management of natural resources. 
The participation of these actors implies the existence of interplay between the formal and informal 
institutions that govern the practices and decisions of actors in natural resource management in 
a social-ecological system. The government and the community, besides enforcing sustainable 
management practices, may collaborate in formulating rules and regulations that may govern 
and improve their management practices and decisions. People around natural resource systems 
should participate in the formulation of resource use and management rules because changing 
rules governing resource management may influence their resource use patterns (Pomeroy, 2001).
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Community participation in rule formulation with the government and other stakeholders 
should not end with choosing the rules but should also extend to implementation and enforcement. 
Community participation in the enforcement of the rules gives them a chance to understand how 
the rules operate in practice and what issues may determine their feasibility. In addition, it increases 
the community’s awareness of the constraints of the existing rules. Thus, they will be in a position 
of proposing and participating in the revision of the rules to address these constraints (Isaac et 
al., 1998). The belief behind this assertion is that any policy, even if made by the government, can 
only become successful when the user community is involved in its implementation.
The interaction of formal and informal institutions in co-management arrangements is 
imperative for sustainable natural resource management (Lingard, Raharison, Rabakonandrianina, 
Rakotoarisoa, & Elmqvist, 2003; Pomeroy et al., 2001; Yasmi, Colfer, Yulian, Indriatmoko, & 
Heri, 2007; Wanitpradit, 2008; Naugran, 2002). Integrating informal (customary) institutional 
frameworks into formal institutional frameworks is especially important when these frameworks 
have to do with the goals, purposes and outcomes of a management initiative. In such collaboration, 
shared and adaptive learning will occur, which can lead to the building of social capital for 
sustainable resource management (Baland & Platteau, 1996; McCay, 2002; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 
2007; Schusler, Decker, & Pfeffer, 2003). The collaboration of formal and informal institutions 
can rescue a resource that both the government and the community would independently fail 
to protect. Naguran (2002), for example, highlights the case of the Ndumo Wetland Reserve 
in South Africa, where government institutions and local people formerly failed to address 
development and conservation objectives but have finally developed a partnership involving 
formal and informal institutions whereby formal and informal actors participate in negotiation 
and rights reformation to address the situation. Working on a similar case, Glaser & da Silva 
Oliveira (2004) report how a government-controlled mangrove system resulted in open access 
when the Brazilian government could not enforce sustainable management. However, when 
co-management was instituted, sustainable management was restored again. Conservation was 
possible when the formal governmental institutional mechanisms recognised and encouraged 
the participation of the community and integrated informal community rules, thereby creating 
collaborative institutional arrangements.
These cases indicate that it is difficult to attain conservation and development objectives where 
formal and informal institutions operate in isolation. The integration of the government and 
community institutions seems an appropriate option because the problems seem to demand the 
capacities of many independent institutional actors if they are to be properly addressed.
Collaboration between formal and informal institutions may be important for the enforcement 
of sustainable natural resource management initiatives. In order to be enforceable, the traditional 
natural resource enforcement rules may need to be supported by government institutions. In 
the same token, government institutions may be useful in enforcing rules when actors and users 
from outside the community are used in the management or use of natural resources and where 
the inside formal or community rules are not positioned so as to restrict the influence of external 
users. Therefore, participation may occur in terms of integrating formal and informal institutions 
to regulate the unsustainable use of natural resources (Pomeroy et al., 2001).
Informal and formal institutions share jurisdiction in natural resource management. Some 
scholars (e.g. Wanitpradit, 2008) claim that the introduction of a co-management arrangement 
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creates cooperative natural resource management between the state and informal management 
regimes. In the integrated arrangement, some responsibilities may be shared, while others may 
remain under informal or formal jurisdiction. Leaders for co-management institutions may be 
selected based on their awareness and knowledge of governing institutions, including formal 
rules like policies and laws or custom-based institutions like rituals, customary rules, conflict 
management institutions under clan and kinship systems. Informal institutions can be a source 
of useful traditional skills, knowledge and experience in a co-management system (Carter, 2008).
Spielmann and Unger (2000) assert that the wisdom, patience, and experience of elders can 
be integrated with formal knowledge to improve decision-making and enhance the success of 
co-management. In some cases, however, co-management can erode traditional institutions that 
existed before its instigation (Langard et al., 2003; Njaya, Donda, & Hara., 1999). The power and 
influence of traditional leaders may be eroded. Some scholars (e.g. Thomson & Gray 2007) assert 
that the superimposition of a resource management policy by the government on the community 
without consideration of existing management systems and rights in the local area ultimately 
undermines useful local institutional arrangements and marginalises poor people. The erosion 
of the power of informal institutions, nonetheless, may have positive or negative implications. 
If the informal institutions were unjust, unfair, and discriminative, such that some individuals 
accumulated power and resources in as selfish way, their erosion might contribute to creating 
equitable community. However, the erosion of good institutions might render co-management 
ineffective (Njaya et al., 1999).
This indicates how complex the interplay of informal/formal and governmental/community co-
management arrangements, institutions and actors in a social-ecological system can be. Whereas 
one institutional actor can assist in reducing or eliminating undesirable elements, consequences 
and weakness as related to another institutional actor, the desirable and useful attributes of one 
institutional actor can also be undermined and eroded by the other.
Governmental and community actors may actively participate in the co-management of 
natural resources when trust builds among them (Taiepa et al., 1997). Trust involves the mutual 
recognition of the learning patterns of cultures participating in co-management (Kendrick, 2003). 
Trust is a mutual process that can enable the involved parties to develop solutions to problems 
that are difficult for one institutional actor to solve (Pomeroy et al., 2001). Co-management may 
enhance trust-building among the participating actors and stakeholders. The government (using 
its research agencies) and the users of a particular natural resource may perform joint action 
to investigate the endangerment of a species or the impact of the use of certain harvesting gear 
on the sustainability of the resource (Kaplain & McCay 2004). This may enhance trust between 
the government and the users of resources through the sharing of mutually important problem 
investigation and solution implementation processes.
However, the development of trust in co-management may take time. In some cases, the 
resource users might not trust the government, thus requiring time to develop trust through the 
creation of platforms for discussion and dialogue among the partners that allow open, frequent 
and ongoing communication and dialogue (Pomeroy et al., 2001; Taipea et al., 1997). In these 
dialogues, important aspects such as power-sharing, commitments, and benefit- and cost-sharing 
should be discussed, while accountability and enforcement mechanisms should be clearly defined. 
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There should also be discussion of mechanisms for enforcing agreements and of sanctions to be 
imposed for non-compliance (Pomeroy et al., 2001).
In principle, the literature in this section can be summarised as follows. Scholars agree that 
the integration of formal and informal institutions and the participation of governmental and 
community actors is important for co-management. Such integration and participation can assist 
in rescuing natural resources, which are deteriorating where individual institutions and actors 
(e.g. formal or informal alone and/or governmental or community alone) have failed to address 
the problem. Whereas participation can assist in eliminating the impacts of and erode some 
negative institutions, it can also result in undermining and eroding useful institutions. Through 
participation, some good institutions may be eroded, especially if the imposition of new institutions 
in an area does not determine the power of the existing institutions.
Up to this juncture, participation has been analysed within the framework of a government-
local community dichotomy. Such a dualist view is likely to mask the heterogeneous nature of 
the community and the government. In practice, participation entails diverse and heterogeneous 
community groups and diverse government units governed by diverse and heterogeneous formal 
and informal institutions. This diversity has implications for the co-management of natural 
resources. In the coming section, the influence of heterogeneity in the collaborative management 
of natural resources involving governmental and community institutions and actors is analysed.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity
Although heterogeneity is a term with many meanings based on the context, in the present thesis 
it implies the existence of multiple and diverse user groups, either permanently or on a seasonal 
basis in a given area, with the aim of exploiting natural resources. The main dimensions referred 
to here are ethnicity and interactions between resident and non-resident resource users, as these 
seem most relevant for the Lake Jipe case study.
Ethnicity in this thesis implies the presence of resource user groups that, though they may 
be implementing the same practices (e.g. fishing, livestock-rearing, etc.), have different cultural 
origins. In light of the existence of multiple ethnic groups, natural resources governing institutions 
at the community level may disintegrate along ethnic institutional lines. The relationships between 
the local user groups and between those groups and the government may be determined by the 
cultural institutional relationships of a given area. Thus, cultural diversity may have implications 
for natural resources management.
Social communities are diverse entities embodying different expectations, ethnicities, thoughts, 
perceptions, objectives, interests, levels of wealth, etc. (Natcher, Davis, & Hickey, 2002). Ethnicity 
is among the important aspects in the co-management of the natural resources. It is an attribute 
that indicates that a resource user’s community is variable (Sick, 2002). Along with gender, class, 
and caste, ethnicity is a basic dimension of conflicts in natural resource management (ICLARM, 
2001). Understanding the rights and interests of various ethnic groups and multiple governing 
ethnic institutions in particular resource settings may be imperative for planning collaborative 
natural resource management (Armitage, 2005).
The ability, capacity and willingness of different ethnic groups may affect natural resource 
management arrangements, either positively or negatively. The existence of multiple diverse 
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ethnic groups characterised by different values, expectations, aspirations, and interests as relate 
to natural resources may result in conflicts among them (Armitage, Marschke, & Plummer, 
2008). On the other hand, cultural diversity, differences in perception and understanding, and 
reciprocal relationships imply the existence of diverse solutions to problems of constraints. In 
other words, they mean the existence of diverse social networks and human capital. Strategists 
and practitioners of natural resource management may need to clearly understand these cultural 
diversities if the outcome of the co-management of natural resources is to be improved. Such 
understanding may enable the mobilisation of social and human capital through the integration 
of formal and informal actor networks and institutions and consequently may improve natural 
resource management outcomes (Jentoft, McCay, & Wilson, 1998; Stratford & Davidson 2002).
Ethnicity can contribute to the success or failure of a co-management system. Some scholars 
emphasise that in a situation in which homogenous ethnicity exists there is a greater chance of 
attaining successful co-management than for heterogeneous ethnicity (Jodha, 1996; Lim, Yoshiaki, 
& Yukio, 1995; Pinkerton, 1987). Kideghesho and Mtoni (2008) reveal that heterogeneous ethnicity 
results in the delayed development of co-management institutional arrangements. In their research, 
these authors found that the presence of many ethnic groups within a particular social-ecological 
environment results in dilution effects for the culture, leading to a lack of social cohesion; they 
also discovered that one strong traditional institution is required for building an operational local 
organisational setting as a preparatory phase for co-management.
For other scholars, nonetheless, the success or failure of co-management arrangements in 
light of ethnicity depends on whether the existing cultural institutional diversities are subverted 
or engaged. Natcher et al. (2005) claim that when differential cultural groups subvert their 
cultural diversities in resource management, the result is that co-management arrangements 
are undermined. Diversity might be used to fuel struggles over resources or as a stage for future 
conflicts (Sneddon, Harris, Dimitrov, & Özesmi, 2002). Instead of collaborating, resource users 
might compete for socio-economic purposes and interests, thus sustaining and even escalating 
conflicts among them. On the other hand, if the cultural institutional diversity (e.g. cultural 
knowledge and experiences) is engaged, there exists a greater chance of developing a successful 
co-management arrangement.
As we have seen above, different ethnic groups may sometimes coexist harmoniously within the 
same social-ecological environment and implement sound natural resource use and management 
practices. In such cases, the influence of ethnicity on co-management may be a lesser priority. 
The primary concern for co-management may be any existing tension between the resident users 
(insiders) and non-resident users (outsiders) of the particular resource.
The relationships between resident and non-resident users may determine the nature of the 
relationships between the government and the local resident users and formal and informal 
institutions in the management of natural resources. The resident users may be motivated to 
form a co-management arrangement with the government to defend their interest in a resource, 
which they may think could be compromised by non-resident users. The community, through 
collaboration with the government, may gain some authority that it may use to exclude outsiders 
who are not welcome in the local area (Nielsen et al., 2004). The use of more advanced fishing gear 
by non-residents might be a rationale for the community’s seeking authority from the government 
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because the community regards these gears as a threat to realising the sustained availability of the 
resource to provide income and food security to residents (ibid.).
For some cases, nonetheless, the influence of non-resident resource users disintegrates 
collaborative institutional arrangements, not only between the government and the local users 
but also among the local user groups. This is when the influence of non-residents results in a 
conflict of interest among partners in co-management arrangements. While some may want to 
adopt advanced technology to enhance the exploitation of resources for commercial purposes, 
others may wish to maintain traditional harvesting technology, adequate for exploiting the resource 
for subsistence purposes (Sekhar, 2004). This may lead to conflicts and resource degradation 
because the stability of the governing institutions may be impaired. Some scholars (e.g. Castello, 
2001) claim that the solution in such a situation is to provide exclusive access rights to the local 
people; through this institutional adjustment, they argue, non-resident users (outsiders) will be 
excluded. However, sometimes, Sekhar argues, the government may be in favour of one side – e.g. 
it may promote investment in an advanced technology to enhance revenues from taxes. Under 
such circumstances, with the government now partial to one side, it may hardly be in a position 
to resolve conflicts between users, and this may undermine sound institutional arrangements 
developed for collaborative and sustainable resource management.
In the above section, we have reviewed how heterogeneity influences co-management. Two 
dimensions related to heterogeneity – i.e. ethnicity and interactions between resident and non-
resident resource users – have been highlighted. Ethnicity can have positive or negative influences 
on co-management, as we have seen, depending on whether diversity is engaged or subverted. 
The literature has also indicated that interactions between resident and non-resident resource 
users are in most cases conflicting and may have negative implications for natural resources. One 
strategy for dealing with this challenge, as suggested in the above account, is to provide users with 
exclusive access rights to exclude outsiders. In the coming section, I turn to investigating how 
property rights may influence co-management.
2.5.5 Property rights
Jentoft (2005) describes property rights as relations between people, the owner of a property 
or good and a non-owner, in terms of their relative positions. In this case, the owners have the 
legal right to deny non-owners the enjoyment of benefits from the property. Jentoft asserts that 
the relationship is not between the property and the owners but rather between the owners and 
non-owners. This implies that there are institutions that govern and determine the interactions 
between the owners/non-owners and the resources. It also suggests that both the owners and the 
non-owners are aware of these institutions. These institutions may define actors entitled to use 
the resources and temporal and spatial boundaries of use, as well as conditions for use.
Several property rights may exist, including private, state, open-access, and communal rights, 
or even combinations of these. Private property rights are adopted where there is limited land, the 
frequency of its use is high, and the population is high; thus, the type of property rights becomes 
strict and more explicit. On the other hand, where land is abundant, population density is low, 
and there is extensive utilisation of land, the property rights adopted are often communal and less 
strict in the sense that shifting is possible. In some areas, a combination of private and communal 
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property rights may exist, and in other areas, what is considered communal may be a complex mix 
of individual ownership (e.g. maize fields) and group ownership (e.g. grazing land) (Wiber, 1993).
The type of property rights under which a co-management system operates determines how 
strong the co-management arrangement can be. A co-management arrangement that operates 
under communal property rights has the power to control access to the resource, impose 
sanctions in response to non-compliance, and ultimately enforce exclusion if the expressed areas 
of dissatisfaction are not addressed. With this property right system, it is possible not only to 
condemn unsustainable use of a resource contrary to an agreement but also to exclude actors 
who do not abide by the governing institutions. On the other hand, for state, private and open 
property rights systems, co-management arrangements operating under them do not have a power 
to sanction by exclusion. Individuals or institutional actors who do not abide by the agreed-upon 
regulations have an exit option. If they do not want to negotiate for collective action, they may 
decide to make their own decision. Co-management arrangements under these four property rights 
circumstances can only have the moral power to condemn non-compliance; they cannot impose 
sanctions through exclusion (Jentoft, 2005). Despite these power differences, nonetheless, Jentoft 
claims, co-management can succeed under any of the mentioned property rights arrangements. 
This is an indication of the existence of other attributes that may influence the relationship between 
co-management and property rights in the management of natural resources. One such attribute 
might be the existence of a legal mechanism.
Pomeroy et al. (2001) assert that the existence of property rights alone is not sufficient to 
enforce the sustainable use of natural resources. Whereas property rights should clearly provide 
for mechanisms (administrative, economic, and collective) and structures for the allocation of 
property rights to optimise their use while conserving resources, there should also be a legal 
mechanism for enforcing rights (Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). These scholars posit 
that the government should be legally able to support the enforcement of property rights to ensure, 
for example, that local people have the power to control the unsustainable use of natural resources 
by outside pressures. This is not to say, however, that when the two attributes (property rights 
and legal support) are appropriately in place, then the success of co-management arrangement 
is totally guaranteed. The success of co-management is determined not just by the existence of 
property rights and legal support but also by the interactions among various formal/informal and 
government/community actors in enforcing these rights, as well as by how the existing institutions 
and arrangements in a given social ecological environment govern the actors in enforcing these 
rights in their practices and interactions.
2.5.6 Leadership
Other important dimensions influence co-management as well. One such dimension is leadership. 
In this section, I review the influence of leadership on co-management. Leadership is an important 
condition for the success of co-management. Whereas some scholars (e.g. Pomeroy et al., 2001) 
have analysed the roles of leaders within the resource user community on co-management, others 
(e.g. Singleton, 2000) have analysed the roles of state/government leaders in co-management. 
These scholars agree that leadership is an important element of the success of co-management 
arrangements. Leaders portray examples for others to follow; they show the way and mobilise 
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energy and power for the co-management process. While the community might already have 
leaders, they might not be the appropriate ones for co-management arrangements (Pomeroy et 
al., 2001).
With their focus on leadership from the community point of view, Pomeroy et al. (2001) 
assert that leaders should be chosen from among the users by the users themselves in order to 
gain legitimacy and respect from their counterparts. However, they also highlight that there 
must be institutional provisions that clearly define the time period during which one can remain 
a leader so that no one maintains the position in the long term. Other community institutional 
actors should also be given an opportunity to develop leadership skills. While, on the one hand, 
periodic change of leadership might be useful for avoiding over-dependence on a few institutional 
actors, which might become a problem when they are not available, it also reduces the chance 
for corruption on the other hand. Furthermore, these scholars assert, the over-dependence of 
one individual might become a constraint when that person dies, leaves his position or moves to 
another because the user’s community might at that time not have developed other people to take 
his place. However, regarding the appropriate duration of a leadership position in the community, 
there are questions to consider. What length of term reduces the chances of corruption? How can 
this figure be determined and operationalised, and who determines it? Perhaps short-term leaders 
might be more corrupt than long-term leaders depending on the context.
Other scholars, as introduced above, have determined the influence of leadership on co-
management from the perspective of the government. Singleton (2000) highlights the role of 
government leaders in co-management arrangements. She asserts that government leaders are 
essential facilitators of cooperative decision-making between the government and the community. 
They can do this by creating opportunities for face-to-face interactions through which shared 
interests can be explored outside the formal institutional context of decision-making. In such 
informal interactions, Singleton argues, skilful leaders can have the opportunity to create occasions 
for cooperative covenants between the community and government.
The above account in this section implies that collaboration between formal/informal, and 
government/community institutions and actors is important in developing leaders for co-
management of natural resources. This collaboration may be governed, enabled and enforced by 
governmental and community institutional mechanisms. The collaboration of formal and informal 
institutions may determine success or failure in developing these collaborative leadership skills 
and actors in co-management arrangements in the social-ecological system.
2.6 Conclusion
So far, I have defined the concepts used for analysing the co-management of natural resources in 
the Jipe social-ecological system along with factors that characterize the institutions – that is, the 
institutional dimensions. However, the Jipe social-ecological system is a complex system wherein 
there exist at least three arrangements and where, therefore, multiple government and community 
and formal and informal institutions govern the practices of multiple and heterogeneous actors 
who play diverse roles within it. The three arrangements are fishery, agriculture and livestock 
sectoral management systems (Figure 2.3).
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The analysis focusing on these three different natural resources co-management arrangements 
within the same social-ecological system goes beyond the conventional analysis that focuses on 
co-management in individual natural resource management systems. The analysis in this thesis will 
provide insights into and challenges to co-management theory and enhance our understanding of 
how diverse but interdependent internal sectoral resource management politics within the same 
social-ecological system can affect the co-management and sustainable management of natural 
resources in the social-ecological system.
In the next three sectoral empirical chapters, I analyse the co-management arrangements with 
multiple governing formal and informal institutions and multiple government and community 
actors in the management of natural resources in the Jipe social-ecological environment. Examining 
one of these co-management arrangements, we will see how a non-government actor (NGO) 
links and builds the capacity of the government and the community actors to enforce sustainable 
natural resources management practices. Prior to these chapters, however, chapter three will give 
the history of the governmental-level institutions in charge of natural resource management in 
Tanzania.
Co-management of Lake Jipe 
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Figure 2.3. A complex lake Jipe social-ecological system with three interacting co-management 
arrangements: fisheries, agriculture, and livestock.
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Intermezzo – Lake Jipe: introduction
This section introduces lake Jipe and describes the methodology and methods used to collect 
data for this thesis. The section first gives a short description of the study area, including the 
location and climatic conditions of Lake Jipe, and the socio-economic, ecological, and cultural 
characteristics of the region. Subsequently, data collection methodology is highlighted and the 
methods, instruments and tools used under this methodology are presented. This entails the 
use of a combination of methods for complementing and confirming data collected using other 
methods. The section ends by introducing methods used for data analysis.
1 Study area
The study was conducted around Lake Jipe, an area encompassing upstream and downstream 
wards of Jipe, Kwakoa, and Mwaniko in Mwanga district. Lake Jipe is a shallow lake located on 
the Tanzania-Kenya border between 3°31’ - 3°40’ S and 37°45’E. The lake covers an area of 30 
km2, and is 12 km long, 3 m deep (Ndetei, 2006), and 2 km wide (Dadzie & Haller, 1988), and is 
on the leeward side of north Pare Mountains (Ndetei, 2006; Twongó & Sikoyo, 2001). Climatic 
conditions of lake Jipe are sub-tropical semi-arid conditions wherein rainfall ranges from 500 to 
600 mm, and temperature ranges from 19.9 oC to 29.5 oC. While rainfalls are of biannual patterns 
with long rains from March to May and short rains from October to December, the hottest months 
are January to March April and the coldest month is September (ESF, 2005).
Lake Jipe is an important field on which various natural and anthropogenic activities and 
interactions exist including ecological, socio-economic, cultural and political interactions as the 
underneath sub-sections unveil.
1.1 Ecological importance
Lake Jipe is connected to Lumi river and other streams originating from Mount Kilimanjaro, 
and to Muvulani river and small streams including Kirurumo from Pare Mountains. These river 
systems are sources of water to this lake (IUCN, 2000). Lake Jipe outflows into Ruvu river which is 
a tributary of Pangani river and therefore lake Jipe is the storage basin of the Pangani basin (Ndetei, 
2006). Lake Jipe is rich in biodiversity by having water-birds: Lesser Jacana, Purple Gallimule, 
Squacco Heron, Black Heron, African Darter, African Skimmer and fish species namely endemic 
Tilapia, Oreochromis jipe and sardine, Rastrineobola argentea. In addition, it is a habitat of crocodile 
and hippos (Twongó & Sikoyo, 2001; MNRT, 2004). However, the lake, which originally covered 
an area of 100 km2, has been reduced to 30 km2 today due to unsustainable resource use practices 
including catchment degradation, leading to erosion and siltation as well as the rapid growth and 
expansion of waterweeds of Typha domingensis (Ndetei, 2006).
1.2 Socio-economic value
Jipe wetland provides livelihood support to many people on both sides of the Kenya-Tanzania 
border (IUCN, 2000). On the Tanzanian side, around 17,800 people inhabit the lake area (Census 
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2002). The lake is used for fishing, and provision of water for domestic consumption. In recent 
years, nonetheless, fish production has been declining due to among others invasion of Typha 
waterweeds, therefore adversely affecting livelihoods of the people who depend on fishing (Ndetei, 
2006). Besides fishing, the areas surrounding this lake are used for agricultural crop production, 
and for livestock keeping. Various crops including maize, beans, cowpeas, lima beans, green gram, 
sunflower, and tomatoes are grown. The livestock kept in the area include poultry, goats, sheep 
and cows. Although farming, agriculture and fishing are the main livelihood activities, secondary 
activities are also carried out including food vendoring, shop transactions, selling of industrial 
and local beers, selling of firewood demanded for roasting the fish and bicycle repair. All these 
secondary activities are largely linked to fishing. It creates temporal interactions of residents and 
non-residents, the latter being more active during fishing seasons. As such, while an excessive 
fishing pressure has a potential for degrading fisheries resources especially due to unsustainable 
fishing practices, on the other hand interactions between residents and non-residents create 
employment opportunities to other inhabitants who do not directly engage in fishing. These 
inhabitants provide economic goods and services needed by those directly engaged in fishing.
Apart from initiatives by individual villagers and by communities to support local livelihoods, 
some support and initiatives derive from the state. While this study was being conducted two 
state driven programmes were being facilitated by the district government in the area. Whereas 
one programme was not sectorally specific, the other programme was sectorally specific. The 
non-sectoral specific programme was implemented under the Tanzania Social Action Fund 
(TASAF), which provides funding support to groups of villagers or village communities as a 
whole to undertake participatory projects of their choice under the facilitation of the government. 
The sectorally specific programme was implemented through a funding from the Ministry of 
Agriculture under the Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project 
(PADEP), which targeted groups of farmers who were advised to design and propose participatory 
agro-projects. In general, villagers in lake Jipe area desire to capitalise on these potential funding 
arrangements to improve irrigation potentials of the area, which is semi-arid and experiencing 
recurrent droughts and unreliable and unpredictable rainfall patterns.
Besides being important socio-economically to the inhabitant of lake Jipe and to those at the 
Tanzania-Kenya border, lake Jipe is important for the district and regional economy. This lake is a 
source of water to the hydro-electric power generating plant at Nyumba ya Mungu dam, which is a 
source of electricity (Mtalo, 2005) to not only Mwanga district but also to the surrounding districts.
1.3 Cultural characteristics
Although culture can be used in broad sense, in this context I refer to culture in terms of customs 
and traditions including some normative practices in the community. Lake Jipe area experiences a 
mix of interactions of residents and non-residents at different spatial and temporal points. While 
the main inhabitants of this area are resident Pare ethnic group, other migratory groups of resources 
users include the Maasai livestock keepers, and fishers from southern, western, central and other 
nearby regions of the northern zone of Tanzania, which exploit pastoral and fisheries resources at 
different times and spaces. As such, Lake Jipe is home to interactions of different cultural groups. 
Although, these cultures remained separated for quite some time, there in a growing tendency of 
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exchange and intermingling of cultures of different groups. Some immigrants to Lake Jipe have 
intermarried to Pare community, contributing to a gradual transformation of traditional practices 
and customs in their now culturally hybrid families. For example, while elders revealed that in 
the past forty or more years residents of Jipe did not engage in off-shore fishing but instead fished 
using long sticks while standing at the shore of the lake, today Jipe residents also fish within the 
water lake using wooden canoes. By the same token, while traditionally women at Jipe were not 
allowed to enter the lake, this tradition has gradually disappeared. In the present days women 
paddle canoes and get in the lake to fetch water.
1.4 Thesis approach
In this thesis Lake Jipe is regarded as a representative example of a Tanzanian wetland ecosystem, 
from which more general conclusions on wetland management in Tanzania can be drawn. I have 
employed a geographic approach in which both social and ecological systems that potentially 
influence management of Lake Jipe wetland have been integrated in the investigation. Within 
one geographic area, the existing arrangements of natural resources management – and their 
interdependencies – have been investigated, focusing on fisheries, agriculture and livestock. 
Within each arrangement, the institutions and actors that comprise these arrangements have 
been identified and assessed.
2 Data collection
This study had to rely mostly on the primary information due to the limited availability of official 
statistical information, reports on Lake Jipe, and earlier academic studies. The reliance on especially 
primary data collection was time consuming and required a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
data analysis techniques.
Prior to the actual data collection process a pilot survey was conducted. After revising the 
research instruments based on the reality and facts acquired at the pilot survey, data collection was 
conducted. In the downstream area Jipe, Kambi-ya-Simba, and Butu villages were selected from 
Jipe Ward, and Kigonigoni village from Kwakoa ward, In the upstream area, Mangio, Vuchama-
ngofi, and Masumbeni villages were selected, from Mwaniko Ward (Figure 2.4).
Multiple sources of evidence add validity and reliability to research findings (Yin 1994). As 
such, a combination of instruments were used for data collection. These included a household 
questionnaire, interviews with key informants, observation, participant observation, and informal 
talks with individuals. These various techniques targeted relevant actors from village, ward, 
district, and national levels. This multiple method, multiple level approach make up the primary 
data collection methodology. In addition, secondary data were collected through documents at 
various offices (village, ward, district and national), and through internet search.
3 Pilot survey
The Jipe and Kwakoa wards, on the downstream, and Mwaniko ward, on the upstream, were 
surveyed prior to the actual data collection. These wards surround Lake Jipe, so its inhabitants 
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exploit Lake Jipe and terrestrial natural resources around it. The aim of this pre-survey was for 
the researcher to familiarize with the reality of the local situation, an imperative step for making 
decisions on sites/villages for data collection, type of users to include, and other stakeholders from 
whom to collect data and information.
Natural resources including the lake, farming land, grazing land, and water tributaries on the 
downstream and upstream areas were surveyed through a cross-sectional transect walk from 
downstream to upstream. During this cross-sectional pre-survey, a local informant who had a good 
knowledge on use and management practices of the pre-surveyed areas provided accompanied 
the researcher. A pre-assessment was conducted to evaluate what natural resource use practices 
and institutions exist around Jipe. The aim of this exercise was to get an overall picture on status, 
trends and dynamics on natural resources use and management practices, and coping strategies 
in the area. In doing so data collection instruments (questionnaires and checklists of questions) 
were also pre-tested and adjusted accordingly. The pre-assessment provided a general overview 
important for selecting relevant sources of data, and modifying the questions and instruments 
(i.e. questionnaires and checklists of questions) to reflect the field reality.
In addition, the pre-assessment allowed for the selection of target villages for data collection. 
In some villages, for example, a pre-survey revealed that livestock keeping was given more weight 
than farming (e.g. Kigonigoni village) whereas in other villages (e.g. Butu), more or less balanced 
integration of different livelihood practices was adopted. Again, for some villages (e.g. Kambi 
Figure 2.4. A map showing the studied villages of lake Jipe on the upstream and downstream areas.
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ya Simba), irrigation farming was being conducted, while for others (e.g. Jipe) irrigation was 
not possible because of lac of available water. This inherent variability in the area is therefore an 
important selection criterion for the rest of the research.
4 Primary data collection
4.1 Household questionnaire
A household questionnaire was used to collect data at household level. Using this questionnaire 
questions were asked about natural resources use and management practices in livestock, 
agricultural production, and fisheries; on reasons for choices or preferences of certain practices; 
on constraints encountered in the implementation of livelihood practices; on awareness on 
environmental degradation; on coping strategies for the constraints encountered; on involvement 
in formal and informal (co-)management institutions; and on conflicts emanating in the use of 
these resources among different users.
Representative households active in livestock keeping, fisheries and crop production were then 
purposively selected for further investigation. For each category, random sampling was used for 
selecting households for interviews. At least 10% of the households were included in the household 
interviews for each selected village (following Grinnell, 2001). A total of 150 questionnaires were 
administered. A sample questionnaire that was used for data collection is indicated in Appendix 1.
4.2 Focus group discussion
This method was used to collect information from natural resources management committees in the 
local area such as fishers committee, the village environmental committee, village water committee, 
elders committees, informal livestock keepers committee, and a group of fishers. These focus group 
discussions provided information about the current natural resources situation in comparison 
with the past situation, problems the committees and institutions encounter in enforcing their 
management roles, and how they address or resolve them. This information complemented and 
clarified the data collected through the household questionnaire administration. The groups and 
committees for focus group discussion were identified during the pre-survey. A total of seven 
focus group discussions were conducted and an average of six members participated per focus 
group discussion. Checklists of questions were used to guide the discussion between the moderator 
and the respondents as indicated in Appendix 2. These questions were used as a guide, and were 
followed by the follow-up and probing questions through which more detailed information was 
collected.
4.3 Key informant interviews
The key informants interviewed involved technical and administrative personnel from the village, 
ward, district, up to the ministerial level. At the village level, the village executive officer, village 
agricultural extension officer, ward agricultural extension officer, ward executive officer (WEO) 
were involved in the interviews whereas at the district level, district natural resources officer, district 
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fisheries officer, district agricultural and livestock officer were interviewed. At the ministerial level, 
staff at the Department’s of fisheries, livestock, and agriculture were interviewed. At the local 
level the key informants were questioned as to their experiences in enforcing natural resources 
management institutions, and constraints they encounter in the process. At the district level, the 
key informants were questioned on how they facilitate sustainable natural resources management 
practices through formulation of by-laws, strategies, etc.; on constraints and challenges they 
encountered; and on how they resolve them. Likewise, an investigation was made on how the 
district government collaborates with the central government in the implementation of the relevant 
institutional arrangements (e.g. policies, acts, strategies, etc.). At the national level, an assessment 
was done on how the government policies and strategies accommodate and involve the local users 
in their formulation. A checklist of questions asked to key informants is provided in Appendices 
3a, b and c. A list of the interviewed key informants is included as Appendix 4.
4.4 Observation
Observation supplemented and/or confirmed the data collected using other approaches. The 
researcher was accommodated at the residence of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO). This 
residence was both used as an office and the house for this official. The ward office is used as a local 
tribunal in the Tanzanian legal framework. Various issues, socio-economic and emanating along 
the resource use processes, are reported to the WEO if the lower government and the community 
instruments have failed to resolve them. Since the researcher was there when these issues were being 
reported and addressed, he could be informed and learn what was going on. For example, through 
this approach, it was possible to uncover that some village leaders partake in natural resource 
degradation practices, or illegitimately protect unsustainable natural resources use practices. 
These government leaders were reported to the WEO by leaders of informal institutions. Though 
the same village leaders had been earlier interviewed, it was not evident yet until the researcher 
observed arguments between the two sides occurring at the WEO’s office. The disadvantage of 
staying at the WEO’s office might be that the investigator was perceived to be allied with the 
WEO, potentially reducing openness of respondents in other data collection activities. However, 
no indications of such bias appear in the analysis.
4.5 Participant observation
For some farmers, interviews were conducted on their fields because at that time they were engaged 
with fieldwork. This was also important because along with verbal responses, the researcher 
could see what was, in practice, transpiring in the field. This activity occurred during July and 
August at the time of crop harvesting (e.g. maize) and preparation of fields for planting other 
crops (e.g. beans). Data collection in the field therefore combined different approaches including 
questionnaire administration, informal talks during work and formal discussions afterwards. The 
researcher participated in the harvesting work, at least for some hours, in order to compensate for 
the time loss of the farmer during the information collection using a questionnaire.
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4.6 Informal talks
Informal talks likewise were used to confirm and complement information collected using other 
methods. Sometimes, when people are formally questioned, they tend to give answers which sieve 
information they think lead them to risk in one way or another. During data collection, informal 
talks were useful in generating more information which could not be obtained during formal 
discussions, possibly because the respondents regarded the talks as causal whereby personal details 
(e.g. names) were not requested. In these talks, for example, they revealed unofficial methods used 
for controlling the waterweeds such as use of petrol to set fire to burn the waterweeds within the 
lake. They also exposed how some village leaders partake or are implied in illegal practices such 
as illegal fishing, charcoal business etc.
5 Secondary data collection
5.1 Documents perusal at government offices
At the village, ward, and the district offices, filed documents were accessed, perused and the relevant 
information/text sorted and photocopied for further analysis. In some research sites, there was 
either no electricity or photocopying services. In such cases, a digital camera was used to record 
relevant documents which were later downloaded to a computer, printed out, and sorted, and 
analyzed based on the objectives of the study.
5.2 Internet search
Due to limited accessibility of information at the national (Ministry) level (key informants at 
this level provided limited time for discussion), complementary information on institutional 
arrangements such as policies, acts, and strategies, were collected from the Internet by accessing 
websites of the relevant ministries (agriculture, livestock and fisheries). Other information such 
as speeches from the ministries was accessed in this way. Websites that proved useful in this 
regard include MIFUGO (www.mifugo.go.tz) and KILIMO (www.kilimo.go.tz). Other published 
documents were also accessed through the international Ramsar website (www.ramsar.org). 
In addition, a literature study of the existing research reports and some official statistics was 
conducted.
6 Data analysis
Two main methods were used for data analysis. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), and 
content analytical methods. SPSS was used for analysing the data collected through the household 
questionnaire. The data were coded, entered into a computer and then analysed. Descriptive 
statistics were calculated from the numeric data (e.g. the number of livestock, amount of crops 
harvested, etc.). Qualitative information collected from focus groups discussions, interviews, 
documents collected from different governmental levels, and from the Internet, were categorized 
into meaningful units and themes in keeping with the research questions.

Chapter 3.  
Historical and administrative overview of natural resource 
management in Tanzania
3.1 Introduction
Before presenting the three case studies that are the focus of this work, this chapter outlines the 
historical background of natural resource management in Tanzania. This background covers 
changes in arrangements, institutions and actors over time. This historical background is important, 
as it provides an overview of the evolution of co-management between the government and the 
community in Tanzania. With such a picture in mind, we can comprehend how institutional 
changes have influenced the current natural resource management framework. An analysis of 
the current natural resource management administrative structure will follow this historical 
background. Natural resource management in Tanzania is currently implemented through a 
decentralised governmental framework. The role of the central government in this framework 
is to design national policy and legal frameworks, provide financial support to enable the 
participation of local governments and communities in implementation and enforce the policy 
and legal-institutional arrangements in natural resource management. This review of the current 
administrative structure will highlight the roles of institutions that link the central government 
to local governments in this decentralised framework.
3.2 Natural resource management eras and approaches in Tanzania
Natural resource management in Tanzania can be categorised into three eras: pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial. Four natural resource management approaches emerged in these eras; namely, 
clan based, centralised (based in colonial, as well as post-colonial Ujamaa, policy), market based, 
and participatory natural resource management. The pre-colonial era was dominated by the clan 
based management regime, whereas during the colonial era, formal centralised natural resource 
management approaches became dominant. The centralised natural resource management approach 
dominated the early part of the post-colonial period, while later, market and participatory natural 
resource management approaches prevailed. Because it is impractical to isolate the management 
approaches from the eras (as the two overlap), in the following section they will be highlighted 
in an integrated way.
3.2.1 Pre-colonial natural resource use systems
During the pre-colonial era in Tanzania, there were no formal national policies to control and 
coordinate natural resource management. Informal arrangements and institutions oriented 
towards chiefdom systems governed the use of natural resources. Each ethnic group had a chief 
who oversaw the use of natural resources (Maghimbi, 1994). The chiefs enforced compliance 
to informal regulations and beliefs and imposed sanctions for non-compliance (Owino, 1999). 
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Elders assisted, and were answerable to the chiefs as the heads of specific clans, and their role was 
to oversee natural resources use in line with the traditions of their clans (Kauzeni, Shechambo, 
& Juma, 1998; Madulu 2005). These traditions included rituals, taboos and beliefs pertaining to 
the use of natural resources. The elders sanctioned those who broke the traditions. For example, 
for the Pare people of Mwanga, district fines could be paid in kind: a local brew and/or livestock 
could be confiscated from a violator regardless of his/her willingness to pay. Natural resource 
arrangements during pre-colonial times were thus in the form of top-down arrangements whereby 
a few individuals, i.e. the chiefs and appointed elders of clans, families, and tribes, enforced beliefs 
and traditional institutions while others in these communities were required to comply with the 
institutions (Kirk, 1999).
Traditional natural management systems had their own methods of avoiding conflicts in 
resource use. It was common to find multiple users of a natural resource of different cultural 
origins and with different interests in the same social ecological environment, such as livestock 
keepers and crops cultivators. In such situations, conflicts were unavoidable. Mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts among the users were therefore imperative. These included occupying different spatial 
positions within or between some ecological systems. While crop cultivators occupied upland 
areas (as these areas had reliable rainfall), herders occupied the lowland areas. An example of this 
was the mutual use of land resources by two ethnic groups, the Maasai, and Chagga on the slopes 
and lowland areas of Mountain Kilimanjaro. The advent of colonialism, nonetheless, interfered 
with these arrangements through the establishment of overlapping resource use arrangements 
where farming was practised, even in areas initially used for livestock grazing (Campbell, Misana, 
& Elson, 2004).
3.2.2 Colonial era
Formal relationships between the government and communities for natural resource management 
were formed during the colonial period. During this era, from 1888-1960, changes in the 
management of natural resources were introduced in the form of the exploitation of natural 
resources through regulations against traditional use practises. This era marked the beginning 
of state-led management regimes. The colonial government generally changed natural resource 
ownership arrangements from communal (clan based) to state based (nationalisation). A central 
change to the law declared the crown (governor) the custodian of the land. Emphasis was largely 
placed on cash crop production, and the allocation of land reflected this priority (Sundet, 
2006). The government viewed local institutions and practises as threats to sustainable natural 
resource management. Clan based management institutions gave way to state-based management 
institutions, and government sectoral organisations were established to enforce these governing 
institutions (Owino, 1999; Van der Knaap, Ntiba, & Cowx, 2002).
The colonial government controlled the resources and the management arrangements. 
This eroded the power held by the elders in the communities prior to the emergence of state-
led initiatives. The communities located near natural resources were forced to abide by these 
regulations through the establishment of punitive measures (Meroka, 2006). However, although 
the colonial government nationalised ownership of natural resources, traditional institutions 
retained some power over natural resources through chiefdoms. The colonial authority used an 
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indirect ruling system whereby chiefs were used for collecting fines, and enforcing sanctions to 
non-compliance with the established regulations. Through this traditional governance, traditional 
institutions could still operate in some resource areas, though the custodian of the resources was 
the colonial government, who had the power to reallocate traditionally occupied land (Kauzeni 
et al., 1998; World Bank, 2007).
Conflicts among resource users were inevitable during the colonial period. Based on their 
policy environment and objectives, the colonial government favoured crop farming. The farmers 
were, therefore, integrated with the colonial economy for the production of cash crops. Other 
livelihood practises, such as livestock grazing, were less favoured. This led to the alienation of 
grazing land and the displacement of herders from areas with water resources, as these were turned 
over to crop farming (Campbell et al., 2004). The herders lost dominance over wetter areas on 
the rangeland, as well valleys and swamp areas, which they used during dry and drought periods. 
This power was transferred to the farmers, who introduced crops farming on these wetter and 
swamp areas (Campbell, 1981). In some areas, the colonial government established a partnership 
with herders by claiming that the government planned to assist the herders to develop livestock 
water infrastructures and pastures. However, the government later reallocated the land used by 
these herders to farmers (Hodgson, 2000). This resulted in conflicts, not only between the colonial 
government and herders but also between herders and farmers (Campell et al., 2004; Hodgson, 
2000).
To summarise the foregoing, during the colonial administration, there were two main issues 
pertaining to natural resource management arrangements: the institutional shift and increased 
focus on the farming, rather than herding, sector. There was an institutional shift from a traditional 
resource control framework to a governmental resources control structure in the form of divide-
and-conquer arrangements. While before the colonial intrusion informal institutions governed 
resource use through traditions and beliefs, the centralised colonial authority displaced the 
informal institutions. Formal colonial institutions now oversaw natural resource governance. 
Regarding sectoral focus, cash crop production was more emphasised than other sectors, such as 
livestock. Institutional arrangements under the colonial administration remained in Tanzania until 
1961, when Tanzania gained independence. Although natural resources remained nationalised, as 
was the case during the colonial period, the independent government adopted the collectivisation 
arrangement called the Ujamaa Policy.
3.2.3 Ujamaa policy
The third era (1961 to early 1980s) was the post-independence, Ujamaa policy era. Ujamaa is a 
Swahili word meaning socialism, adopted by the independent Tanzanian government in 1961. It 
forced people to come together into planned villages and mobilised their labour collectively in 
agricultural production (Mueller, 1980; Muzaale, 1988). Though the natural resources remained 
nationalised as a legacy of the colonial government, the Ujamaa policy eroded the authority of 
chiefs and traditional leaders that was recognised under the colonial administration (Mniwasa 
& Shauri, 2001). The mandate over ownership, utilisation and management of natural resources 
shifted from traditional leaders and chiefs to politically-elected village leaders (Campbell et al., 
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2004). Emphasis was placed on the consolidation of bureaucratic institutions of the government 
(Mniwasa & Shauri, 2001).
Decision-making was one-sided during the implementation of the Ujamaa policy. Although 
the local people resided in the newly planned areas, they were not consulted before relocation 
or given an opportunity to give their views as to the suitability of the new areas for economic 
activities (e.g. for farming, livestock keeping, etc.). Government bureaucrats oversaw the people’s 
relocation. The local people had to comply with the government’s decision. Failure to follow this 
mandate resulted in coercive relocation enforced by government bureaucrats (Christiansson, 1988).
The Ujamaa policy had social, environmental and economic consequences. Socially, it extended 
the erosion of traditional clan based resource management organisations that had already started 
with enactment of the African Chief Ordinance of 1953 (Sheridan, 2004).1 In fact, interference 
with the clan-based governance of resource use implied the freedom to destroy natural resources. 
The appointed government agencies were unable to oversee management of the vast natural 
resources in the country in a way that was efficient or effective given the personnel resources for 
this work. The end of colonialism thus not only marked the beginning of political freedom but 
also the undermining of the environmental conservation initiatives and legislation initiated during 
the colonial periods (German, 2004; Kauzeni et al., 1998). Resources that had been successfully 
protected under the traditional common property arrangements became nobody’s resource 
with the repeal of chiefdom systems, and experienced open access exploitation. Environmental 
degradation was therefore an inevitable consequence (Meroka, 2006; Sheridan, 2004). Plans drawn 
by the state that disregard existing complexities of local social and ecological systems certainly 
result in instability of these interdependent social and ecological systems (Scott, 1998).
Ujamaa policy paid little attention to natural resource conservation but strongly emphasised 
economic growth. The collective strategies were implemented in a top-down style. The local 
people had to receive and implement commands to move to planned villages without being 
consulted as to whether those areas were suitable for economic activities (Christiansson, 1988). 
Later, the appropriation of private natural resources for economic development was replaced by 
the state’s engagement in large-scale production through its parastatals. However, contrary to the 
government’s mission to boost the economy through the Ujamaa policy (Kauzeni et al., 1998), the 
economy significantly deteriorated (Meroka, 2004). The investment in government driven-projects 
did not yield the anticipated results, largely due to poor management and corruption (Assens 
and Jensen, 2003), poor law enforcement, poor policy implementation, and the lack of adequate 
skilled workers to run the projects (Limbu & Mashindano, 2002). The parastatals became both 
inefficient and ineffective, leading to economic deterioration (Assens & Jensen, 2003; Barrow & 
Mlenge, 2003). Thus, both natural resource degradation and economic deterioration were the result.
Furthermore, the Ujamaa policy put more emphasis on some sectors than others. It favoured 
crop production, relocated people into collective settlements, and established collective crop 
farms. For example, a land reform policy was introduced and implemented that reallocated most 
1 The African chief ordinance of 1953 repealed the authority of the chiefs. Because after independence the 
trend was towards nationalistic unity, the party (CCM) bureaucrats negatively regarded the chiefs as having 
power in their clans that could be used to divide the people into tribal based fragmentations, harming state 
nationalism.
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of the areas that were used for grazing to crop farming under collective production arrangements. 
Because of this, herders were deprived of grazing resources, ultimately leading to conflicts 
between herders and farmers (Shivji, 1997). Sectoral conflicts that prevailed during the colonial 
administration era escalated during the Ujamaa policy tenure. For example, the enforcement 
of land redistribution reform arrangements partitioned land into small administrative units 
(villages) for collective agricultural production, a shift from common property and a family-based 
economy to collective production, adversely affecting the livestock keepers. It was estimated that 
because of this institutional reform, about 250,000 livestock keepers lost their land and had only 
restricted access to pastures and wells. The livestock keepers could hardly exercise the migratory 
grazing practises they were accustomed to because sedentarisation was viewed as a prerequisite 
for modernisation (Kirk, 1999).
The Ujamaa policy did not accomplish its intended goals in Tanzania. The top-down 
interactions between the government and the local people in natural resource management during 
the Ujamaa era was unsuccessful in improving either economic growth or conservation of natural 
resources. Social, economic, and environmental deterioration were the inevitable consequences. 
An alternative approach was required to improve these situations. The government of Tanzania 
launched internal economic recovery programmes to stabilise the deteriorating economy. These 
included the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP), which aimed to increase production 
and exports, as well the structural adjustment programme (1982-1985), which aimed at pruning 
the central government budget and restructuring public enterprises (Meertens, 2000). These 
reform and stabilisation strategies did not work. At the same time, the World Bank and IMF 
placed pressure on the government of Tanzania to deregulate all spheres of its economy as part 
of its reform program; otherwise, the country would not receive financial assistance from these 
institutions (Meertens, 2000). Although the government initially resisted the adoption of the IMF 
and World Bank programmes because they were not in line with their socialist strategy, later, as 
the internal reform programme failed, it was forced to comply (Limbu & Mashindano, 2002). The 
country thus turned to market-based approaches.
3.2.4 Market economy era
The failure of Ujamaa policy, with its consequences for economic, social, and environmental 
deterioration, forced Tanzania to adopt market-economy policies in the mid-1980s. In this era, the 
government’s control over the economy diminished, while the influence of market forces increased. 
Market liberalisation led to the integration of local resources with large market systems at the 
regional, national and international levels. This resulted in the escalation of over-exploitation and 
the degradation of natural resources in some areas, such as the southern highlands of Tanzania. In 
these highlands, the commercialisation of agricultural production resulted in the transformation 
of farming practises, whereby farmers came to cultivate fast-growing crops using unsustainable 
farming practises to gain a cash income as rapidly as possible. Farmers shifted from cultivating 
pyrethrum and green peas using ridges and terraces to cultivating wheat and Irish potatoes in a 
flat cultivation system. This shift resulted in soil erosion (Sokoni, 2001).
Whereas economic liberalisation can be commended for reducing or eliminating situations 
wherein one individual or group of individuals benefit from actions and efforts of others in natural 
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resource management, especially when common property is converted to private management 
regimes, Tanzania has also suffered some negative results. Because most land resources are 
communal, not common, liberalisation led to increased inequality in natural resources access. For 
example, some groups in the community are now able to sell communal property, thereby benefiting 
at the expense of others. Other local people cannot manage their natural resources in sustainable 
ways because, among other reasons, they lack adequate capital and labour in light of agricultural 
commercialisation. Large farm plots in particular have difficulty maintaining sustainable farming 
practises such as the use of ridges and terraces, and face poor markets for agricultural produce. 
Further the change of cropping systems to favour short-term crops is destructive to contour bunds 
and terraces regarded as fertile areas for cultivating crops (Sokoni, 2008).
The transition to a market economy has transformed both traditional and governmental 
institutions and arrangements. Commercialisation has altered traditional land use and allocation 
arrangements. Traditional methods of allocation and inheritance of land have given way to new 
arrangements, wherein land is sold or leased to individual farmers even outside a clan. This 
negatively affects the availability of land for members of a clan, and stands in contrast to earlier 
eras, when elders enforced land allocation arrangements and made sure that all members of the 
clan were given some land. On the side of the government, commercialisation has led to the sale 
to private ventures of village land that had previously been available for the use of villagers as a 
whole. This is supported through the land policy of 1995, which officially allows individuals to 
obtain land for agricultural investment provided this land is not under communal use, used by 
community projects in the village, or a conservation area. This resulted in competition for land and 
natural resources between large-scale farmers and small-scale farmers and between pastoralists and 
crop cultivators, among other interests. It is rare today to find unoccupied land in many villages 
in Tanzania (Sokoni, 2008). Market based policy has therefore resulted in an institutional shift 
from clan-based and socialised arrangements to individual or private institutional arrangements, 
and have impacted access, use and management of land resources.
Market liberalisation contributes to conflicts among resource users in Tanzania. Transformation 
of natural resources under traditional institutional use arrangements (i.e. under the clans) or 
under a group of users (e.g. communal grazing land) to private management arrangements 
creates tension and insecurity among resource users. The commoditisation of agriculture and 
the encouragement of private tourist industry, for example, have led to further alienation of 
grazing land previously under communal management. This has led to conflicts between private 
investors and herders (Campbell et al., 2004). In some areas, even the government has been 
involved in land sales, whereas at the village level, land used by herders is appropriated and sold 
by the village government to large-scale farmers. This has escalated conflicts, not only between 
users of communally owned land and private investors but also between users of the communal 
land and the government (Rie, 2002). In these situations, traditional institutional arrangements of 
resource use based on social solidarity among users are undermined and replaced by individual 
arrangements that favour individuals with command over resources. As a result, private resource 
use arrangements unbalance resource accessibility among individuals in the community. Few can 
access the resources, and the majority has limited or no accessibility. The limited accessibility 
of the resources may lead to overuse pressure and the degradation of the limited resources that 
can be accessed (Sokoni, 2001). Under such situations, environmental conservation partners 
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and stakeholders may recommend participatory natural resource management to alleviate 
unsustainable natural resource management.
3.2.5 Participatory approaches
Community-based natural resource management emerged in Tanzania in the 1980s. Its inception 
was due to recommendations by donors and conservation agencies that the government had 
to adopt this approach as it had failed to implement effective natural resource conservation 
policies (Songorwa, 1999). Its adoption was not universal, however; community-based natural 
resource management varied in the time of its inception depending on the resource. For example, 
Willy (2000c) mentions that the first participatory community based forests were established in 
1994, while Songorwa (1999) notes that the community-based management of wildlife resources 
began earlier. Though there are some discrepancies in the literature regarding the inception date 
depending on the resource under study, we can generally state that community-based natural 
resource management began in the late 1980s.
The emergence of participatory natural resource management was expected to resolve 
various issues in the management of natural resources, including resource ownership. Under 
this management system, integration and the consideration of rights of resource users is viewed 
as a method of encouraging active participation in resource management. Studies of resource 
management in Tanzania show that when the local people see themselves as the owners and co-
managers of natural resources in their vicinity, there is a sense of concern about using a resource 
in sustainable ways. Similarly, a feeling of commitment to monitoring the use of the natural 
resources by external users has been observed (Willy, 2000c). The provision of secure ownership 
rights and the authority granted to the community over management of natural resources may 
make community members accountable in implementing management plans and enforcing rules 
to limit the unsustainable use of natural resources (Odera, 2004).
Participatory natural resource management in Tanzania influences the contentious relationships 
among resource users, though information on the nature of the influence is mixed. In some cases, 
the establishment of participatory natural resource management has succeeded in improving social 
relationships between resource users. This has occurred through the formation of representative 
conflict resolution committees integrating formal and informal institutions in the villages, and 
the establishment of mechanisms to punish non-compliance with sustainable natural resource 
use and management (Kajembe, Monela, & Mvena, 2003). Other experiences, however, show 
that the establishment of participatory management may transform existing relationships, not 
only within the community but also between the community and external users of a particular 
resource. Some contentious relationships may continue to develop after the implementation 
of participatory management as a result of external and internal resources, user groups who 
depend on and fight for the same resource for food and income, and heterogeneity within the 
same community the result in conflicting interests, purposes, and marginalisation of the interests 
of some members of the community. These conflicts render the potential for natural resource 
sustainability questionable. At other extremes, government agencies with different interests may 
conflict in their interactions with the community. While the interests of one of the agencies may 
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be congruent with the interests and objectives of the community, the objectives of another agency 
may contradict those of the community (Nelsen, 2004).
Leadership may also influence the participatory management of natural resources. Leadership 
involves leaders from the community level to the governmental level. Leadership can be 
independent or can combine traditional or formal powers. The record of participatory natural 
resource management in Tanzania indicates that when leadership is capable, stable, and accountable 
there is higher chance of sustaining collective natural resource management. In contrast, when the 
leadership is unstable and/or unaccountable, it is likely that conflicts between parties will dominate 
participatory natural resource management, which may lead to its ultimate failure (Nelsen, 2004). 
While Nielsen (2004) notes that an increase in revenues and employment for villages in Northern 
Tanzania results from participatory natural resource management, he also notes that conflicts 
emerge alongside these benefits. Such conflicts can be attributed to unstable governance, poor 
decision-making and poor management of revenue. Although village leaders usually serve a term 
of five years before a new election, the community in one village (Sinya village) changed village 
leaders three times within one five-year term because the leaders misappropriated the revenues 
that from the community’s participation in eco-tourism and environmental management projects. 
This is indicates that although community participation in natural resource management may have 
the potential to generate both socioeconomic and environmental benefits, other factors within 
the community may constrain the sustainable realisation of these benefits and hence discourage 
community participation. In contrast to this negative result, however, Baldus, Bensen and Siege 
(2003) find that in Selous National Park, good leadership was an important dimension that enabled 
the community to organise for participatory conservation work, and to share in the benefits accrued 
from their efforts. To manage revenues accrued from their participation in wildlife management, the 
community and the village government established a village committee for overseeing management 
arrangements. The sharing of the benefits of this participatory initiative is discussed among all 
villagers in the village assembly in an open and democratic way, and profits from the management 
work are invested in other community projects or saved in a community bank account. These 
contrasting findings indicate that, depending on how the leadership is structured, it may contribute 
to or constrain sustainable participatory natural resource management.
3.3 Current administrative natural resource management structure
So far, this chapter has highlighted the evolution of natural resource management in Tanzania. It 
has covered several approaches: namely, clan based, top-down (colonial and Ujamaa approaches), 
market based, and participatory natural resource management regimes. However, there has also 
been a change in the administrative structure from a centralised to a decentralised governmental 
structure that has accompanied the shifts in management approaches. The natural resource 
management regimes in the present era are implemented under a decentralised governmental 
structure. In this section, the current administrative structure of natural resource management 
will be explored.
Currently, natural resource management in Tanzania is implemented within a decentralised 
framework (Figure 3.1). The argument in support of decentralisation of natural resources in 
Tanzania is that when the central government had previously concentrated its power and authority 
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over natural resource management, it could not provide practical protections against natural 
resource degradation (Mniwasa & Shauri, 2001). This is an extension of the understanding that 
the degradation of natural resources was caused by the failure of the top-down natural resource 
management approach. However, this extended approach recognises that the failure of top-down 
natural resource management regimes does not fully explain natural resource and environmental 
degradation in Tanzania. Other factors, including the concentration of the decision-making and 
ownership powers by the central government, also contributed to environmental degradation. 
In response to these problems, the central government has since granted the responsibility of 
enforcing sustainable management of natural resources to local government authorities. The Local 
Government Act No. 6 of 1999, which amends the Local Government Act of 1982, argues that 
because local governmental institutions are situated in local areas, they are in a better position to 
deal with environmental and natural resource management issues than the central government, 
which is situated further from the sources of the issues. In turn, the central government is required 
to empower local governments and community actors to properly engage in resource management 
in their entrusted jurisdictions.
At Lake Jipe, the three sectors under study (agriculture, livestock and fisheries) present some 
organisational differences in natural resource management. While for some sectors formal 
organization of local resources users exists for others informal organization exists. In the fisheries 
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Government 
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Regional Secretariat 
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Figure 3.1. The Administrative structure of natural resource management in Tanzania.
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sector, village-level committees established under national fisheries policy and law represent 
fishing communities in the management of fisheries resources. In other sectors, there are no 
formal sectoral committees for the management of natural resources. Instead, there are informal 
committees formed by the livestock keepers and the farmers themselves. In most cases, these 
are designed to defend users’ interests. For example, the livestock keepers’ informal committee 
was formed for the purpose of protecting pastoral land against encroachment from other 
land users. Similarly, farmers formed informal committees for negotiating and sharing water 
resources among themselves. Whereas the formation of the fisheries committee was influenced 
by formal governmental institutional arrangements, the formation of the livestock keepers’ and 
farmers’ committees evolved in the process of resource use to mediate between the users. Besides 
these formal and informal committees, each sector is represented in a formal multidisciplinary 
environmental management committee that governs the management of natural resources in the 
villages as a whole.
In the coming sections, I briefly highlight the relevant actors in the implementation of natural 
resource management within the framework of decentralised local government. These actors 
include Sectoral Ministries, the Ministry of Regional Administration and the Local Government, 
the Regional Secretariat at the regional level, and the district council. Under the district council, 
in line with the current study, there are Departments of Natural Resources in which fisheries are 
integrated, and the Department of Agricultural and Livestock Development. This departmental 
separation continues along the administrative levels at the wards, division, and villages.
3.4 Ministerial level
Sectoral ministries represent one level of administrative structure in natural resource management 
in Tanzania. Two of the sectoral ministries are examined in this section: the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food Security and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries. 
Under the current managerial framework, the central government, and therefore the ministries 
as well, is charged with (among other things) preparing national sectoral policy environments. 
The following questions will be answered in this section: how do the sectoral ministries relate? 
How do the sectoral policies formulated by these ministries involve the local community at their 
preparatory stage, and how do these policy instruments accommodate community participation 
in management of the natural resources used in the livestock production, agricultural production, 
and fisheries management?
3.4.1 The relationship among ministries
Relationships among the three sectors at the ministerial level are complicated. While some sectors 
fell under one ministry at one time and then separated to two different ministries at another time, 
others have undergone the opposite transition. Until the late 1990s, the agricultural and livestock 
sectors fell under the same ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development. 
At the time of writing, the two sectors fall under independent ministries. These changes have 
not only occurred structurally but also in policy planning. While before the separation of these 
ministries, and some years afterwards, the livestock and agricultural sectors had were integrated 
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in policy planning, since 2006 the two sectors have had independent policy planning processes. 
While the agricultural and livestock sectors came to be separated into separate sectors, the fisheries 
and livestock sectors underwent the opposite process, integrating to form a single Ministry of 
Livestock Development and Fisheries.
The changes in integration among the three sectors can be explained by a combination of inter-
sectoral conflicts and politics. Agricultural and livestock staff and professionals at the ministerial 
level hold opposing points of view regarding the relationship between the two sectors. Agricultural 
professionals and staff argue that the two sectors should fall under one umbrella ministry because 
the majority of rural people in Tanzania are agro-pastoralists; therefore, to address the challenges 
these clients face, management and planning for the two sectors must be centrally integrated (MAC, 
1997). Their counterparts specialising in livestock management claim that, under the integrated 
ministries and policy planning arrangements, the livestock sector has been given less emphasis 
(MLD, 2006). These stakeholders favour the view that for the development of the livestock industry 
requires an independent Livestock Ministry responsible for central livestock planning.
The integration of the fisheries sector into the Ministry of Livestock Development (MLD) 
resulted from political influence. Whereas the fisheries sector before its integration in the MLD 
was a division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), following Tanzanian 
cabinet reshuffle in the early 2008, this sector was removed from the MNRT and placed into the 
MLD to form the Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries (MLDF). The reasons for 
this decision, according to President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, is that the fisheries sector has 
been underemphasised because the MNRT is laden with other vast sectors of forest and wildlife 
management. The President asserted that livestock and fisheries sectors are related and that fisheries 
could be more productive if given a higher priority. These arguments may seem convincing but it 
remains to be seen whether the placement of fisheries sector in the MLDF will, in itself, result in 
improved fisheries productivity, and whether it will lead to an effective use of the fisheries’ existing 
potential. Other factors, such as good leadership, good planning, accountability, etc. can influence 
the development of the sector regardless of which ministry provides oversight.
Although at the central level the livestock and agricultural sectors are separated, at the local 
level the two sectors are integrated into one department. It is possible that integration of centrally 
separated sectors at the local/district level will give the district department an opportunity to 
mediate contradicting and uncoordinated institutional arrangements from the central authorities. 
However, it is also possible that this difference at the local level will result in confusion within 
the district departments, especially when there is a limited capacity to translate and understand 
the institutions from uncoordinated central levels. This latter possibility seems less likely, though, 
because the district departments are under the authority of the district councils that are responsible 
to the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG) that coordinates local 
government administration and central sectoral policies and laws. The MRALG was established 
in 1998 to coordinate sectoral institutions, policies and programmes from the line ministries, and 
to oversee the implementation of these institutions in the local areas. In essence, the MRALG has 
technical and administrative staff that coordinate and communicate with the local government 
authorities where policies and programmes are to be implemented (Baker, Wallewik, Obama & 
Sola, 2002).
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The establishment of the MRALG implies the some problems with direct communication 
between the sectoral ministries and their staff at the district levels (CARE 2006). However, there 
is duplication of chain of commands (Dallu, 2002). The local government staff receives commands 
from the sectoral ministries, and from the ministry overseer of decentralisation, i.e. MRALG. If 
the commands and institutions from MRALG and sectoral ministries are poorly coordinated, the 
result is a conflicting implementation of the institutions and programs at the local level. Proper 
coordination of the institutional arrangements of the MRALG and sectoral ministries is, therefore, 
imperative to avoid potential contradictions in the implementation process at local level. The 
question, nonetheless, is whether the MRALG has the power to manage these challenges and 
positively influence the management of natural resources.
The formation of the MRALG has resulted in the sharing of authority and roles between 
the central sectoral ministries and MRALG. The MRALG is now the institution responsible for 
employing the staff that run the sectoral institutions at the local level. While sectoral ministries used 
to be responsible for employment, the staff are now answerable to the MRALG. Therefore, while the 
sectoral ministries have the jurisdiction of formulating the policies and laws for the management 
of natural resources at the local levels, the MRALG has the jurisdiction of coordinating the sectoral 
institutions and their implementation at local level, and of employing the technical staff who 
facilitate and oversee the implementation and enforcement of the sectoral institutions. Thus, in 
essence, and with exception of the advisory communications (done through representatives of the 
sectoral ministries at regional level), the institutional relationships between the sectoral ministries 
and sectoral departments at the local level are mediated by the MRALG.
Because the institutional arrangements of the three sectors, though prepared at the central 
level, are implemented at the local level, conflicts and contradictions among the institutions 
and actors at the central governmental level may negatively affect the implementation of these 
arrangements at the local level. The conflictive and contradictory sectoral institutions may disrupt 
each other’s governing potential of one another, making it difficult for local actors to implement 
their policies. This may also make it difficult for sectoral actors at the district level to design the 
supporting institutions and laws for the enforcement of the mandates of the national sectoral 
institutions. In this case, it may be difficult to achieve collaborative planning and to navigate 
the competing influences of the different sectors. In turn, this may impair the collaborative and 
sustainable management of natural resources for agricultural, fisheries and livestock production 
at the Lake Jipe social-ecological environment.
3.4.2  Participation of local community in policy processes and natural resource 
management
For all three sectoral policies, the local community is involved in the policy process through a 
consultative approach. The process is overridden, however, by relevant central governmental 
agencies (agriculture, livestock and fisheries) that, based on social, political, and economic 
pressures (local and global), prepare agendas for policy formulation or revision. The users at 
the community level can be represented through the users associations or through relevant local 
governmental departments. In addition, in zonal meetings that usually take place each quarter, 
the local authority representatives participate in discussing various issues regarding natural 
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resource management. Deliberations from these meetings are transmitted to the relevant sectoral 
departments at the central governmental level.
Participation of the local community in the conservation and management of natural resources 
is explicit in fisheries policy but implicit and unclear in livestock and agricultural policies. The 
fisheries policy of 1997 clearly states that for sustainable fisheries management, communities 
in the vicinity of fisheries resources must participate in fisheries management through the 
formation of fisheries committees appointed by fishing communities. In contrast, livestock and 
agricultural policies (Agricultural Policy of 1997, and Livestock Policy of 2006) emphasise the 
commercialisation of agricultural and livestock production, and claim that the integrated and 
sustainable management of natural resources that these production activities require will be 
promoted along with the livelihood objectives. However, the role of local communities in the 
management of natural resources in these transformations is unclear.
3.4.3 The regional secretariat
The regional governments facilitate sectoral policy and plan implementation at the local 
governmental level. A Regional Secretariat (RS) links the central government and the local 
governmental authorities. The RS is comprised of the Regional Commissioner (RC), the Regional 
Administrative Secretary (RAS) and four technical clusters; namely, management, economic 
and development, social services, and physical planning and engineering. The RS has the role of 
facilitating the implementation of sectoral policies. Included in the economic and development 
technical cluster are technical staff, including agricultural, livestock, and fisheries officers. They 
form one of the four technical clusters of the RS. They are employed by the sectoral ministries 
but are attached at the regional level. Before decentralisation, the role of these technical staff 
was to implement the sectoral policies. Within the current decentralised structure, their role 
has changed to facilitators. They facilitate the sectoral departments at the local government 
(district) level in their implementation of policies by providing them with expertise and capacity-
building programmes (Baker et al., 2002). Technical personnel at the district level have assumed 
the responsibility of implementing national sectoral policies that once was implemented at the 
regional level.
Although the RS is regarded as a linchpin linking the central government and local governments, 
in reality it is constrained in performing this role. For example, in the Kilimanjaro region where 
this study was conducted, technical members of the RS have limited facilities, are poorly informed, 
and have limited financial resources to enable them to enact their roles effectively. The technical 
officers at the local governmental level (the district level) are better informed than the technical 
officers at the regional level. In other words, there is evidence for poor management by the technical 
officers at the regional level. In part, this occurs because communication between the sectoral 
ministries and the local government authority bypasses the RS. In addition, training may be given 
to the officers at the local governmental level by officers from the sectoral ministries without an 
awareness of the officers at the regional level. The RS, therefore, is both poorly informed and 
lacking in the necessary training. Furthermore, due to financial limitations, the RS technical officer 
sometimes has to depend on local governmental authorities for transportation to the field to assess 
the implementation of the sectoral development arrangements. All of these constraints make the 
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technical officers at the RS level less confident and capable of implementing their responsibilities 
effectively (Regional Agricultural Advisor (RAA), Kilimanjaro Region 2008).
Due to a lack of technical and physical resources, the government is therefore limited it its 
ability to enforce sustainable natural resource management on its own. This problem calls for 
co-management arrangements where the government entrusts some of the management to the 
local people, and collaborates with informal institutions at community level, which may reduce 
costs to the government while enabling sustainable enforcement of sound management practises.
3.4.4 Local /district government authority
There are three important institutions at the local governmental level: the district council, the ward 
development committee, and the village council. The agricultural, livestock and fisheries sectors 
are represented at these councils. At the district level, there are two departments relevant to this 
study thesis: the Agricultural and Livestock Department, and the Natural Resources Department, 
which includes the fisheries sector. As introduced in 3.3.1, in contrast to the ministry level, 
the livestock and agricultural sectors are integrated at the district level as the Agricultural and 
Livestock Department. In addition, while the livestock and fisheries sectors are integrated (part 
of one ministry) at the central governmental level, at the district council level they are separated; 
the fisheries sector falls under the Natural Resources Department.
The district-level departments existing are entrusted with implementing the agricultural, 
livestock and fisheries programmes and policies. They are responsible for drafting programmes, plan 
of actions, strategic plans, by-laws, etc., in keeping with national policy and its legal instruments. 
In other words, they have the responsibility of adapting national institutional arrangements 
(policies, laws, Acts) to local situations. This level is also responsible for coordinating participatory 
arrangements for natural resource management and the livelihood demands of the local people. 
To use the example of the fisheries, at this level, participatory planning and deliberations are 
undertaken on how to involve the local fishing community in participatory management of 
fisheries resources in keeping with the national fisheries policy.
Ideally, communication between the sectoral ministries and departments at the district council 
level has to be coordinated through the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government. 
However, in practise, not all communications follow this path. The sectoral ministries and the 
Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government may have parallel communication 
with the district sectoral departments at the district level and this can cause contradictions, 
conflicts, and dilemmas for actors at the local governmental level.
At the ward level, there are representatives of the agricultural, livestock and fisheries sectors, 
although they are not equally available at every ward. Besides the technical people at these levels, 
there are administrators who oversee all executive aspects for villages under their jurisdictions 
including agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and the use of natural resources in general. At this 
level, there are sometimes not adequate staff to act as technicians, so administrators have to fill 
the technical role.
The village is the closest level to the users of natural resources in fisheries management, 
agricultural production, and livestock production. Administrative and technical roles are 
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performed. However, at this level too, there is generally a shortage of technicians, and therefore 
the administrative officers sometimes fill their positions.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter briefly described the administrative structure in the implementation of natural 
resource management in Tanzania. In brief, it has depicted the roles of relevant government 
institutions along with the challenges and constraints to effective management that accompany 
those roles. This chapter has also mapped out the history of resource use. It has uncovered the 
path dependent sectoral approach in the management of natural resources that led to the current 
government structure. It further indicates that the failure of the government to manage natural 
resources in a data-poor environment has led to some management jurisdictions being entrusted 
back to the local people. In other words, management is returning to the informal/customary 
institutions ignored in the colonial, Ujamaa and market periods.
In the next three coming chapters, empirical cases of co-management of natural resources 
between the government and the local people at Jipe Lake in Mwanga district, Kilimanjaro 
region in Tanzania will be discussed. These three empirical chapters will investigate collaborative 
arrangements in natural resource management between the government and the resource users 
at Lake Jipe. The investigation entails the analysis of interactions of the government and the 
community, in among other aspects, resource management, institutional enforcement, and problem 
resolution. Because there are multiple diverse formal and informal institutions that govern and 
mediate the relationships among the stakeholders in natural resources for the three sectors, 
dynamic interactions exist within and between these institutions, as well as with governmental 
and community actors. These interactions have implications for the use of these natural resources 
because their nature determines the sustainability of use of the natural resources in the Jipe social-
ecological system. Sustainable management of natural resources at Lake Jipe, therefore, depends 
on interactions between formal and informal institutions, practises based on actors’ objectives, 
and the effects of these interactions on natural resources systems and the social-ecological system 
as a whole.

Chapter 4.  
Management of fisheries resources at the Lake Jipe wetland in 
Tanzania
4.1 Introduction
Fisheries resources at Lake Jipe bring together various government and community actors. The 
Natural Resources Department at Mwanga district is entrusted with enforcing and overseeing 
management of fisheries resources at the district level, while the community implements policies 
and by-laws through fisheries committees. The local fishing community comprises two geographical 
categories of fishers: residents and non-residents. The category of resident fishers includes fishers 
that come from an upstream area of Lake Jipe. Non-resident fishers generally originate from the 
southern regions of Tanzania and nearby regions, such as Tanga, Arusha and Kilimanjaro (Figure 
4.1). Migratory fishers move from one place to another based on the availability of fish.
The Mwanga district has adopted a national approach which emphasises collaboration of 
local governments and local people in the enforcement of fisheries institutional arrangements. 
At Lake Jipe, a fisheries committee has been formed to guide the enforcement of collaborative 
fisheries resource management. The committee was established in keeping with the institutional 
Figure 4.1. Regions in Tanzania from which fishers and migrants to lake Jipe originated.
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requirements stipulated in the fisheries policy of 1997 and the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003. The current 
dominant assumption is that institution of participatory management is a solution to unsustainable 
management practises. Using the case of Lake Jipe, this chapter investigates the collaboration 
between the government and the community in the management of fisheries resources at Lake 
Jipe. Specifically, the chapter first analyses fisheries management practises and their impacts on 
fisheries resources in the Lake Jipe area. Second, it examines how the government and community 
collaborate in managing sustainable fisheries practises. Third, it explores the participation of 
government and local institutions in resolving conflicts that emerge in fisheries management. 
Finally, it analyses and evaluates co-management arrangements that exist in fisheries management 
in the Lake Jipe area.
4.2 Background on fisheries at Lake Jipe
This section highlights four aspects of fisheries resource management at Lake Jipe: the evolution 
of fisheries activities, the status of fisheries resources, the use of fisheries resources, and actors 
involved in fisheries resource management.
4.2.1 Evolution of fisheries activities at Lake Jipe
Fishing has been one of the main livelihood activities conducted at Lake Jipe since the 1950s. By 
1964, there were 150 fishers at eight camps along Lake Jipe namely Mkisha, Jipe, Ubungu, Urondo, 
Makuyuni, and Mirangeni. Some of these camps are now villages, while others vanished as people 
moved out. Many of the fishers in the area were newcomers from other countries and regions, 
including people of groups such as the Jaluo, the Kisi from Kenya, they Nyasa, and the Manda from 
southern regions of Tanzania. These newcomers came to mix with the native Pare people. After 
1968, the number of fishers increased to 2,000, and in the same period the Nyumba ya Mungu 
dam was established. Some fishers moved to this dam where they established new settlements 
that still exist today. These settlements are Kagongo, Bora, Nyabinda, Njia Panda, Handeni, and 
Kiti cha Mungu (Mwanga, 2006).
According to the elders at Lake Jipe, fishing activities at the lake are generally believed to have 
been started by newcomers from Tanga, Songea, Mwanza, Mbeya, Kigoma and other regions of 
western and southern Tanzania who were originally brought to the Tanga region during colonialism 
as migrant workers to provide forced labour in sisal plantations. During the construction of the 
central railway infrastructure, these labourers were used to build the railway line from Tanga to 
Kilimanjaro, and it is during this time that they noticed the existence of Lake Jipe. Some returned 
to their home regions and reported the location of the lake to friends and family, while others 
moved to the Lake Jipe area directly after completing construction of the railway line. It is said 
that in the 1950s this important livelihood practise was mainly carried out by the resident fishers 
born in the vicinity of the lake. These early resident fishers fished at the subsistence level, and 
limited their fishing activity to inshore trapping using long sticks due to their fear of wildlife 
attacks from crocodiles, hippos, and lions. The arrival of newcomers from the southern and 
western regions of Tanzania marked the beginning of large scale fishing activities. Fishers from 
these regions began implementing commercial fishing practises, including the use of dragnets. 
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From the 1960s onward, the Lake Jipe region experienced the integration of locals and outsiders 
in fishing activities at the wetland.
As mentioned above, the arrival of non-resident fishers in Lake Jipe transformed fisheries 
practises. Elders claim that before this period, illegal fishing was not practised. This is because only 
large fish, of more than three to five inches, were captured at the time. Illegally harvested small 
fish would have been unmarketable due to the abundance of large fish. However, demographic 
changes introduced unsustainable fishing practises into the area. When non-resident fishers first 
arrived in the 1960s, according to elders at Lake Jipe, they killed many crocodiles, and so were 
able to engage in more offshore fishing. Over time, resident fishers came to engage in offshore 
fishing as well. This led to the decline in the fisheries industry of Lake Jipe that began in the 1970s.
Fishing is a dependable activity that contributes to the livelihood of local people. It is estimated 
that of all livelihood practises of the area, fisheries contribute approximately 60% of the total food 
security (Mwanga, 2006). There is, however, not much information regarding the contribution 
of Lake Jipe fishing to the national economy. Planners and economists who study this sector 
commonly estimate the contribution of the fisheries sector in Tanzania on the basis of three 
main inland lakes (namely, Lake Victoria, Lake Nyasa, and Lake Tanganyika) and to generalise 
the performance of these great lakes as the total contribution the economy of the fishing sector. 
The contribution of these big lakes to the national economy has been well understood. However, 
though overlooked, Lake Jipe and other small lakes of its kind are important sources of subsistence 
for inhabitants, and also provide employment opportunities to fishers, fishing communities, and 
non-residents engaged in fisheries transactions, thereby contributing to the district and regional 
economies.
4.2.2 Status of fisheries resources at Lake Jipe
The fish at Lake Jipe have been in decline from the 1970s to the 2000s (Table 4.1). It was not possible 
to get statistical data from the district and national fisheries authorities on changes in fisheries 
production at Lake Jipe. The information used in this study is based on anecdotal information 
from fishers at Lake Jipe based on their experiences and memories of changes in catches per unit 
efforts for the past three decades. This decline is depicted in Table 4.1. In the 1970s, the number 
of fish per catch ranged between 3,500 and 4,000, in the 1980s it ranged between 2,000 and 3,000, 
in the 1990s the number ranged from 900 to 1000, and for the 2000s it ranged between 300 and 
700. Not only has the amount of fish declined from 1970s to the 2000s, but the fish size has also 
decreased. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s large fish of three to five inch sizes were generally 
captured, in the current years, fish of sizes less than two and half inches are more common in 
each catch (Table 4.1).
Fishers and fisheries authorities disagree as to the primary cause for the decline in fish 
availability. Fishers at Lake Jipe argue that the proliferation of water-weeds, which increased in 
the 1970s, has given the fish places to hide, making them difficult to access. Fishers support this 
argument by noting that when they clear some areas of water-weeds, they are able to catch larger 
fish. This indicates to them that the best solution to fish unavailability is to clear the water-weeds.
Although the water-weeds are a problem, fisheries authorities note that unsustainable fishing 
practises are a problem as well. By placing the entire explanation for low catch quantities and small 
74  Co-managing complex social-ecological systems in Tanzania
fish sizes on water-weeds, fishers justify their fishing practises, which in fact have a negative impact 
on fish availability at Lake Jipe. From an interview with fisheries officers at Mwanga district, it 
appeared that while they too view water-weeds a problem that threatens the sustainability of Lake 
Jipe, they note that the use of unsustainable fishing equipment plays an equal role in contributing 
to the unsustainability of the lake.
Fishers’ view of water-weeds as the primary problem may be attributed to the fact that water-
weeds reduce the fishing space available to set their nets. In principle, this seems a physical obstacle 
to their livelihood opportunities. It seems that their major concern is fishing space. The fishers 
are not reflexive on their own practises, however. Greater awareness may be needed to enlighten 
fishers on detriment to fisheries sustainability caused by fishers’ unsustainable practises.
4.2.3 The use of fisheries resource
The use of fisheries resources can involve both good and bad practises. Co-management can 
benefit from good practises, and, can, in turn, enhance these practises’ contributions to sustainable 
fisheries management. Co-management can also benefit fisheries sustainability by understanding 
bad practises and developing the strategies to change these practises to have a positive impact 
on the sustainability of fisheries resources. Because of this, it is important to develop a picture of 
both the benign and damaging fishing practises at Lake Jipe.
The harmful fishing practises at Lake Jipe involve the use of destructive fishing tools that 
degrade the lake ecology. These tools include nets whose wholes are smaller than the recommended 
two or more inches (according to fisheries by-laws at Mwanga) and mosquito nets, which degrade 
immature fish stock. This endangers the future of the supply of fish resources. According to 
established institutional arrangements (e.g. the Fisheries Policy of 1997), the use of destructive 
fishing equipment results in the exploitation of juvenile fish stock and, thereby negatively impacts 
the reproductive potential of future stock. The continued use of these destructive tools will result 
in a further decline in the availability of sizeable fish. In response to declines in the availability of 
fish, fishers become more likely to turn to illicit methods in their fishing to meet their livelihood 
and income needs. The use of illicit nets therefore results in a vicious cycle of fish stock degradation.
Table 4.1. Decrease in catch quantity and fish length per catch effort from the 1970s to the 2000s 
(source: fishers at Lake Jipe, 2009).
Years/decades
Fish	per	catch	
Number	of	fish	(range) Frequent	catch	sizes	(inch)
1970s 3,500-4,000 4-5
1980s 2,000-3,000 3-3.5 
1990s 700-1000 2-3
2000s 300-700 <2.5
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Other practises at Lake Jipe have positive implications. Some practises, though carried out 
at a small scale, have the potential to conserve the environment if they are enhanced. One such 
practise is the manual removal of water-weeds to create spaces so that fishing hooks, nets and 
fish traps may be set. The manual removal of water-weeds (by cutting) to create spaces for fishing 
indicates that fishers are capable of working together to achieve broad goals, which could be 
applied to conservation.
4.2.4 Actors involved in fisheries management at Lake Jipe
Fisheries resource management at Lake Jipe comprises multiple governmental and community 
actors. While some actors (e.g. the District Natural Resources Department) are entrusted with 
facilitatory and regulatory roles, others enforce, monitor, control and survey management practises 
(e.g. the fisheries committee) and mediate resource use disputes among resource users (e.g. the 
elders and the District Commissioner). The presence of multiple government and community 
actors indicates interplay of multiple and complex systems of norms, rules and regulations in 
the use of natural resources. The existence of multiple actors may imply the existence of tension 
among their values, capacities, and roles, and the interplay among them has implications for the 
management of fisheries resources. It is possible that the alignment of these multiple actors will 
create diverse sources of social capital that can be useful for mediating the various problems 
that may face those involved in natural resource management. However, it is also possible that 
the existence of multiple actors and institutions will result in incompatible and contentious 
relationships that may have negative impacts on the sustainable management of fisheries resources.
At the community level, various user-actors may have contrasting objectives and interests, and 
their interactions may constrain participatory resource management. At Lake Jipe, actors that use 
fisheries resources at the community level can be categorised into resident and non-resident fishers. 
While resident fishers use fisheries resources in the area mainly for subsistence, non-residents 
carry out commercial fishing. These variations in objectives and interests result in conflictual 
relationships, especially when those actors who have a strong or permanent dependence on fisheries 
resources in the area perceive that the participation of other actors results in the degradation of 
the resources. These relationships may determine how time is used by resource managers. That 
is, instead of time being used primarily in enforcing sustainable resource use practises, it might 
be used to resolve the conflictual relationships among the users.
While governmental actors are entrusted with the facilitation of fisheries management, some 
of them may constrain the enforcement process. Fisheries management at the governmental 
level in Mwanga district is the shared jurisdiction of governmental actors at the district council 
level, as well as at the division, ward and village levels. Administrative and technical actors 
at the district, ward, and village levels have roles to play in the enforcement of participatory 
fisheries management. Although all these levels fall under the government, the existence and 
involvement of multiple governmental levels and actors is likely to complicate the tasks of enforcing, 
monitoring and coordinating fisheries policy, especially because actors may vary in their interests. 
The governance of the different jurisdictions may be rendered ineffective by tensions between 
self-interests and entrusted interests. While governmental actors at the higher levels (e.g. the 
district) may formulate regulations that have to be implemented at the local level, the actual 
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implementation of these regulations depends on, inter alia, the commitment and willingness 
of actors at the lower governmental levels to enforce them. This will be explored further in the 
latter sections of this thesis, which analyse the participation of various governmental actors in 
the enforcement of fisheries management at Lake Jipe.
Having briefly highlighted the various actors involved in fisheries management at Lake Jipe, 
I will now analyse interactions between the government and the local community. This analysis 
is confined to the enforcement of fisheries management, conflicts and conflict resolution. Since, 
however, the enforcement of fisheries management is based on the implementation of the Fisheries 
Policy of 1997 and the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003, a brief overview of the fisheries policy and the 
act will be provided before the analysis of the interactions is presented.
4.2.5 Fisheries Policy of 1997 and Act 22 of 2003
Enforcement of sustainable fisheries management should be in congruent with the national 
Fisheries Policy of 1997, and the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003. These institutional instruments provide 
for community participation in fisheries management.
The establishment of the Fisheries Policy of 1997 necessitated a repeal of the Fisheries Act 
of 1970, and the revision of other fisheries regulations, namely the Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act of 1989, the Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute Act of 1980, and the 
Marine Parks and Reserve Act of 1994. This was because these acts were legacies of the former 
government-centred top-down management regime. The establishment of the Fisheries Policy 
of 1997 thus led to the enactment of the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003, which mandates participatory 
management of fisheries resources. Fishing communities in the fisheries resources areas are 
integrated in management plans and the implementation process.
The national Fisheries Policy of 1997 has many objectives, but the following are relevant to 
participatory fisheries management:
• Efficient use of the fisheries resource base to increase production and availability and to 
improve economic growth.
• Integration of conservation and sustainable management of fisheries resources in community 
social and economic plans.
• To promote the fishing community’s involvement in the planning, development and 
management of fisheries resources.
• To strengthen cross-sectoral collaboration between fisheries and other sectors.
• To strengthen collaboration between fisheries and other sectors in the general development 
of the fisheries sector, and minimisation of operational conflicts.
These five objectives are discussed in greater detail below.
Efficient use of fisheries resource base
Collaboration among various actors is important to the efficient use of fisheries resources. The 
Fisheries Policy of 1997 highlights that for fisheries resource base to be used efficiently; there must 
be collaboration among various actors, including the user community, in the surveillance and 
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enforcement of fisheries regulations. This is important for effective enforcement of the Fisheries 
Act 22 of 2003.
The Fisheries Act authorises the Minister of Fisheries to facilitate the enforcement of joint 
surveillance. The act underscores that joint surveillance involving the government, other relevant 
agencies, and the local fishing community is imperative for ensuring the enforcement of the act. 
Therefore, participatory management of fisheries resources between the government and the local 
people in the vicinity of the fisheries resources should be implemented. One of the important steps 
in creating joint surveillance is the formation of community management units. The community 
management units are seen as imperative to the sustainable development of fisheries resources. 
The formation of the community management units is emphasised in the act as a prerequisite 
for the appropriate management of fisheries resources. The act states that the use of community 
management units will guarantee the protection and conservation of fisheries resources because 
the primary stakeholders are integrated into the management regimes.
Although the act recognises the importance of the formation of community management 
units, it also places a high level of trust in the management of these units, but good management 
is not certain. The act does not foresee potential negative interactions between the management 
units and the community at large, and therefore, doesn’t provide recommendations to mediate 
such problems. At Lake Jipe, for example, although the management units have been formed, they 
receive little cooperation from the community, who regard the units as government interference. 
This negatively affects participatory fisheries resource management.
Integration of conservation objectives with socioeconomic objectives
The policy understands that, in order to achieve sustainable fisheries management, an integration 
of social and economic objectives is needed in the conservation objectives. One of ways mentioned 
therein is the introduction of alternative options for generating livelihoods, such as establishment of 
fish farming (aquaculture). It highlights that through such considerations, it is possible to ban and 
control unsustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. At the Lake Jipe area, one of the reasons 
for the high dependence of fishers on fisheries resources is the lack of reliable alternative livelihood 
options. Alternative livelihood options could help in relieving high pressure on fisheries resources 
though the option mentioned in the policy (i.e. aquaculture) can be difficult to implement at Lake 
Jipe because this would require a reliable supply of water, which is a limitation at the Lake Jipe area.
Involvement of fishing community in fisheries management
The Fisheries Policy of 1997 views community participation in the management of fisheries 
resources as an important means for sustainable development. It sees fishing community 
associations (committees) as a pre-requisite for creating a sense of ownership in the management 
regimes, and therefore emphasises the formation of these associations. It urges various fisheries 
projects to involve the community in their implementation, as such involvement enables the 
empowerment of the fishing community. This policy also carefully identifies areas where the 
community will have incentives to participate. The policy encourages community involvement 
not only in the formulation of the policy, but also in its implementation. It does so by entrusting 
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some management functions, such as monitoring landing sites and enforcing compliance with 
regulations requiring the use of sustainable fishing equipment, to the community.
The Fisheries Act also provides for community participation in fisheries management. In 
Article 17, Parts P, R, and S, the act emphasises the fundamental importance of the community’s 
role. The act also gives the Fisheries Minister powers to impose conditions that are imperative 
for appropriate use of fisheries resources. These conditions entail the use of traditional practises, 
joint surveillance, and the formation of community management units.
The act views participation as contractually based. Part V, Article 18 addresses the agreement 
made between the fishing community and the government necessary to the participation of 
the local fishing communities in the management of fisheries resources. It highlights that the 
government, through the Director of Fisheries, is authorised to make such an agreement with 
the fishing community (beach management units). In this agreement, there must be a clear 
statement of objectives, a description of the agreed-upon area, a list of the management functions 
to be undertaken under the agreement, guarantees for the access and use of resources under 
the agreement by other users, a time period for the agreement, a provision for the revision 
of the agreement, and a provision for the settlement of disagreement. This indicates that the 
management of fisheries resources is considered the shared jurisdiction of the government and 
the community. Rather than applying top-down management, the government must negotiate 
with natural resources users for both sides to benefit from the management initiative. The act also 
indicates awareness that parties will disagree, and therefore methods for settling disagreements 
must be discussed.
The Fisheries Act recognises the traditional practises of the fishing community. The act 
authorises the responsible minister to ensure that traditional fisheries practises (which are consistent 
with sustainable fisheries management, needs and interests of local users’ community highly 
depending on these resources) have to be respected and integrated into the management regimes. 
This ensures that there both scientific and local knowledge are integrated in the management of 
fisheries resources.
Strengthening of inter- and cross-sectoral collaboration
The Fisheries Policy recognises the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration in fisheries 
development. It states that collaboration among different sectors on various issues is important 
to addressing and minimising conflicts among different sectors. Consequently, it is also important 
to sustainable development of the fisheries sector. The policy suggests four methods through which 
the collaborations can be operationalised. These methods include programmes for joint meetings 
by all sectors related to environmental management, natural resources, tourism, and conservation 
of natural resources. All related sectors can use joint meetings to address overlapping issues that 
require multidisciplinary collaboration.
4.3 Enforcement of sustainable fisheries management practises
Enforcement of fisheries institutional instruments is important for sustainable management of 
fisheries resources and other resources that they depend upon. Enforcement ensures that, along 
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with the socioeconomic concerns, environmental and sustainability aspects are considered. In 
this context, the natural resources from which socioeconomic benefits are derived are sustained 
be available today and in future. This section analyses the collaboration between the district 
government and the local community in the enforcement of sustainable fisheries practises.
4.3.1 Creating awareness on fisheries policy and legal instruments
An understanding of the institutional arrangements and boundaries of operation is crucial for 
effective enforcement of sustainable management practises. At Mwanga district, the district 
natural resources office creates stakeholder awareness concerning the Fisheries Policy of 1997 
and the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003 (henceforth collectively referred to as fisheries policy). This is 
done through preparation of a seminar presenting the by-laws for enforcing sustainable fisheries 
management practises based on national fisheries policy. The seminar is given to the local key 
stakeholders to provide them with an understanding of areas of regulatory enforcement. Various 
relevant institutions are represented at the seminars, including the village community. This 
ameliorates barriers to implementation.
It is important that the whole community is aware of the legal instruments of resource 
management. In order to spread this awareness, representatives of the community participate in 
the seminars, and are then responsible for educating the rest of the community. At the village levels, 
such education is accomplished through the village assembly. There, local community members 
are informed about their responsibilities pertaining to fisheries resource management. Through 
this process, fisheries committees have been appointed in each village to steer the community in 
the management of fisheries resources.
4.3.2 Monitoring, control and surveillance
The government and the fishing committees share the responsibilities of monitoring, controlling 
and surveilling fisheries resources. However, in contrast to the former top-down approach 
whereby the government managed all of these functions alone (though its capacity to do so 
was limited), in the current arrangement, the local people assume the primary responsibility 
for day-to-day enforcement through the fisheries committees. The district government assists 
in these arrangements, especially through patrolling when fishers oppose the activities of the 
fisheries committees; for example, when fishers block the functions of the committees and threaten 
committee members. The district government also collects taxes, issues licences for fishing and 
fishing vessels, and ensures order in the monitoring, control and surveillance functions at the 
community level. Sometimes, surprise patrols are conducted when the district authority learns 
that unsustainable fishing practises are occurring at the lake area. This is facilitated through 
informal communications from agents in the villages on the presence of fishers involved in illegal 
fishing practises, and especially when the violators seem to overpower fishing committees in these 
villages. The police may become involved if necessary. In particular, police involvement takes place 
when fishers threaten the lives of the fisheries committee or hinder them from administering the 
jurisdiction entrusted to them.
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Motivational and coercive mechanisms are used to confiscate unsustainable fishing equipment. 
The motivational approach offers fishers who own prohibited equipment a grace period for 
surrendering that equipment to fisheries authorities. If they do not comply, a patrol is carried out 
to arrest those who would did not surrender their equipment. Forceful confiscation, depending 
on the case, may be accompanied by legal charges. Table 4.2 shows the incidences of collaborative 
confiscation of illicit fishing tools by fisheries committees, and fisheries officers, village leaders, 
district fisheries officers and police in February and March of 2006 in the Mwanga district.
It shows that most of the confiscated tools were from Lake Jipe (6,302), and Mikocheni (2,000). 
The time period indicted is the time after which migratory fishers from Nyumba ya Mungu dam 
moved to Lake Jipe.
Consultative mechanisms are applied in addition to confiscation. The Natural Resources 
Department collaborates in District Commissioner meetings in various fishing communities and 
consults with them on how to strategically combat unsustainable fishing practises. These meetings 
are a response to unsustainable fishing practises and threats faced by the fisheries committee 
members when they enforce regulations. In these meetings, the District Commissioner discusses 
the government’s stance against the violators of law and compromisers of peace. The District 
Natural Resources Department uses these moments to strategise with the community on how to 
contain unsustainable fishing equipment and practises.
Two main approaches to curbing unsustainable fishing practises are generally raised at these 
meetings. These are the encouragement of violators to comply willingly with regulations, and the 
use of coercive means. The encouragement of owners of prohibited fishing equipment to surrender 
that equipment is performed by designating a grace period for surrendering that equipment before 
applying the coercive approach (e.g. conducting a patrol from house to house, and/or involving 
the police in the confiscation exercise). From December 2005 to May 2006, confiscated equipment 
valued at a total of 24 million Tanzanian shillings was collected, as illustrated in Table 4.3.
In most cases compliance is limited, as indicated in Table 4.4 This necessitates the employment of 
forceful means through patrols that enforce compliance. For example, in 2006 (June to September) 
56 articles of prohibited equipment were confiscated, of which, fifty (50) were small prohibited 
nets, while six (6) were mosquito nets.
Along with the confiscation of illicit fishing equipment, immature fish are also confiscated, and 
the violators have to pay fines for capturing juvenile fish. The fine is generally TZS 1000 (€0.63) 
per kg of small fish (Table 4.4). The monetary values indicated in Table 4.4 are the values of the 
confiscated tools and the fish as estimated by the fisheries officers at the district. The table indicates 
cooperation between the fisheries committee, the district natural resources department and the 
fisheries officers in patrolling to combat unsustainable fishing equipment. The participation of the 
natural resources department in the patrol occurs especially when the fisheries committee cannot 
implement these roles alone due to resistance from fishers, who sometimes even threaten their lives.
Once confiscated, the illicit fishing tools are burned. It is questionable however, as to whether 
burning the confiscated fish equipment is by itself a solution to curb illicit fishing. Although the 
prohibited fish equipment is confiscated and destroyed, such equipment reappears after a short 
period. This is not to say, however, that the practises of confiscating and burning the prohibited 
equipment are useless. The reappearance of the prohibited equipment nonetheless implies that 
such practises should be complemented with other practises that influence people’s attitudes 
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Table 4.2. The implementation of a patrol to combat illegal fishing in Mwanga district for February 
and March in 2006 (source: Natural Resources and Fisheries Department, Mwanga district, 2007).
Date Place/village Prohibited	
gears	
confiscated
Actors	participated	in	the	patrol Action	taken	against	victims
10.2.06 Bora 2 • Lang’ata ward fisheries officer
• Fishers committee
• Arrested and case opened at 
Mwanga police station
10.2.06 Njia Panda 3 • Fisheries officers at Kirya ward
• Ward leadership
• Seized equipment was burned
17.2.06 Lake Jipe 2,625 • District fisheries officers
• District police
• Ward leaders
• Fisheries committee
• Patrol of households
• Seized equipment was burned
19.2.06 Njia Panda 18 • Kirya ward fisheries officer
• Village leaders
• Seized equipment was burned
• Owners escaped 
19.2.06 Kiti/ Mungu 6 • Kirya ward fisheries officer
• Village leaders
• Seized equipment was burned
• Owners escaped
22.2.06 Bora 2 • Ward fisheries officer
• Village fisheries committee
• Owners surrendered illegal 
equipment
• Equipment burned
23.2.06 Kagongo 23 • Ward fisheries officer
• Village fisheries committee
• Owners surrendered 
prohibited equipment
• Equipment burned
24.2.06 Njia Panda 5 • Ward fisheries officer
• Ward and village leaders
• Equipment burned
• Owners hid themselves
11.3.06 Kagongo 3 • Ward fisheries officer
• Fisheries committee
• 6 owners seized and case 
opened against them at 
Mwanga police station
11.3.06 Njia Panda 2 • Fisheries officers
• Ward/village leaders
• Seized equipment was burned
15.3.06 Mikocheni 2,000 • District fisheries officers
• Ward fisheries officers
• Fisheries committee
• Seized equipment was burned
22.3.06 Kagongo 2 • Ward fisheries officer
• Ward leaders
• 2 owners arrested and taken 
to police
23.3.06 Lake Jipe 3,677 • District fisheries officers
• Lake Jipe ward leaders
• Patrol of households
• Seized equipment burned
• 1 owner caught, charges 
opened against him
Total 7,955
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towards resources. At Lake Jipe, for example, fishers remarked that they were never trained on 
sustainable fishing practises, but have been chastised for conducting illegal fishing practises. 
The fishers’ claims were confirmed during my interview with the District Fisheries Officer. He 
remarked that fishers know the effects of their activities and would act in a similar way even if 
they were trained. This implies that no capacity-building seminars have been given to the fishers. 
Again, the reappearance of illegal fishing equipment after destruction indicates that the problem 
has only been partially addressed. It appears that the focus is on the product, while the cause is 
not addressed. Illegal equipment may be sold by markets or fishers may modify legal equipment 
to allow them to catch smaller sizes of fish. The current co-management arrangement therefore 
Table 4.3. Confiscation of the destructive fish equipment at Mwanga district for December 2005 to 
May 2006.
Prohibited	
fishnets
Mosquito	
nets
Total	value	
(TZS)
Prohibited fishing equipment returned willingly 63
Prohibited fishing equipment returned during the patrol 2,078 11
Total	 2,141 11 24,050,000
Table 4.4. Confiscated illegal fish and fishing equipment from June to September 2006 in the Mwanga 
district (source: Mwanga natural resources office, 2007).
Date Illegal	practise	uncovered Monetary	value	
(TZS)
Participated	in	patrol
June 2006 23 prohibited fishnets seized 14,320,000 Ward fisheries officer
Fishers and fisheries committee
July 2006 73.5 kg of juvenile fish confiscated 420,000 Natural resources officer
22 prohibited fishing nets and 1 
mosquito net seized
13,080,000 Ward fisheries officer
Fisheries and fishers committee
Aug-06 17 kg of Juvenile fish seized 15,000 Fisheries committee
1 prohibited fishing net and 5 mosquito 
nets
1,050,000 Ward fisheries officers
Sep-06 35 kg of juvenile fish seized 35,000 District natural resource officers
4 prohibited fishing net seized 2,600,000 Fisheries officers and fishers
Total 31,520,000
4. Management of fisheries resources at the Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania 83
also needs to consider the sources of destructive fishing equipment, so that the sources of the 
problem, as well as its effects, are controlled.
In natural resource management, when carrot approaches fail, stick approaches are used. The 
use of police has been already introduced as a method adopted by the fisheries department at 
Mwanga district to enforce compliance with fisheries legislation. The police are involved when 
the fisheries patrolling team (which may involve fisheries officers alone or fisheries officers and 
committee members) encounter life-threatening resistance from the fishers, as indicated in the 
following report from the Ward Fisheries Officer:
When we were conducting a patrol at around 9:30 AM, I, together with the Ward 
Executive Officer (WEO), Village Executive Officer (VEO), Auxiliary Police, and a 
group of 20 fishers (fisheries committee) seized three persons who had fished juvenile 
fish along the lake shore. We arrested them. One of them made a traditional emergency 
shout for help, traditionally called ukunga, and, to our surprise, a group of people 
came with stones, swords and big wooden cooking spoons in their hands. They started 
stoning us, and one of the violators bit a person who was holding him and managed 
to escape. We could not continue with the patrol, but managed to leave with two 
violators, and we took with us the evidence of juvenile fish to the nearby police post. 
While there, we called the District Natural Resources Officer and he joined us at the 
police station. The Natural Resources Officer requested to be provided with three 
armed police officers to accompany us to the village, where we continued the patrol 
and arrested other violators with prohibited fishnets and mosquito nets and led them 
all together to the central district police station to open a legal case against them (Ward 
Fisheries Officer, Kirya ward, July 2006).
The quote above shows how difficult it is for the fisheries committee and the fisheries officers 
to enforce sustainable fisheries practises in some villages. It indicates that the fishers in these 
villages collaborate against the enforcement of sustainable management practises. They even 
use traditional mechanisms and networks such as ukunga (danger alarm) to fight against the 
formal institutional arrangements. This necessitates the use of force because the safety of those 
responsible for enforcing sustainable fisheries regulations enforcement is at stake. In these villages, 
the appointed fisheries institutions have less power to counteract unsustainable fishing practises 
and, patrolling therefore has to involve the police. The use of the police is in keeping with Fisheries 
Act 22 of 2003 as provided in Part 4, Section 37. In such a situation, however, the sustainability of 
management initiatives is questionable, since it is costly to carry out this practise regularly, and 
the local people may not assume ownership of resource management.
Some responsibilities are entrusted to the government. These include pressing charges for 
non-compliance with fisheries regulations, raising of awareness among the users of the fisheries 
resources, and inspection of fish and fining for fishing and transporting juvenile fish.
The Natural Resources Department presses legal charges against violators of fisheries regulations. 
Legal charges are especially common when an individual or group of fishers intentionally hurts 
those responsible for enforcing sustainable fisheries management practises. For example, in 2006, 
the fishers beat and wounded a fisheries officer at Nyumba ya Mungu dam when he was confiscating 
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prohibited fishing equipment. They dislocated his arm and wounded his liver. Charges are also 
common when fishers fail to pay the fines on equipment that has been seized. When legal charges 
are pressed against violators, they are punished in accordance with the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003. 
If a person is convicted under this violation, the act provides for a prison sentence of not more 
than 6 years (Part IX, Section 41 of the act).
Creating awareness of the legal instruments of fisheries sustainability is important to the active 
participation of relevant actors. At Mwanga, when the participatory fisheries management approach 
was established, the District Natural Resources Office raised stakeholders’ awareness on national 
fisheries policy through seminars. This was imperative to ameliorating barriers to implementation. 
Various relevant institutions were represented, including the fisheries committees and government 
leaders at the local level. The representatives, thereafter, were responsible for creating awareness of 
fisheries policy among the rest of the community and other relevant actors. At the village levels, 
such awareness was provided through the village assembly. The local communities in such meetings 
were informed about their responsibilities to fisheries resource management. It is through this 
process that fisheries committees were appointed in each village to steer the community in the 
management of fisheries resources.
The inspection of fish transported for trade in urban areas from the villages is designed to 
control fishing of juvenile fish. According to the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003, fishing of small fish is 
prohibited. The Mwanga district fishing by-laws prohibit fishing of fish of less than two inches. 
When caught with immature fish, violators are fined, as indicated in Table 4.5. On some occasions, 
this practise has led to a clash between the natural resources auxiliary policies and the fishers at 
the checkpoints. For example, one time when the researcher was travelling from Jipe village to 
Mwanga town, at the inspection point, the fish businesspersons and the natural resources auxiliary 
police fought because the fish businesspersons resisted paying the fine when found guilty after 
inspection. In order to minimise risks to them, fish businesspersons sometimes avoid checkpoints 
by transporting fish at night, when the checkpoints are not in operation.
Table 4.5 indicates that for every kg of small fish confiscated, the victim is fined TZS 1000. 
The Mwanga District Council has modified the penalty and amounts stipulated in the Fisheries 
Act 22 of 2003, Article 47. According to the by-laws, 100,000 TZS is charged as a fine for catching 
Table 4.5. Fines charged due to fishing and transportation of small sized fish at Mwanga district 
(1000 TZS = 0.63 €).
Date	 Violator	 Case/violation Fine	(TZS)
11/7/07 Fisher 1 Transportation of small fish for sale less than 2 inches (30 kg) 30,000
22/6/07 Fisher 2 Transportation of small fish under 2 inches (100 kg) 100,000
18/9/06 Fisher 3 Fish under 2 inches (10 kg) 10,000
18/9/06 Fisher 4 Fish under 2 inches (10 kg) 10,000
18/9/06 Fisher 5 Fish under 2 inches (10 kg) 10,000
18/9/06 Fisher 6 Fish under 2 inches (5 kg) 5,000
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fish smaller than the two inch minimum, but it did not mention any specific scale. The Natural 
Resources Office at the district has modified this by charging according to the weight of small 
fish that are seized.
This section discussed the participation of the government and the local community in the 
enforcement of sustainable fisheries practises. It described the main activities undertaken by 
those responsible for enforcing sustainable policy, including creating awareness of fisheries policy. 
It also described other practises undertaken by the government and community actors in the 
enforcement process, which are monitoring, control and surveillance, confiscation and destruction 
of illicit fishing equipment, confiscation of small fish, and fining. It indicated that in undertaking 
the monitoring, control and surveillance functions, the government and the local community, 
as represented by the fisheries committee, collaborate. Although the central day-to-day roles are 
undertaken by the fisheries committees, there are instances when the fishers resist the fisheries 
committees. The committees then require help from the government through the ward fisheries 
and the district fisheries officers. Further, in some instances, the government fisheries authorities 
and the fisheries committees cannot perform their enforcement functions alone because the 
fishers threaten their lives. At this point, they need help from the security police because the 
auxiliary police at the village levels fail to contain the resistance of the fishers. Confiscation of 
fishing equipment is also difficult for the fisheries committees to perform alone. Although this 
has been possible in some villages, in others it has resulted in direct harm to those enforcing the 
regulations. In these cases, the involvement of the District Natural Resources Department and the 
security police was necessary to confiscate unsustainable fishing tools. In addition, this section has 
indicated that, along with confiscation of illicit fishing equipment, small fish are also confiscated, 
and violators are charged fines for catching or transporting small fish. This affects both fishers and 
fish businesspersons transporting the fish to markets, who have to pay a fine if they are caught 
carrying small fish. However, as discussed above, this sometimes involves clashes between the 
natural resources auxiliary police at the checkpoints and the businesspersons.
The foregoing discussion has indicated that, in general, there is good cooperation between 
the government and the fisheries committee at Lake Jipe in combating unsustainable fisheries 
management practises. This is not always the case, however. Sometimes leaders at certain levels have 
not been sufficiently cooperative or have been unable to facilitate the activities of the committee. 
This has resulted in conflicts between the fisheries committee and governmental leaders. At other 
times, constraints at the governmental led to a failure to meet some responsibilities, especially at 
the district level. When the fishers experienced such a hardship, they resolved to employ specific 
strategies in attempt to address the situation. The aim of the coming section is to analyse these 
strategies the fisheries committee undertakes.
4.3.3 Strategies to counteract constraints of sustainable fisheries management
This section analyses different strategies of the fisheries committee when it is blocked by the 
fishers and the fishing community, or when the enforcing actors at the governmental level do not 
cooperate with the fisheries committees or do not facilitate their work as is required under the 
institutional and legal framework.
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Fisheries committees respond to the poor performance of facilitators at local level by bypassing 
the next reporting level in the chain of authority. For example, if fisheries officers and administrators 
at the village and ward levels do not facilitate the work of the fisheries committee, the committee 
bypasses them in the reporting chain. The committee itself presents the problem to the district 
fisheries office. In other words, bureaucratic protocols of accountability are ignored in such 
situations. A section of a letter from the District Fisheries Officer (DFO) to the Ward Executive 
Officer (WEO) illustrates this response:
We have received complaints from the Secretary of Fisheries committee at Lake Jipe 
regarding unsustainable fishing practises. On 4/6/06, the committee patrolled around 
the lake, and illicit fishers blocked them. They reported to your office but you did not 
give them assistance. You may recall that we previously patrolled around Lake Jipe 
and confiscated and burned illicit fishing equipment. Therefore, we expected that your 
office and fisheries committee would not allow the illicit practises to re-emerge. Due 
to the deficit of fisheries officers, we have only one officer in the division stationed at 
Kigonigoni village. For the successful protection of fisheries resources against illicit 
fishing, the cooperation of your office and the fisheries committee is necessary (District 
Fisheries Officer, for the District Natural Resource Officer, 10/6/2006).
The letter shows how hierarchical government structures can be bypassed by the fisheries 
committee when the hierarchy acts as an obstacle to enforcing sustainable fisheries management. 
The letter indicates that the District Natural Resources Office received complaints from the fisheries 
committee on the laxity of the leaders at the village and ward levels in curbing illicit practises. 
The district authority at the district intervened by ordering village and ward actors to cooperate 
with the committee.
Direct communication with the District Commissioner is another method used by the 
fisheries committees to empower their organisations against unsustainable fishing practises and 
against seemingly non-cooperative village and ward leaders. At the Jipe-Ndea division, fisheries 
committees have used this method to form a divisional fisheries union. This self-organisation 
is aimed at strengthening their voice in their concerns against illicit fishing and the laxity of 
enforcement instruments from the government at the village, ward and division levels. This action 
resulted from the realisation that technical officers entrusted them to perform functions that 
were not facilitated by the government. Furthermore, this organisation is designed to collaborate 
against illicit fishers who do not comply with fisheries regulations; when they violate regulations 
in one village, they flee into another. That is, after they have clashed with the committee and 
their equipment has been confiscated, fishers move to another village where they proceed with 
their unsustainable practises. Since the fisheries committees in the villages had been working 
independently of other similar committees in other villages, they could not address this situation 
adequately. The divisional fisheries committee union is designed to counteract this problem. This 
is illustrated in the letter from the union addressed to the District Commissioner, accusing the 
technical and administrative staff of not cooperating with the committee. At the same time, the 
letter informs the District Commissioner that they have formed a union at the division level, and 
they ask him to approve it. A portion of this letter is included below:
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We would like to inform your office about illicit fishing at Lake Jipe. We the fisheries 
committee have decided once again to inform your office about this situation, which 
is worsening daily. Last year, we informed your office about this situation and your 
office instructed the divisional secretary of the Jipe-Ndea division to take charge of this 
issue of illegal fishing. But what surprises us is that since the divisional secretary was 
given your instructions, he has not implemented even a single directive and now the 
situation is worsening. The situation at Lake Jipe is becoming extremely poor because 
since last year, many fishers from Nyumba ya Mungu dam in Mwanga and Manga dam 
in Korogwe have come to Lake Jipe, and these fishers are very experienced at the illicit 
capture of juvenile fish using dragnets and small netted fishnets of 1.25”. Honourable 
DC, we support your sincere efforts, which you have started implementing at Nyumba 
ya Mungu dam to combat illegal fishing, and we ask you to introduce such initiatives 
to Lake Jipe. Hon. DC, this committee would like to inform you of one thing. Many 
past DCs of this district failed to achieve their goals of combating illegal fishing because 
the village, ward and divisional leaders would not give them cooperation and this has 
even led to the loss of possible revenues. We need your assistance because here at Lake 
Jipe we do not have a fisheries officer. We have heard that the district sent a fisheries 
officer to this area last year, but we have never seen him. We ask you to take this issue 
seriously. Last year, we came to your office as a village fisheries committee for Jipe 
village, but now we have formed a divisional fisheries committee because Lake Jipe is 
found in two wards, Jipe and Kwakoa that together compose the Jipe-Ndea division. 
We have formed this divisional committee without informing the divisional secretary 
because he has never cooperated with the fisheries committees in the two wards. We 
need to be empowered to arrest illegal fishers and take them to legal facilities (Jipe-
Ndea Division, fisheries committees, 2007).
Procedurally, when such union is formed, leaders and technicians, and the village, ward and 
district levels must be informed. Since the fisheries committees have identified the leaders who 
seem to be obstacles to their roles, however, they bypassed them and pursued action from the 
higher authority at the district level.
4.3.4 Community participation in fisheries management
Although the fisheries committee represents the community, community members still have 
specific responsibilities in the management of fisheries resources. The role of the community 
can contribute to the success or failure of fisheries management as a whole. The participation 
of the community in the management of fisheries resources at Jipe mainly involves appointing 
fisheries committees. Although the community appoints the committees, it does not provide them 
with due cooperation at the policy enforcement stage. The committees are regarded as policing 
institutions that stand for the district and national hierarchies, but not as an integral part of 
the fishing community. Though the committees are elected by the fishers, they are regarded as 
impositions from the central and district governments. Such thinking is perhaps premised on 
the fact that the functions performed by these committees are similar to those performed by the 
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district officials before the formation of these committees – surveillance, monitoring, and control. 
Even in the current management regime, the District Natural Resources Department facilitates 
the committees, especially when blocked to implement their jurisdictions.
The fishing community regards the ownership of fisheries committees as existing outside 
the boundaries of the fishing communities. There is evidence that before the committees were 
appointed, insufficient effort was exerted to make local people clearly understand the rationale of 
forming these committees and whom they were going to serve. It also seems that less knowledge 
exists on the governing institutions in some parts of Lake Jipe community. The fishing community 
may compel the committee to work in the way they deem proper, and failure to do so would result 
in voting members off the committee. This is the case especially when catches from the lake decline 
and some fishers tell the community that the reason for this problem is the strictness of some 
members of the fisheries committee. This generally indicates that fisheries policy and regulations 
are not well understood among the fishing community.
Although the fisheries committee has the power of enforcing fisheries by-laws, the community 
has the power of deciding who should be included in the committee. Some elites know this and 
intelligently use the community to remove committee members who seem to be barriers to their 
interests. This is illustrated in an interview with a member of the fisheries committee in Butu 
village (a former chairperson). He was dismissed from his chair position because he was strict at 
enforcing by-laws against illicit fishing practises, while the local people wanted him to slacken 
the by-laws. When he was persistent, they replaced him with another chair.
The by-laws explained plainly that fishing nets of less than two inches should not be 
used for fishing. When I was chairperson of the fisheries committee, I had to make 
sure that this regulation was followed. Later, I discovered that when you become strict, 
people hate you. However, I think the fishers who carry out illicit fishing practises 
mobilised the people to force my dismissal from the chair position. People started 
to force me to allow them to use small fishnets, which I did not agree with. To my 
surprise, one day they organised a meeting and told me that from that day on I was 
not the chairperson but a mere member in the fishers committee (Member, Fisheries 
Committee, Butu village, 2007).
The current management framework empowers the community to determine the fate of 
members of fisheries committees because they appoint them. A lack of mechanisms to safeguard 
the security of committee members is an obstacle to the committee’s smooth functioning. There is 
currently no formal document that codifies the mode of membership in the fisheries committees 
and conditions for termination. This enables the community to remove members from the 
committee without even a rational analysis of the situation. Members may thus be displaced 
even when they operate within a framework of stipulated regulations.
The foregoing discussion describes how actors have different interests, which in one way or 
another trigger them to act at an expense of other actors, and also against sustainable resource 
management concerns. This demonstrates that in natural resource management, where many 
actors with different interests and intentions are involved, conflicts are inevitable.
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4.4 Conflicts and conflict resolution in fisheries management
This section analyses conflicts that emerge in the management of fisheries resources at Mwanga 
district in general, and Lake Jipe in particular. It also discusses approaches used to mediate and 
resolve these conflicts.
4.4.1 Conflicts
The following first analyses conflicts at the community level that emerge in the management and 
use of fisheries resources among various actors. In this respects, conflicts at this scale are termed 
intra-community conflicts. These conflicts occur at the village, ward and division governmental 
levels. Conflicts between the district government and the community, termed cross-scale conflicts, 
are then addressed. Finally, conflicts that arise across national borders, between fishers on the 
Tanzanian side and Tsavo National Park authorities on the Kenyan side, are discussed. This type 
of conflict are termed cross-border conflicts. Table 4.6 summarises these conflicts.
Intra-community conflicts
As introduced above, conflicts within the village community occur between the village/ward/
division government and the fisheries committee, between resident and non-resident fishers, 
between the fisheries committee and fishers, between village governments and non-resident fishers.
In collaborative decision-making, the failure of one side to fulfil its entrusted responsibilities 
constrains the effectiveness of another side, and may result in conflicts between collaborating 
parts. At Lake Jipe, the village, ward and division governmental leaders all engage in conflicts with 
the fisheries committee when these government leaders become an obstacle to the enforcement 
of fisheries by-laws. Based on participatory fisheries resource management, the committee has 
to collaborate with the village, ward and division governmental levels. Governmental actors are 
responsible for facilitating the committee by, for example, inflicting punitive measures upon fishers 
who threaten the committee and block them from implementing their responsibilities. Some 
government leaders fulfil their responsibilities. The most egregious violation of the governments’ 
role is when leaders ally with those involved in illicit practises. The fisheries committee is aware 
of when leaders are likely to benefit from illicit income obtained from violators, and responds 
with distrust. This lack of trust creates a lack of cooperation. The fisheries committee is then 
inclined to bypass the governing structures at the village, ward and division levels, and advances 
its concerns to the district governmental level. Thus, the committee demonstrates its belief that 
local governmental actors cannot facilitate its work. It therefore looks to governmental actors 
outside the village boundary for support. This weakens collaborative natural resource management. 
The successful management of natural resources requires cooperation among actors at different 
positions.
Irresponsibility contributes to the constraints on sustainable fisheries management. In this 
context, by irresponsibility I mean that those expected to facilitate community empowerment, 
capacity building and other facilitatory responsibilities, do not fulfil those responsibilities. 
Two aspects are relevant in the irresponsibility domain: namely, administrative and technical. 
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Administratively, it is the responsibility of administrators at the local level (e.g. ward executive 
officer, divisional secretary, village executive officers, etc.) to intervene when order and peace is 
compromised among local actors in the policy implementation process. This is intended to safeguard 
that the assigned responsibilities are fulfilled. The lower community institutions for enforcing 
fisheries regulations require cooperation from government facilitators. The administrators have 
the job of creating a harmonious and orderly environment to avoid uncertainty among community 
actors when performing their entrusted roles. By the same token, the extension service providers 
are expected to ensure the provision of relevant services, advice and training that enhance the 
capacity of the enforcing committees at the community level. The failure of governmental actors 
to appropriately fulfil their responsibilities constrains the committees in their work.
Table 4.6. Conflicts among fisheries actors as one of the problems of the fisheries sector at the Lake 
Jipe area (source: field survey, 2006).
Actors	involved Source	of	conflict Resolving	institution	(s)	
Resident fishers versus non-resident 
fishers
• Use of destructive equipment by 
non-resident fishers
• Distortion and removal of 
resident fishers’ equipment by 
non-resident fishers
• Village government
• Natural Resource Office
• Elders
• Divisional Secretary
Fisheries committee versus fishers • Illicit fishing practises
• Not observing the established 
institutional arrangements
• District Natural Resources 
Department
• Police
• Ward Fisheries Officers
• Ward Executive Officer 
Non-resident fishers versus village 
leaders
• Use of illegal fishing equipment
• Non-resident fishers threaten to 
physically assault the leaders
• Non-residents fishers do not 
observe village rules
• Village government and 
established by-laws
• General village meetings
District/Division/Ward/Village 
leaders versus members of the 
fisheries committee
• Not recognising the role of the 
committee, interfering in negative 
way
• Not facilitating and protecting the 
committee against illicit fishers
• Controversially releasing the 
violators of regulations 
• District Commissioner
• District Natural Resources 
Office
Tsavo national park officers and 
Kenyan police versus Tanzanian 
fishers
• Tanzanian fishers invading the 
Tsavo National Park
• Legal actions taken, dialogue 
between Tz and Kenyan 
governments
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In other situations, government leaders, who should facilitate and support the enforcement of 
fisheries management by-laws, may oppose the process. These leaders align with illicit fishers and 
obstruct the action of the fisheries committee and responsive leaders. The following portion of a 
letter from the Ward Fisheries Officer to the District Fisheries Officer illustrates this phenomenon.
Refer to the heading above. I am informing you that the illicit fishing that continues at 
Kiti cha Mungu is supported by village leaders. On 12/06/2007 at 5:30 pm, I, with the 
Ward Executive Officer (WEO) and some fishers, conducted a patrol at the area where 
illicit fishing equipment was used, and we found three boats with ropes for pulling 
illicit fishing nets. When we were burning the ropes, a group of fishers appeared and 
insulted us, claiming that we were harassing them. Some of them assaulted a member 
of the fisheries committee who was with us in the patrol, claiming that he is too strict, 
and that he had better die. This fisher also stated that no one among us could arrest 
him, but that only the police could do that. They continued to threaten us, and later 
one of them asked us ‘why are you leaders very strict, not like our village leaders?’ 
This statement is similar to claims we have heard from resident fishers who refuse to 
participate in patrols until their village leaders participate because the illicit fishers 
give the leaders money every month, so that they do not monitor them but instead 
protect them. In total, those who were insulting and threatening us were five fishers. 
They claimed that they would kill two leaders of the fisheries committee, and if they 
failed to do so, they would set their houses on fire. These threats have been reported 
to a local police station (Kirya Ward Fisheries Officer; Mwanga District 17/06/2007).
The letter indicates that some leaders constrain collaborations between the government and 
community institutions (i.e. the fisheries committee) in enforcing sustainable fisheries management 
by promoting illicit gains and defending the law violators.
Competition for scarce resources is another source of conflict among resource users in the 
community. When a resource is scarce, each group strives to procure a part of that resource, and 
in that struggle, the interests of other users may be ignored or affected. One such conflict is that 
between non-resident fishers and resident fishers at Lake Jipe. There is a general conception among 
Lake Jipe residents that non-resident fishers, besides carrying out unsustainable fishing practises, 
are cruel. At Ruru subvillage, for example, non-resident fishers dragged their fishing nets in fishing 
sites where the residents had set their nets, hooks, and fishing baskets. This kind of conflict was 
intense because it led to the use of knives and spears. Had it not been for the elders’ intervention, 
the conflict could have resulted in fatal outcomes. The elders and the village government then 
reported this conflict to the Natural Resources Department, and police at the district. The District 
Natural Resources Office intervened to resolve these conflicts by exhorting the fishers to respect 
one another’s fishing arrangements.
Conflicts between resident and non-resident fishers are not only attributed to the interference 
of fishing sites of resident fishers by non-resident fishers. Generally, the two conflicting groups 
are not on good terms. It is broadly true that if resident fishers had the power to prevent non-
residents from fishing in Lake Jipe, they would do so. Such a power, nonetheless, does not exist, 
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so the two have to use fisheries resources together. This is because the resources are owned by the 
government, not by resident fishers.
The existing fisheries legal instruments do not put boundaries on resource users. According 
to these procedures, anybody can fish anywhere in the country (Tanzania) if he/she has procured 
fishing and fishing vessel licences, and pays the required taxes to relevant authorities. From a 
sustainability point of view, this makes it difficult to control unsustainable fishing practises. For 
example, it is difficult to get migratory users to engage in sustainable practises because their 
interest is to obtain adequate amounts of fish, but not to sustain the resources of the lake. This 
is because when fishing resources are depleted in one area, migratory fishers move to another. 
This results in conflicts between migratory users and the residents of the particular area, as the 
residents depend on the resource on a daily basis for food and income. For residents, Lake Jipe 
has been a major source of their livelihood for many years. They are therefore concerned about 
migratory fishers’ degradation of that resource. This concern is so strong that non-residents are 
excluded from fisheries committees on the argument that their inclusion could lead to greater 
degradation of fisheries resources. The residents assume that the inclusion of non-resident fishers 
in the committee would give them the opportunity to perpetuate poor fishing practises.
However, non-resident fishers who have intermarried in the resident community and have 
established settlements are now regarded as a part of the resident community. The exclusion from 
the fisheries committees therefore does not apply to them. For example, there are fishers from 
Lake Nyasa in the southern regions of Tanzania and from the Singida region in central Tanzania 
who are members of the fisheries committees. These individuals are regarded to have the same 
stake in fisheries resources as the Pare residents because they have become a part of that group. By 
excluding non-resident fishers from the fisheries committee, resident fishers and the community 
imply that they have a greater commitment to the lake than non-resident fishers. In other words, 
they believe that they are to be more likely affected by degradation of the fisheries resources than 
non-resident fishers. This belief most likely originates in their persistent dependence on the lake 
for subsistence and income.
The scarcity of dependable resources creates pressure to relax the enforcement of governing 
rules, which leads to intra-community conflicts between law enforcers and resource users. At Lake 
Jipe, this conflict exists between the fishing community and fisheries committee. When fish supplies 
are scarce, the fishing communities in some villages want the fisheries committee to be less strict 
in its enforcement of fishing regulations. This was the case in Butu village, where a member of the 
fisheries committee was dismissed from the chair position because he was strict in enforcing the 
regulations when fish were scarce. Since the village community appoints the fisheries committee 
and, therefore, can dismiss them, they use this power to enforce adaptations of the regulations 
based on the fish availability. In other words, some fishing communities want the regulations to be 
implemented on the basis of seasonal fish availability. When there is abundant fish, the regulations 
can be enforced in keeping with established institutional arrangements, whereas when there is 
scarcity, they should be less strict.
This may imply that when fish are scarce, even fish of sizes smaller than recommended (the 
recommended size is at least 2 inches), could be harvested. The local people consider resources 
conservation to have lower priority when socioeconomic needs are not met, especially in times of 
deficit. They try to cope with this scarcity by enforcing the modification of the formally established 
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arrangements to counteract seasonal shortages and meet their needs. When the limited livelihood 
options are less productive, the priority of environmental concerns becomes low. Balancing the 
conflicts of interests between socioeconomic and environmental concerns at such a time is a 
challenge.
Fisheries committees and fishers also conflict when the latter do not want to comply with 
orders from fisheries committees requiring them to stop illicit fishing practises. A portion of a 
letter written by the Ward Fisheries Officer to the District Fisheries Officer illustrates this fact:
Today, Sunday, a member of the fisheries committee prevented two fishers from 
fishing using small fishing nets and mosquito nets. They decided to assault him. While 
assaulting the committee member, a religious leader, who was passing by, asked them 
to stop the assault. One of the fishers, the owner of illicit fishing equipment, beat the 
religious leader using either a knife or a sharp edged tool and wounded him on his 
head, so he was bleeding. They also took off the committee member’s shirt, beat him, 
and threatened that they would set fire to his grass-thatched house. The wounded 
reported to the police station. At the same time, the illicit fishers have hidden their 
boat and illicit fishing equipment in a place we do not know. These fishers have always 
been stubborn and they do not even want to surrender their illicit fishing equipment 
(Ward Fisheries Officer a Kirya Ward, 19/2/2006).
The consequences of the conflicts have the potential to extend beyond actors directly engaged 
in enforcement. In the case above, a mediating actor suffered in the same way as the member 
of fisheries committee. Tension between socioeconomic and ecological interests caused this 
consequences. There is a strong tension between the procurement of livelihoods and environmental 
concerns. One reason for this tension is that the fishers do not have alternative livelihood options 
to diversify sources of food and income. They do not, therefore, consider the effects of their 
practises today against the availability of resources in the future. The reduction in the sizes of 
fish obtainable from the lake due to their own unsustainable harvest methods triggers further 
use of unsustainable fishing tools to obtain substantial amounts for subsistence and income. This 
constrains the efforts of the fisheries committee. Collaboration with the District Natural Resources 
Office and the security enforcers, i.e. the police, is thus sought to force the violators to comply.
Non-observance of established institutional arrangements leads to conflicts. This may be 
caused by simple ignorance, or by a strong desire to fulfil livelihood needs. The lack of diverse 
livelihood options may also catalyse this non-observance. At Jipe, conflicts occur between the 
village government and non-resident fishers. This conflict occurs because non-resident fishers 
do not recognise the governing and fishing institutions in the hosting villages. In addition, non-
resident fishers threaten village leaders. The leaders report this in ward development committee 
(WDC) meetings, which are regularly held every quarter of the year. For example, in the WDC 
meeting held on 11th May 2005 at Jipe village, the village executive officer (VEO) reported that 
non-resident fishers threaten the leaders when required to comply with the governing rules. They 
do not want to follow the village rules and fisheries by-laws.
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Cross scale conflicts
Cross-scale conflicts occur between fisheries committees and District Natural Resources 
Department. The fisheries committees, as previously indicated, are keen on performing the 
responsibilities entrusted to them. This justifies their efforts to counteract unsustainable fishing 
practises. They demonstrate their commitment to their responsibilities by their practise of 
bypassing some governing structures when those structures do not effectively act against illicit 
fishing practises. A portion of a letter written by the fisheries committee, and addressed to the 
District Commissioner illustrates this reality:
Refer to our letter Ref. S/R/No. A01/2006 we addressed to the Division Fisheries Officer 
of Jipe-Ndea Division on the disputable release of illicit fishers we had seized. After 
the release, these fishers are carrying out even more destructive fishing methods using 
illicit equipment. We ask your office to empower us to deal with this issue (Fishers 
committee, Ruru subvillage, 13/2/2007).
The source of the conflict in the case above is the fisheries committee’s surprise at the controversial 
release of the illicit fishers they had arrested. It seems that the fisheries committee was not satisfied 
with this release. What surprised them further is that after their release, the violators once again 
engaged in the same violation, only even more intensely. It is possible to imply from the situation 
that violators of the regulations might have bribed village and ward level governmental actors. The 
fishers, having seen this weakness, follow the established bureaucratic procedures by informing the 
next higher government hierarchy, that is, the Division Fisheries Officer. However, silence from 
the technical officer at the division level ended their pursuit of this matter. They then reported the 
issue to the District Commissioner (DC). It may seem surprising that the fisheries committee did 
not go through District Natural Resources Office, but their previous experiences whereby similar 
concerns were not appropriately addressed by that officer might have triggered their decision to 
report to the DC directly.
Prior to writing this letter, the fisheries committee had requested assistance to curb unsustainable 
fishing practises. The assistance was sought when the committee observed that their lives were 
threatened by the illicit fishers. They asked the District Natural Resources Office to bring the 
police in to assist them in confiscating prohibited equipment and small fish already harvested. The 
Natural Resources Office responded that it was constrained by financial resource. Surprisingly, 
the committee saw members of that office visit the villages to collect taxes from fishers. Thus, they 
interpreted this to mean that the Fisheries Officers were likely to be involved in illicit arrangements 
with the illicit fishers. They therefore decided to report this in writing to the DC. They wrote a 
letter accusing the Natural Resources Department and asking the DC for assistance. A portion 
of their letter to the DC affirms this:
We first of all commend you for your efforts to control illicit fishing. Honourable 
DC, illicit fishing has tremendously increased and now it is done openly at any time. 
Our lives are endangered as members of fisheries committee, as are the lives of all 
the people who support us. Owners of prohibited fishing equipment and fishers have 
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established a squad to harm us. Honourable DC, we have reported this situation to 
the District Natural Resources Office so that they would request the Commanding 
District Police (OCD) to send policemen to our village to assist us with the exercise 
of confiscating and destroying prohibited equipment and arresting the violators. The 
Natural Resource Office has ignored our requests. We ask you to assist us with ten 
police officers for us to be secure in controlling the illicit fishing practises. Honourable 
DC, the District Natural Resources Officers are not with us in fighting against illegal 
fishing, they work for their own interests. When we ask them to bring the police, they 
respond that they do not have fuel for transport, but surprisingly they come daily to 
our village to issue fishing licenses. We cannot understand whether the problem is fuel 
or that the owners of the prohibited fishing equipment have bribed them. We ask you, 
Honourable DC, to assist in solving our dilemma. In addition, we request you to assist 
the Ward Fisheries Officer of Lang’ata by providing reliable transportation for him 
to be able to patrol the entire ward. Presently, it is hard for him to move around this 
vast area on foot. So, he is supported with a bicycle given to him by Good Samaritan 
villagers (Fisheries committee Kigongo village, 5/9/2006).
The account above illustrates the reason why the fisheries committee overlooked the District 
Natural Resources Office. This was based on their previous experience, whereby this governmental 
department could not help in addressing problems the committee faced in its work even as the 
committee was convinced that department had the power to do so.
It would be possible for the District Natural Resources Officers to misinterpret the committee’s 
complaints as being attributable to the villagers’ lack of understanding of the financial constraints 
experienced by the district department. Nevertheless, the District Natural Resources Officers 
need to acknowledge that the committee is doing a good job, and that their concern demonstrates 
that are committed to undertaking sustainable management of the fisheries resources even by 
assessing the accountability of the district authority. This attribute can be developed further so 
as to improve sustainable management of fisheries resources in the area. Care should be taken 
not to lower the morale of fisheries committees. In order to sustain the morale of the committee, 
relevant governmental authorities need to act accordingly when the fisheries committee presents 
issues that hinder the sustainable management of fisheries resources in the area.
The failure of the District Natural Resource Officer to appropriately execute his responsibilities 
is sometimes due to reasons beyond his control. Limited financial capacity is among the restrictions 
that influence the implementation of fisheries policy at Mwanga district. This problem renders 
institutions and departments entrusted with facilitation ineffective. Coupled with information 
gaps regarding the powers of higher departments between facilitators and the entrusted executers 
of specific policy roles, this results in conflicts and mistrust between involved actors in certain 
shared roles. This is the case in the interactions between Fisheries Department at the Mwanga 
district level and the fisheries committee, whereby the former is expected to facilitate the later in 
ensuring their security in surveillance and monitoring responsibilities.
Contradictory messages from leaders also cause cross-scale conflicts. Messages from the 
leaders to their constituents may cause an impasse in fisheries management. While authorised 
institutions enforce sustainable management practises and by-laws, other resource users may use 
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the messages delivered to the community as rationale for their non-compliance. At Mwanga, this 
problem has occurred between the fishers of some communities and the ward and the district 
fisheries officers. The cause of this impasse was a speech, which was delivered by the Minister 
for Natural Resources who was interpreted as having said that fishers should fish without fishing 
licences. The following section of a letter from District Natural Resource Officer to the District 
Executive Director (DED) indicates this:
The patrol was planned because illicit fishing resumed in the Nyabinda and Njia 
Panda villages. The illegal fishing included the use of prohibited fishing equipment 
such as small sized dragnets, and fishing without a fishing license, which is a violation 
of fishing laws of 2003 and the regulation of 2005. We requested 10 police officers for 
our security, but were given seven. When we arrived at the landing sites at the lake, it 
was around the time for fishing, and fishers were about to pick their vessels and tools 
to get in the lake. We announced that we had to check that only those with fishing 
licenses could be allowed to pick their vessels and get in the lake. Suddenly, a big group 
of fishers with stones and clubs in their hands surrounded us. They blocked our escape 
route with big logs, and threatened to shed our blood. We tried to persuade them not 
to harm us and calm down but they would not. The fishers then claimed that they 
have been allowed to fish without licenses by the Minister of Natural Resources and 
Tourism, and demanded that we should bring him so that he could discuss this with 
them. We ultimately decided to leave the area because our lives were endangered 
(Natural Resources Officer, Mwanga District, 21/11/2007).
In order to gain acceptance from constituents, and to win their votes for the upcoming elections, 
political leaders may deliver speeches to show they are responsible, caring, and sympathise with 
problems of their people, and want to assist them to achieve solutions to their priority problems. 
Sometimes, the delivered speech may contradict with official regulations.
Cross-border conflicts
The management of cross-border natural resources with diverse and contrasting objectives has 
the potential to result in conflicts among diverse trans-boundary actors. A part of Lake Jipe falls 
within Tsavo National Park on the Kenyan side. Fishing is prohibited in this area. Nevertheless, 
fishers from the Tanzanian side enter the park area illicitly. They illicitly fish in this area for the 
same reason the area is protected, because of the abundance of big fish. When caught, besides 
being accused of illegally entering the park, fishers are also accused of illegally crossing the 
border and carrying out fishing in the prohibited area. Claims of entering the country without a 
legal permit, however, are rarely raised when this occurs. In normal circumstances, this is not a 
pertinent violation because inhabitants of the Lake Jipe area (Tanzanians and Kenyans) intermarry 
and intermix in social and economic functions without having legal permits to cross the border. 
It is possible to find Tanzanian women selling fish on the local markets in Kenyan side, or Kenyan 
vendors selling vegetables and buying milk on the Tanzanian side. Leaders at the international 
border cooperate in the resolution of socioeconomic matters involving their people regardless 
4. Management of fisheries resources at the Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania 97
of their legal national identity. Nonetheless, in the case of fishing in the park area, the issue of 
legal identities becomes pertinent. Settlement of this kind of problem requires adhering to legal 
procedures (Table 4.7), which necessary involves their countries of origin.
Table 4.7 shows some fishers from Tanzania who were fined and/or sentenced to jail in Kenya 
because of illicit fishing in the protected area of Lake Jipe on the Kenyan side, which is within 
the Tsavo National Park. Besides arresting and imprisoning the criminal fishers, complaints 
against fishers from Tanzania encroaching on protected areas in Kenya are also raised in letters 
to Tanzanian authorities (e.g. the Ward Councillor, Ward Executive Officer, etc.). Further, the 
violators sometimes request, through their relatives who visit them while in captivity, that the 
authorities in Tanzania send formal requests to Kenyan authorities to allow them serve their 
punishment in Tanzania.
Although the fishers know that it is forbidden to enter and to fish in the Tsavo National Park, 
and are aware of the consequences they are likely to encounter when caught, they chance fishing in 
the protected area, with the awareness that, if not caught, they will obtain substantial amounts of 
big fish that will enhance their incomes. This is contrary to the thinking of the Natural Resources 
Officers at the Mwanga district, who believes it is possible to eliminate this cross border conflict 
by educating the fishers as to the negative impacts of not observing the international boundaries.
4.4.2 Conflict resolution
In this sub-section, I analyse mechanisms used to address conflicts emergent in the use and 
management of fisheries resources. We have already seen that conflicts occur at the community 
level (involving the fishers, fisheries committee, and the village, ward and division governmental 
levels) and at the district level between the community (fisheries committee) and the government. 
Mechanisms used to resolve these conflicts depend on the nature of the conflict, the degree of the 
conflict, the level at which it occurs, and the actors involved.
Collaboration between the government (formal institutions) and the community (informal 
institutions) is one way of resolving conflicts in fisheries management. An example of this 
collaboration is that which integrates the elders in the community and the government at the village 
and district levels when conflicts exceed the power of the community to resolve. Most conflicts 
Table 4.7. Actions taken against Tanzanian fishers who trespass into protected areas in Kenya on 24 
May, 2005 (source: Natural Resources Office, Mwanga district, 2007).
Violators Action	taken
Fisher 1 6 months imprisonment
Fisher 2 6 months imprisonment
Fisher 3 6 months imprisonment
Fisher 4 Fined TZS 175,200
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involving residents are resolved by elders without involving the government. In addressing these 
disputes (among the residents), elders employ traditions and customs that are legitimate among 
the residents. These may include fining offenders, or preparing a meal and local brew and eating 
together while mediating the dispute. This mechanism is based on the legitimate authority and 
held by elders in the community.
However, when conflicts involve both outsiders (non-residents) and residents, the outsiders do 
not recognise the authority and legitimacy of the traditional arrangements. Although the elders 
can ease the tension between users to a certain extent (especially by restraining these residents 
from reacting violently), they need to cooperate with the government to address this kind of 
conflict. In such conflicts, the use of weapons, such as knives, spears and arrows, may occur, as 
took place at Mkisha subvillage at Lake Jipe. In such situations, the elders inform the District 
Natural Resources Office and the Police. The District Natural Resources Office visits the area and 
collaborates with the Divisional Secretary and elders to resolve the conflict by advising fishers to 
respect one another’s fishing sites. The level of conflict thus necessitates the collaboration of the 
community and various governmental levels. Whereas the elders are the first to intervene in this 
dispute, the level of the conflict threatens the elders’ ability to manage the situation. This causes 
the elders to call for the involvement of other authoritative bodies.
Formal bureaucratic procedures involve consultative meetings between the District 
Commissioner (DC) and the fishing community. In these meetings, the DC is accompanied 
by the District Natural Resources Officer, who strategises with the fishing communities about 
mechanisms for combating illicit fishing. The DC’s responded to the accusations levelled by the 
fisheries committee against the District Natural Resources Officer through a consultative meeting.
The use of established legal mechanisms is imperative for resolving conflicts due to violation 
of the by-laws. This is especially the case when some actors physically harm others when told to 
stop using unsustainable natural resource exploitation methods and equipment. Conflicts that 
result in harm to other actors are addressed in the Fisheries Act 22 of 2003 and the district fisheries 
by-laws. For example, Article 41 of the act stipulates that anyone who obstructs the entrusted 
authorities from exercising their jurisdictions commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, 
to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding six years.
Integrated legal and diplomatic mechanisms are used to mediate cross-border conflicts at 
Lake Jipe. Encroachment on the Tsavo National Park situated on the Kenyan side of Lake Jipe 
by fishers from the Tanzanian side requires collaboration between leaders from the two sides to 
resolve emerging disputes. Kenyan ward leaders communicate with ward leaders in Tanzania about 
the illicit fishing practises of Tanzanian fishers. The Ward Councillor reports this to the District 
Natural Resources Officer for action. Besides such collaboration, legal actions are taken against 
illicit fishers, including fines and imprisonment, as was indicated in Table 4.7. The two countries 
may negotiate as to whether the fishers should be imprisoned in Kenya or should be returned to 
Tanzania and serve their punishments in Tanzanian prison.
Local stakeholders’ meetings are another approach to conflict resolution, though the success 
of such an approach is not always certain. Participatory approaches are used to address conflicts 
between village leaders and non-resident fishers, who do not observe the regulations and threaten 
the leaders at Lake Jipe. A village assembly is convened in which all villagers, including resident and 
non-resident fishers, are entitled to participate. Leaders at the ward and village levels explain the 
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established procedures and encourage non-resident fishers to observe them and to stop threatening 
the leaders. This method has to be implemented on a regular basis because non-resident fishers 
enter and leave the area frequently.
Since this thesis investigates the possibility of co-management of natural resources between 
the government and local people, the next section identifies and evaluates co-management 
arrangements in the management of fisheries resources at Lake Jipe.
4.6 Co-management analysis and evaluation
Co-management exists in fisheries management through the interplay of formal and informal 
institutions in fisheries management at Lake Jipe. Formal institutions are government-based 
institutions. While governmental actors enforce some formal institutions, others formal institutions 
have been entrusted to the community and community organisations steer their actions, while 
the government facilitate those actions. The fisheries committee is one such organisation, which 
is appointed by the community to enforce fisheries policy through monitoring, control and 
surveillance, of natural resources use practises in the users’ community. These responsibilities have 
been entrusted to the community by the government, and are implemented within the framework 
of and with the help of government institutions. The government retains the jurisdictions of 
collecting revenues from taxes, fishing and fishing vessels licenses. At the community level, there 
are also informal institutions, which are based on norms, traditions, and customs, that evolve 
to resolve socioeconomic and cultural issues emerging in interactions between users of fisheries 
resources. These interact with the formal institutions to govern and mediate fisheries resource 
use and management among users.
Fishers are important actors in the co-management of fisheries resources at Lake Jipe. However, 
co-management involves resident fishers, while non-resident fishers are excluded because they 
are viewed as a threat to fisheries resource management. They are commonly identified as the 
perpetrators of illicit fishing practises. It is, nevertheless, questionable as to whether excluding 
non-resident fishers is a solution to their unsustainable practises. Because they are excluded, 
non-resident fishers may regard themselves as not having a stake in the resource, and, therefore, 
may continue to perpetuate unsustainable resource use practises. However, while the inclusion of 
non-resident fishers in management committees may help to engender a sense of ownership over 
resource management, it is not clear how they should be integrated. This is because non-resident 
fishers do not stay permanently in one area. While today they may be at Lake Jipe, tomorrow they 
will be at another area, and they may return to Lake Jipe at a later time. Moreover, it is probable 
that new non-resident fishers are likely to come to Lake Jipe area in different fishing seasons. 
While the exclusion of non-resident fishers may not provide a solution to unsustainable fisheries 
practises, their inclusion needs to be considered with care in order to accommodate their tendency 
to migrate seasonally.
The participation of governmental actors at the local level (village, ward, division) is 
contradictory. While in some areas, some local leaders seem to support co-management initiatives, 
in other areas they seem to block or frustrate the co-management arrangement.
In some cases, they even seem to align with violators of fisheries regulations and institutions 
as is implied not only in letters from fisheries institutions to the district leaders, but also in letters 
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from the Ward Fisheries Officers to the district leaders. It seems that some local government leaders 
do not support co-management arrangements because they benefit from illicit collaborations. 
There are therefore divisions in the implementation of fisheries management among the local 
leaders, and between the local leaders and the district leaders. While the district leaders generally 
promote the implementation and enforcement of fisheries regulations, the institutions at the local 
levels (village, ward, and division) are not well-integrated. Some officers support the enforcement 
of fisheries policy and have cooperated well with fisheries committees, to the extent that one 
committee became concerned with an officer’s working constraint (i.e. the lack of transportation) 
and tried to alleviate it. In contrast, other officers obstruct the enforcement of fisheries regulations, 
and devise mechanisms to acquire illegal revenues. Instead of facilitating the committees, they 
constrain them, and do not seem to cooperate even when the committee communicates with 
them. For these officers, the initiation of the fisheries committees may appear as a threat to their 
power, and to the benefits they acquired before the establishment of these institutions. These mixed 
interactions contribute to either the success or the weakening of the co-management arrangements.
The frequent involvement of the police in co-management may imply that co-management 
is not supported by the fishers and community users at Lake Jipe. It appears that the fishing 
community is not ready for co-management, but that co-management has been thrust upon them. 
When the police are frequently involved in the policing of the co-management arrangements, 
one can ask whether these resource management regimes are sustainable. Similarly, the low 
level of cooperation between the fishing community and the fisheries committee, and the 
prevailing conflicts between the fishers and the fisheries committee, may raise the argument 
that the co-management arrangement currently prevailing in fisheries management at Lake Jipe 
is an imposition, rather than a legitimate and widely accepted arrangement. While the fisheries 
committees are entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing compliance to fisheries policy in 
the fishing community, their work need to be legitimated in the eyes of the fishing community 
who are the target of fisheries management initiatives. The frequent police coercion over the local 
users to observe fisheries regulations, and the low cooperation received by community actors 
carrying out enforcement responsibilities, may imply that the co-management regime will not 
be sustainable in the long term.
Informal institutions at Lake Jipe have a role to play in the co-management arrangements, 
and these collaborate with formal institutions. The informal institutions are norms and customs 
that govern relationships among specific resource users. At Lake Jipe, social norms and traditions 
give elders the power to mediate conflicts among resource users. Although the local or district 
government is usually ultimately responsible for the resolution of conflicts between resident 
and non-resident users of fisheries resources, the elders assist these actors in resolving conflicts, 
especially at the onset stage, because these actors are close to the people. In most cases, the elders 
report these conflicts to the government leaders because, even at the village level, there may be 
some delays inherent in the channels that relay information to governmental leaders. Moreover, 
at other times, at the village level, the government may fail to suppress the conflicts before higher 
level governmental actors are informed. In such cases, the elders may manage to calm the fishers 
before these governmental actors arrive at the scene, as was the case in Mkisha sub-village. Their 
power to resolve these conflicts is due to the legitimacy of elders in the sight of the local people, 
including the resident fishers. However, the elders’ ability to resolve conflicts is higher within the 
4. Management of fisheries resources at the Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania 101
community than in a situation that comprises external and internal users. This is because the 
external users (non-resident fishers) do not recognise the elders’ legitimacy as traditional leaders.
One of the most important actors implementing fisheries co-management between the 
government and the community at Lake Jipe is the fisheries committees. This type of committee 
can be seen as a co-management arrangement in itself, as the committees are given resources 
from the government but are appointed by the community. The fisheries committees regard the 
responsibilities entrusted to them seriously. They even challenge the District Government Natural 
Resources Department when they perceive this authority to be disabling their efforts to curb illicit 
fisheries practises, as is indicated in the example in section 4.4.1. However, as mentioned earlier, 
the committees are not accorded due cooperation by the fishing communities, who view them 
as an imposition from the government, rather than as representatives of the community that 
appointed the committee members. As we have also seen, the fisheries committees know where 
to report to in case a governmental level is not responsive. This knowledge allows the committees 
to bypass non-responsive governmental levels and actors, and to report unaccountable leaders 
to a higher institutional level. These committees are composed of resident fishers, and therefore 
there is a general tension between the committee members and non-resident fishers. There is a 
belief that if non-resident fishers were included in the fisheries committees, they would be likely 
to misuse their position to perpetuate unsustainable fishing practises. For fisheries committees 
to sustain their efforts, however, they need support from the government and other community 
actors in their areas to create a smooth management process rather than escalating conflicts 
among actors at the local level.
The Fisheries Section (in the Natural Resource Department) at the district level is an important 
formal actor for overseeing formal fisheries management institutions by enforcing, facilitating, 
and coordinating collaborative fisheries management at the district level. It is the enforcer of the 
policy and legal instruments at the local level. However, it may appear that the District Fisheries 
Section focuses more on procuring revenues from local resource areas than building the capacity 
of fishers. For example, the provision of training to the fishers, the exploiters of fisheries resources, 
is not prioritised. If sustainable management of the fisheries resources is to be attained, training 
should be given, not to the fisheries committee alone, but also to fishers. The fishers need to gain 
skills on sustainable fishing practises and methods. The Fisheries Section currently excuses this 
lack of training by saying that fishers would not alter their behaviour, even if trained. This point 
is disputable. Similarly, although non-resident fishers are excluded in the management of fisheries 
resources, the district department has not made any effort to negotiate participatory fisheries 
management among these users.
The existing co-management arrangement, therefore, is composed of formal and informal 
institutions. Collaboration between these institutions (through government by-laws and regulations 
and the norms and customs of the community as guided by the elders) enables the resolution 
of conflicts among fisheries resource users and those responsible for fisheries management. 
While formal (government-based) institutions alone mainly resolve fisheries management issues 
involving governmental actors and the community based fisheries committee, and between the 
institutional enforcers and the users, informal institutions mainly resolve issues emerging among 
resident resource users. However, these formal (state) and informal (community based) institutions 
integrate or cooperate to resolve resource use conflicts that involve both external and local users, 
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which cannot be adequately resolved by formal or informal institutions individually. Although 
community informal institutions have not been recognised and entrusted by the government to 
partake in the management of fisheries resources, they have joined the process based on their 
authority in the community. The power of the local institutions, however, is limited when resource 
use issues comprise local and external users. In these cases, the integration and collaboration of 
formal and informal (local institutions) is necessary.
While the fisheries co-management arrangement works to resolve resource use conflicts 
between resident and non-resident fishers and between fishers and enforcers of sustainable 
fisheries management, it focuses on the fisheries sector alone. Other sectors that influence the 
management of fisheries resources at Lake Jipe (e.g. livestock and agriculture) are ignored. Suffice 
it to mention here that the problem of siltation of Lake Jipe is contributed to by, among other 
things, unsustainable farming practises downstream and upstream of Lake Jipe. The management of 
Lake Jipe resources is, therefore, a multi- and cross-sectoral issue. The next chapter will present an 
analysis the collaboration between the government, non-governmental actors, and the community 
in the management of natural resources in agricultural production.
Chapter 5.  
Management of natural resources in agricultural production at 
Lake Jipe
5.1 Introduction
The sustainable management of Lake Jipe resources in agricultural production depends on, 
among other things, collaboration between the government, non-governmental actors, and 
agricultural producers. The users of natural resources in agricultural production at Lake Jipe 
comprise upstream and downstream farmers. The two localities are interconnected by water that 
flows from the upstream area to the downstream area. Therefore, poor water management practises 
upstream have negative consequences for water downstream. Land also connects the two areas, 
so that land management practises at the upstream area have implications for the downstream 
area. Poor land management at the upstream area results in soil erosion and deposition to the 
bed of Lake Jipe, which is located downstream. Whereas the farmers are the primary managers 
of natural resources at Lake Jipe, governmental and non-governmental actors are the facilitators 
and enforcers of good management practises.
This chapter analyses co-management arrangements between the government (agricultural 
sector) and the community (farmers) for sustainable management of Lake Jipe. Specifically, the 
chapter analyses how governmental, non-governmental and community institutions collaborate 
in managing land and water resources in agricultural production. The paper begins with a brief 
overview of environmental problems in the management of natural resources in agricultural 
production at Lake Jipe. The chapter then analyses how governmental, non-governmental, and 
community institutions participate in resolving conflicts that emerge in resource management. 
Finally, it analyses and evaluates co-management between governmental, non-governmental and 
community actors and states the implications for Lake Jipe.
5.2 Environmental problems in Lake Jipe due to agriculture
The main environmental problem at Lake Jipe is siltation caused by inappropriate agricultural 
activities. Two major sources of the problem are land degradation on steep slopes and the 
encroachment of cultivation on fragile areas such as river tributaries and the shores of Lake Jipe.
Inappropriate cultivation practises degrade land resources. Cultivation methods used at Lake 
Jipe include flat cultivation, fallow, and the use of ridges, terraces and contours. Flat cultivation is 
a land tillage method whereby a hand-hoe or plough is used to cut and turn the soil, and usually 
stalks are burned. When it is practised on steep areas, it results in soil erosion due to a lack of soil 
harvesting structures. Fallow is the practise whereby a farm plot is left uncultivated for a specified 
period in an attempt to replenish its potential for future productivity. The flat cultivation method 
is the main farming system practised by farmers at the Lake Jipe area, even on steep areas. For 
example, out of 80 farmers interviewed, 49.2% practise flat cultivation, 24% practise fallow, 19.5% 
use ridges in their farms, 3.8% use terraces, and 3.8% use contours (Figure 5.1). This implies that 
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the majority of the farmers have not adopted soil conservation techniques, such as terracing or 
contours. Although they make use of crop rotation and inter-cropping techniques as methods 
to improve soil fertility, their farms remain vulnerable to soil erosion caused by sloping terrain, 
especially during rains. The Lake Jipe Ward Extension Officer noted that the farmers’ failure to 
adopt these techniques may result from the fact that contours and terraces are labour-intensive 
and that they require relatively high cash investments, which farmers cannot afford.
Soil erosion leads to a decline in production due to a decrease in soil fertility over time. 
Although it was not possible to get statistical data to substantiate this argument, interviews with 
farmers indicate that agricultural production has been in decline over recent years (Table 5.1). 
When their farms are less productive, farmers may move to fragile areas because arable land is 
limited. This encroachment on fragile areas, which farmers’ view as relatively fertile areas, may 
result in the development of gully erosion, as indicated in Figure 5.2. The eroded soils are deposited 
on the bed of Lake Jipe.
Even though farming is prohibited on the steep mountainous areas inclining toward Lake Jipe, 
these areas are encroached upon by cultivation practises. Moreover, the farming techniques carried 
out on these fragile areas are poor. These encroached-upon areas are located both downstream 
and upstream of Lake Jipe.
Poor enforcement of conservation by-laws is a contributing factor to the encroachment 
upon these areas. They are public lands that are managed by the Natural Resources Department 
of Mwanga district. Monitoring of these areas is ineffective, however, creating opportunities for 
Table 5.1. Consequences of soil erosion at Lake Jipe (source: field survey, 2007).
Consequences Respondents	(%);	n=80)
Less harvest 65
Soil infertility 40
Abandonment of some farm plots 30
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Figure 5.1. Management systems used in agricultural production at Lake Jipe.
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encroachment by human activities. These encroached-upon areas are quickly degraded, and the 
soils they once contained erode and are washed towards Lake Jipe.
The appropriation of water resources is another problem in natural resource management 
at Lake Jipe. Agricultural activities around the water resources destroy vegetation on the shore. 
This occurs not only close to the shores of Lake Jipe but also near tributary rivers. This problem 
escalates during dry seasons. Farmers encroach upon areas close to the water resources in an 
attempt to enhance food security and reduce the likelihood of food shortages. They are aware 
that the government prohibits cultivation in the fragile areas (e.g. close to water sources), but 
their view is that government regulations are difficult to enforce during such a time. Since the 
vegetation close to the encroached-upon water resources act as a filter for and barrier to silt that 
is carried by water that flows from the upland areas, the degraded areas enhance the rate of silt 
deposition into Lake Jipe and its water sources.
5.3 Land management practises
In analysing sustainable management at Lake Jipe, the land use practises of upstream and 
downstream users merit consideration. As we have seen in the preceding section, the siltation 
problem at Lake Jipe is caused by inappropriate farming practises at both downstream and 
upstream areas. Both areas are therefore important to understand because even when farming 
practises on the downstream are sound, if farming practises on the upstream are poor, sustainable 
management of the lake will not be attained. This section therefore analyses farming practises of 
both localities, the areas upstream and downstream of Lake Jipe.
Figure 5.2. A formerly cultivated area in the proximity of Lake Jipe is now only dry gullies due to 
rain erosion. Shrubby vegetation and water-weeds at the Lake Jipe are visible in the background.
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5.3.1 Farming practises
Common farming practises at the areas upstream and downstream of Lake Jipe are inter-cropping, 
agroforestry, crop rotation, flat cultivation, ridges, contours, and terraces (Figure 5.3). Inter-
cropping is an intensive farming technique whereby various crops are combined on a single 
unit of land. Crops used in this kind of farming are usually beans and maize. Farmers utilise this 
practise due to a shortage of land available to practise monocropping, and because it is a strategy 
of spreading risk through diversification.
Crop rotation is a practise designed to increase soil fertility by alternating crops between 
planting seasons. Again, the two crops commonly grown under this practice are beans and maize. 
Maize production increases when maize is cultivated on a plot that was previously used for beans. 
Since land is a limiting factor, the decision to practise crop rotation or inter-cropping depends on 
the farmer’s intention to either increase the yield of one crop or to spread the risk among different 
crops in a single season.
Agroforestry combines trees and crops on the same land management unit. The agroforestry 
system is useful in controlling soil erosion on steep slopes, and can minimize soil and wind 
erosion in lowland areas. This system provides the dual benefits of conserving the environment 
and providing socioeconomic benefits, such as timber, firewood, and fruit, to people.
Flat cultivation is common in some sloping land and valley floors where food crops are 
cultivated. Whereas maize and beans are planted on sloping areas, valley floors are used to grow 
maize, beans, sugarcane, banana and yams. Land is vulnerable under these management systems 
because cultivation on steep slopes does not use appropriate techniques for soil erosion control. 
Further, in the valley floors, the practises are extended to edges of water resources. The cultivation 
of crops such as banana, sugarcane and cocoyam at or near water sources and river systems may 
reduce water flow downstream.
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Figure 5.3. Farming practises of the farmers located upstream and downstream of the Lake Jipe area.
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Some practises, such as the use of ridges, contours, and terraces are generally practised on 
a small scale. These practises have not been common in the community but are the result of 
interventions by government extension workers and non-governmental agents, such as MIFIPRO. 
These have been introduced as a way of addressing land degradation problems due to poor land 
husbandry systems. Since land is limited, some practises, such as contours, are meant to provide 
multiple land use benefits to farmers, such as fodder for livestock and controlling soil erosion 
by adopting an intensive management system. Ridges and terraces are potentially important for 
controlling soil erosion and conserving soil moisture.
Various approaches have been applied to promote these techniques, including the use of 
farmer field schools. In these schools, farmers learn through demonstrations and practise various 
methods of managing soil and improving land productivity. Adoption of these technologies, 
however, is low due to a variety of factors (Table 5.2). A shortage of land is a constraint to the 
adoption of contour use. Nearly three quarters (72%) of farmers acknowledge the importance of 
contours in providing the dual benefits of livestock fodder and controlling soil erosion, but opt 
to plant fodder on land that cannot be used for agricultural production due to a shortage of land 
for food crop cultivation. Constraints to adopting ridges and terraces include labour shortages 
(37.5%), and a lack of funds to invest in these (62.5%). Farmers stated that they are incapable of 
investing in these structures due to the deterioration of their income caused by low agricultural 
productivity. There are therefore many challenges to the economic and environmental feasibility 
of these important but under-utilised agricultural techniques.
In terms of natural resource management, the upstream and downstream areas are connected. 
Unsustainable land use practises upstream lead to the movement and deposition of eroded soils 
into water streams, causing pollution downstream. Similarly, upstream farming practises close to 
water sources degrade those sources, leading to a decline in water flow. The farmers interviewed 
in this study have noted a decrease in water flow in rivers, and they attribute this situation to land 
degradation (21.7%), drought (17.4%), a lack of adequate rainfall (17.4%), and degradation of 
indigenous trees (4.3%) (Figure 5.4). Although indigenous trees are crucial for water conservation, 
there is only a low level of awareness of their importance among farmers.
Table 5.2. Reasons for under- or non-adoption of sustainable land use techniques (Source: field 
research, 2007).
Reason	 Respondents	(%)	n=80
Lack of funds to invest in techniques 62.5%
Lack of labour 37.5%
Land shortage 72%
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5.3.2 Capacity building in farming practises
The management of land in agricultural production at Lake Jipe is related to capacity-building 
of farmers, which is performed by a non-governmental agency (Mixed Farming Improvement 
Project, (MIFIPRO)) and the government. Since poor cultivation practises upstream result in 
soil erosion and the deposition of eroded soil into downstream Lake Jipe, individuals practising 
farming on sloping areas are trained in sustainable land management practises by these groups. 
Farming techniques are taught through training seminars and participatory experiential learning 
techniques, such as farmers field school (FFS). In these educational programmes, farmers practice 
various techniques, such as ridges, contours.
These two groups also offer farmers education in the form of advice. Since the Lake Jipe area, 
especially the lowland region, is commonly stricken by drought, government technicians advise 
farmers to grow drought resistant crops, such as cassava, cow-peas, lima beans, and sorghum for 
food purposes, and cotton as a cash crop. To motivate the farmers to adopt these technologies, 
the government provides farmers with seeds of these crops free of charge. Since these crops can 
thrive in drought conditions, their adoption has implications on reducing the exploitation of 
fragile areas close to the river margins and along the shore of Lake Jipe.
However, the rate of adoption of these technologies by farmers is low. While some farmers 
claim that the techniques (i.e. contours, ridges, terraces, and agroforestry) are labour and cost 
intensive (Lake Jipe Ward Agricultural Officer 2008), other technologies that do not require 
such investments are also not adopted due to a lack of preference. In some cases, educational 
staff have limited knowledge as to farmers’ socioeconomic and socio-cultural interests before 
introducing these interventions. For example, during the drought season of 2006, when there was 
a severe food shortage at Lake Jipe, the government, through its technical staff, gave the farmers 
sorghum seeds to plant for food production. However, the Pare community regards sorghum as 
food for animals, not for human consumption. If one eats sorghum, the rest of the community 
will look down upon that person as the poorest in the community. The seeds, therefore, remained 
untouched by the farmers. The government had only a limited understanding of the farmers’ 
socio-cultural setting before advising them to sow sorghum, and consequently farmers did not 
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Figure 5.4. Farmers’ reasons for the decline of water flow at the upstream area (n=80).
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adopt the advice2. Therefore, two-way communication is imperative for putting participatory 
natural resource management into practise.
5.4 Water management practises
In this section, the irrigation practises of farmers at Lake Jipe will be analysed and the capacity-
building arrangements and practises facilitated by governmental and non-governmental actors 
will be discussed.
Water is used for agricultural production under irrigation farming. Irrigation farming is 
conducted both upstream and downstream of Lake Jipe. In the upstream area, it is conducted on 
valley floors. Except for some farmers that learned border irrigation from their counterparts in the 
downstream areas, traditional surface irrigation practises are generally implemented upstream. 
Beans, maize and vegetables such as cabbage, tomatoes and spinach are cultivated on these valley 
floors. The people in the upstream areas must cope with a shortage of arable land. Nevertheless, 
the use of valleys for irrigation farming is not environmentally sustainable. Because of the land 
shortage and a high food demand from the upstream population, the irrigation practises have 
come to encroach upon local water resources. This may reduce water flow to the downstream areas.
Irrigation practises in the downstream area depend on water flowing from the upstream areas. 
In contrast to the upstream areas, where farming practises are carried out on an individual basis, the 
farmers downstream have formed a farmers’ organisation. This organisation was formed to manage 
water allocation issues. The organisation bargains over water allocation with upstream farmers.
The main irrigation practises on the downstream are the traditional surface flood irrigation, and 
the improved irrigation practises using the border technique. Farmers have practised traditional 
surface flood irrigation in the region from time immemorial. However, field observations and 
interviews with farmers (Figure 5.5) reveal that this irrigation method wastes water, and creates 
soil erosion through surface run-off. Further, this method is time-intensive, especially where 
water is scarce. Some farmers work until midnight irrigating their fields due to the amount of 
time required for irrigation. This irrigation system wastes water through percolation as it flows 
2 This was revealed by a farmer at Lake Jipe.
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Figure 5.5. Problems encountered in irrigation farming at Lake Jipe (n=110).
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from the intake at the parent river, along the furrow, and finally to the fields. Canal erosion slows 
water flow rate, so that less water arrives at the fields than is taken from the water source.
Another irrigation practise is improved irrigation using borders. With this system, an irrigation 
furrow is constructed from the parent river to the fields with bricks and cement. A farm plot is 
split into subplots with raised borders that concentrate water in one plot until it is wet enough, 
and then the water is allowed through an outlet to another plot. The flow rate is high with this 
method. There is reduced soil erosion because the surface run-off speed is reduced, and less time 
is required for irrigation (Figure 5.6). While farmers with traditional furrows may irrigate until 
midnight, those using improved furrows only have to irrigate until 6:00 pm.
5.4.2 Capacity building in irrigation practises
The improved irrigation technology has been introduced by the Mixed Farming Improvement 
Project (MIFIPRO). In addition to providing education about the use of borders in irrigation, 
MIFIPRO facilitated farmers’ construction of improved irrigation infrastructure for some furrows. 
MIFIPRO mobilised farmers to contribute to the purchase of construction materials, provide 
their labour and contribute to the training staff ’s transportation costs as part of the construction 
project. The farmers who provided their labour and contributed money became the owners of 
the improved furrows. While irrigation knowledge is useful, it was not provided to all farmers in 
the area. The farmers who could not contribute were excluded, and consequently conflicts arose 
between the farmers included in the project and those who were excluded.
Since the improved irrigation structures save time, some farmers still operating under the 
traditional system secretly used the improved irrigation structures at night to irrigate their fields. 
They irrigated secretly because the improved irrigation infrastructure was owned by the farmers 
that contributed their resources to its construction. Although water use was the right of any 
villager, farmers had to pay a membership fee to use the improved furrow. This membership 
fee for one season was 50,000 Tanzanian shillings (TZS) (€ 27.80). The farmers that owned the 
furrow used this method to exclude other farmers, and thus to control the number of farmers that 
could be served by the improved structure. Though it produced important benefits, the MIFIPRO 
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Figure 5.6. Advantages of the improved irrigation furrow at Lake Jipe (n=80).
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intervention therefore also introduced conflicts to the farming community between those who 
benefited from the intervention and those who did not.
While the original irrigation border intervention did not assist all farmers, some farmers have 
nevertheless learned border techniques from those that did directly benefit. For example, farmers 
that carry out irrigation farming downstream but reside upstream have disseminated knowledge 
about border irrigation to the upstream areas, and some farmers already practise it.
The government is a partner of MIFIPRO in the provision of irrigation services (Figure 5.7) 
and in recent years has come to build on MIFIPRO’s work through an additional intervention. 
This intervention is made possible through agricultural development funds from the Participatory 
Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project (PADEP). Farmers are encouraged to choose 
projects they want to implement and are trained on project proposal writing with assistance from 
agricultural technical staff and the Ward Executive Officer. This is followed by an assessment of 
the potential environmental impacts of the projects by a District Facilitation Team (DFT). Should 
technical problems arise, farmers are advised to revise their proposals. The resulting project 
proposals are forwarded to the PADEP headquarters at the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security 
and Cooperatives for funding. Funds then flow back from the Ministry to the farmers along the 
same chain. Irrigation projects were the type most commonly proposed by farmers at Lake Jipe, 
and therefore seem to be their priority need.
Technical agricultural actors 
at the district 
Technical and administrative 
actors at the ward and villages 
MIFIPRO 
Village governmental 
actors 
Farmers/farmers groups 
Technical empowerment
Partnership
Financial empowerment
Figure 5.7. Partnership between the government and MIFIPRO in capacity building of the farmers.
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In contrast to MIFIPRO’s intervention, less time is spent in the community in implementing 
the government’s intervention. Although some farmers using traditional irrigation management 
practises have been offered irrigation infrastructure through the Participatory Agricultural 
Development and Empowerment Project (PADEP), less time is invested in irrigation practises 
because the government assumes that farmers have already been educated about these practises 
by MIFIPRO. This presumption may be incorrect, however. In some areas, especially those 
not yet accessed by MIFIPRO, farmers still use traditional irrigation techniques instead of the 
border technology. In such areas, both training on irrigation practises and improved irrigation 
technology is needed.
As with MIFIPRO, before the government grants funds to farmers, farmers must pay 20% 
of the project costs. This requirement is based on the assumption that it will create a sense of 
ownership over the project. The government also feels that it cannot offer everything to farmers, 
but that agricultural development must be a partnership between the government and the farmers. 
In acknowledgement of this, the government gives farmers some freedom of choice in irrigation 
infrastructure development. Farmers decide what contractor to engage in the construction of 
irrigation infrastructure. Tendering approaches are adopted, whereby potential contractors can 
apply for construction work. This is intended to empower farmers to make their own decisions. 
These practises are indicative of shared responsibilities in the management water in agricultural 
production, where the administration is shared between the government and farmers. Instead of 
the government dictating who should construct irrigation infrastructures, farmers are provided 
with profiles and addresses of potential contractors, and they decide who should be involved in 
the construction.
To summarise the foregoing discussion, in the upstream-downstream relationship in 
agricultural use of natural resources, three aspects are important. First, knowledge flows between 
the two areas. The people downstream have learned farming practises from the upstream areas, 
which are their areas of origin, and they generally perpetuate these practices. Further, the new 
techniques learned downstream through initiatives are transferred by individual farmers to the 
upstream area. Second, water links the two areas. The people downstream are dependent on water 
that flows from the upstream area. Third, the two areas are connected by the movement of soil 
caused by poor farming practises upstream. Though the movement of soil has little impact on 
the upstream users, it effects the downstream farmers negatively. Co-management arrangements 
must therefore consider both localities to be successful at promoting sustainability.
Governmental and non-governmental actors play important roles in building the capacity 
of farmers in both localities for sustainable management of natural resources in agricultural 
production. A partnership exists between the government and the MIFIPRO in the provision of 
financial and technical support for water and land management. This partnership has not been 
without its problems, however, as some constraints create conflicts or impair the adoptability of 
some technologies. For example, the introduction of the irrigation services among some farmers 
created conflicts between those farmers and others who did not have legitimate access to the 
improved structures. Other constraints are related to farmers’ financial inability to put available 
technologies to work, and poor understandings of farmers’ socio-cultural setting, resulting in 
some sustainable recommendations not being adopted.
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As outlined in Chapter 2, natural resource management in Tanzania involves arrangements, 
formal and informal institutions, and governmental, non-governmental, and community actors. 
Institutions govern the practises of the actors to attain sustainable management of natural resources 
while ensuring the procurement of socioeconomic benefits. In the coming section, the institutions 
governing the management of natural resources in agricultural production in the Lake Jipe area 
will be analysed.
5.5  Institutions relevant to natural resource management in agricultural 
production and conflict resolution at Lake Jipe
In this section, I identify and discuss committees, institutions and regulations that are relevant 
to the use of natural resources in agricultural production and conflict management at Lake Jipe. 
Both the government and community institutions, including farmers’ institutions participate in 
enforcing the sustainable management of natural resources in agricultural production. Relevant 
formal and informal institutions and regulations include forest conservation by-laws, village 
environmental by-laws, improved land use regulations, water management institutions, and 
customary regulations. While some of these institutions and regulations are governed through 
cooperation between the community/farmers and the government (e.g. the environmental by-
laws), others are entrusted to farmers alone, and others are governed by local custom.
5.5.1 Ward/Village Land Councils
Land has multiple uses and involves complex tenure arrangements and processes that require 
mechanisms for governing sustainable use and mediating conflicts of interests among various 
stakeholders. At Lake Jipe, land councils were formed in the early 2000s for the purpose of 
administering and mediating land use and management. Their formation was in line with Village 
Land Act of 1999. Although the formation of these councils was top-down from the district to the 
ward and village levels, conflicts in land use among various users within and between different 
sectors at the village level was the basis for the decision to create the district land councils. 
The appointment of land council members is a participatory process that involves the village 
community through the village assembly. The councils consist of villagers who are not members of 
the village government. A pre-requisite for their appointment is that they have to have knowledge 
of the village area and its boundaries.
Land councils address land issues occurring in formal government-allocated land and in 
customary land tenure arrangements. On land allocated under the governmental system, formal 
land laws apply, whereas for land allocated and managed under the customary system, customary 
rules apply. Land councils, therefore, employ both formal and informal rules in dealing with 
issues related to land administration, use and management in villages at Lake Jipe. For land that is 
managed under the customary system, decision-making is mainly based on customary institutions, 
though formal land institutions enforce compliance to customary institutions when the need arises.
While land councils at the village level consist of villagers and elders who oversee customary 
regulations in their clans, the ward land council comprises elders that represent village interests 
and ward-level governmental leaders, who represent the ward development committees (WDC). 
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The ward land council is therefore a co-management institution and uses a combination of formal 
regulations and customary rules. When land-use issues cannot be resolved by the village council, 
they are presented to the ward council, which uses both customary and formal rules collaborate 
to resolve the issues. If these local councils fail to resolve land disputes, those disputes are then 
addressed at the district level.
5.5.2 Ward tribunal
The ward tribunal acts as a local judiciary. It is the lowest body in the organisational structure of 
the Tanzanian judicial system. This multidisciplinary institution governs various socioeconomic 
and environmental issues among the local people in their villages. This institution deals with issues 
that include those pertaining to land use and conflicts among land users. However, in order for 
issues related to land use to be presented to the ward tribunal, they must first have been brought 
to the village and ward land councils, where they were not able to be resolved. This institution 
also operates under customary rules if land disputes occur in land that is under customary land 
management. If a case fails to be addressed at this level, it is forwarded to the district land council 
and to court for further mediation and arbitration.
5.5.3 Environmental by-laws
Environmental by-laws at the village level are responsible for controlling environmental degradation. 
They enforce sustainable environmental conservation by prohibiting cultivation practises around 
water resources, close to the lake, on steep areas, and in forest areas under village jurisdiction. 
Administration and enforcement of the by-laws is entrusted to a committee appointed through the 
village assembly and led by members not included in government leadership (e.g. the chairperson 
and the secretary of the committee are community members). Nonetheless, though they may 
not assume leadership positions, some members of the village government are members of the 
committee. At Jipe village, for example, of the ten village environmental committee members, 
four are from the village government (sub-village leaders).
The district government, through the District Natural Resources Department, influences 
the formation of an environmental institution, and a district legal officer facilitates the process 
technically. When environmental by-laws were first established at Lake Jipe, a small committee, 
comprising the village government and the district legal officer, prepared draft by-laws. Subsequently, 
the village assembly was convened and the community was informed of the regulations, and they 
were given 30 days to give comments. After the 30 days, the by-laws were approved and enforcement 
began. The village assembly also appointed members of the environmental committee from the 
community. Committee members from village government were not selected but were integrated 
by virtue of their positions as leaders in their sub-villages.
The village environmental committee initially came into being with no capacity to enforce 
by-laws. Although the district influenced the formation of this institution, it did little to build the 
committee’s capacity for enforcement. As member of the committee noted:
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It was easy for the government to mobilise the formation of environmental committees, 
but it forgot to empower the committee after its formation; we don’t know how to 
properly perform our responsibilities. The committee is physically present but 
functionally incapable (Hatibu, 23/7/2007).
I uncovered through the interview that there were no mechanisms for evaluating the status of 
environmental degradation in the village. Realising this weakness, MIFIPRO has assisted in the 
empowerment of this committee through training and explaining the environmental by-laws. 
However, because their responsibilities are multifaceted, significantly more training is required 
to empower the committee.
5.5.4 Water management committees
Two kinds of water management committees exist at Lake Jipe. These are both formal committees, 
and they are the village water committee and the lake committee. The village water committee 
was formed as a requirement of governmental water law, whereas the formation of the lake 
committee was influenced by MIFIPRO. The village water committee enforces the management 
of water for domestic consumption in villages. Through the village assembly, villagers appoint 
village water committees. Its members are villagers who are not leaders in village governments. 
The lake committee enforces the management of surface water on tributary river areas and Lake 
Jipe. Village government members, as well as non-members, can be members of this committee.
Although village water committees focus on the allocation of water for domestic consumption, 
they also enforce the protection of the water sources from which people draw water for this purpose. 
Since there are no tap water services, people sometimes use water sources situated far from their 
homes for domestic consumption because the water in furrows closer to homes is contaminated 
with cow dung and mud due to agricultural activities. The committee monitors water sources 
used for consumptive purposes and ensures that they are not contaminated by human activities, 
including farming. Sanctions are stipulated for non-compliance.
The village water committees are active in enforcing sustainable water management at Lake 
Jipe. They can even sanction village leaders if they do not comply. For example, the wives of the 
Village Chairperson and the Village Executive Officer were caught cultivating within the prohibited 
distance from a water source. There is a rule that when one violates regulations, he/she is charged 
a fine of TZS 10,000. When the two women were caught, they were required to pay the stipulated 
fine, but they declined. The case was taken to the village leaders, i.e. the Village Executive Officer 
and the Village Chairperson. Since the violators were their wives, the two leaders ignored the case. 
The chairperson of the village water committee took the case to the Ward Executive Officer. The 
two village leaders were called, reprimanded and paid the fines. This example indicates that when 
community actors are supported, they can have the power to participate in the management of 
natural resources together with governmental actors.
The lake committee enforces conservation of Lake Jipe from siltation from human activities. 
Among their responsibilities is to enforce excavation of soil harvesting structures at specified 
distances from the shore of the lack, so that soil eroded from agricultural practises is harvested 
from both the lowland and upland areas near Lake Jipe. As mentioned earlier the committee was 
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mobilised by MIFIPRO. Nevertheless, village leaders govern the committee, and the community is 
involved in the excavation of soil. The long-run maintenance of the ditches is uncertain, however. 
For example, per metre excavated, farmers are paid TZS 1000. The participation of local people, 
therefore, may be motivated by the money they receive from this work. While this arrangement 
currently offers incentives for farmers to participate, in the future farmers may stop participating 
when they are no longer paid to continue the practise. The collaborative management of natural 
resources, therefore, must consider trade-offs between participation, incentives, and long-term 
ownership of initiatives, especially when the activity is undertaken in the style of a project, as is 
the case for MIFIPRO.
5.5.5 Customary institutions
Customary land management arrangements in the area of Lake Jipe are those institutions that 
operate within specified social-ecological boundaries and are legitimate to specific social actors. 
They are based on the traditional belief that if one does not comply to certain resource use 
practises, there is a danger of being stricken by misfortune or disaster. On customary land, there 
are clan forests that are used for traditional functions, such as rituals and initiation ceremonies. It 
is forbidden to cultivate these areas due to the value attached to them by the clans. These beliefs 
may seem irrational, but they have been a method of conserving water and forests in the area. At 
Lake Jipe because of the high level of legitimacy the Pare people attach to these arrangements, one 
can find governmental forest that is encroached upon while a traditional one is left untouched. 
The meanings people attach to natural environment around them can be useful in conserving 
the environment.
Traditional management systems operate in a centralised fashion, whereby a clan elder 
monopolises the decision-making and others are required to comply. These systems are male 
dominated and discriminatory in nature. The clan elder is always a man, and women are never 
allowed to approach ritual forests, no matter their age. The rationale behind this prohibition is 
that they might be at menstruating time which would upset the gods. Although such institutions 
can be helpful in conserving natural resources, they are also discriminatory, and therefore not 
consistent with the values of participatory natural resource management.
5.5.6 Irrigation farming institution
The irrigation farming institution is an informal organisation of farmers that participate in 
irrigation farming downstream of Lake Jipe. This organisation evolved from the common 
challenges encountered while carrying out irrigation practises. In other words, experiential 
learning caused farmers to organise as a mechanism to counteract emerging constraints. In 
particular, this arrangement developed from difficulties arising in the use of water resources for 
irrigation downstream when the resource is negatively impacted upstream.
Downstream irrigation practises are conducted based on allocation of water among farmers 
using shared furrows. The users of each furrow form an informal group that has leaders who 
mediate water use issues within the group. The leaders are essential for overseeing water allocation 
schedules because it is not possible for all farmers to irrigate at the same time. Furrow groups 
5. Management of natural resources in agricultural production at Lake Jipe 117
are led by traditional rules arrangements, which are respected by users since they are a legacy, 
inherited from their ancestors. Violation of these regulations results in being sanctioned in 
accordance with their norms. The furrow groups established an informal committee called the 
furrow committee, which is an informal organisation of farmers to address inter-furrow groups 
concerns pertaining to furrow use and the allocation of water. These committees are composed 
of leaders from various furrow groups.
Due to geographically narrow valleys where irrigation practises can be conducted upstream, 
some farmers from this locality have acquired irrigation plots and are members in irrigation 
organisations. Their presence is helpful in monitoring water use upstream when the water flow 
downstream slows. They act as informers about water problems after spying on upstream farmers’ 
water use. If the cause for declining water flow from upstream to downstream is predominantly 
the poor practises of upstream farmers, the irrigation groups downstream establish an informal 
collective organisation to negotiate the situation with the upstream water users. The informal 
organisation enables resource users to negotiate for the equitable distribution of water resources, 
and through this process, a co-management arrangement has resulted between the upstream and 
downstream farmers, village governments in both areas, and customary institutions. Water used 
for irrigation purposes becomes the unifying factor in the negotiation process.
Practises that threaten the socioeconomic benefits to some users result in mobilisation for 
negotiation between water users downstream and upstream. This process facilitates the enforcement 
of formal conservation institutions because governments on both sides are involved, especially 
when farmers experience negotiation deadlock. Although the objective is not the conservation of 
water resources specifically, downstream farmers become a bridge for monitoring and enforcing 
water conservation practises and involving various actors in the negotiation process, and thus for 
enforcing conservation of water upstream.
5.5.7 Influence of MIFIPRO in the organisation of irrigation farming institutions
Although informal institutions govern irrigation practises, the non-governmental actor, MIFIPRO, 
has influenced the farmers’ organisation at Lake Jipe. Traditionally, irrigation practises have been 
organised on an individual basis, and some individuals from various clans, especially elders, 
oversee and negotiate the allocation of water. The intervention of MIFIPRO has led to a shift in 
the farmers’ organisation. This organisational shift developed after irrigation infrastructures were 
improved, which forced several farmers served by the same irrigation infrastructure to collaborate 
and negotiate the management of infrastructure and sharing of water resources. Group leaders 
have been established within individual groups, and a network of farmers groups (UWAMAKA) 
has emerged to oversee water use and management issues between the farmers groups operating 
at Lake Jipe basin. Over time, informal institutional collaborations have developed as a mechanism 
of sharing water resources among farmers. Although MIFIPRO did not introduced regulations to 
govern water use in the area, its intervention through the development of irrigation infrastructures 
shifted irrigation administration from individually-based to group-based.
Section 5.5 has uncovered how various formal and informal, as well as governmental and 
community, institutions and actors participate in managing natural resources in agricultural 
production. Whereas some institutions directly enforce the sustainable use of specific natural 
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resources, as can be understood from their titles, for other institutions, the enforcement of 
sustainable natural resource management is an implicit part of a process in which actors negotiate 
the allocation of natural resource services to achieve socioeconomic goals, as was highlighted with 
the irrigation farming institutions. The section has also shown that some institutions integrate the 
government and the community (e.g. the environmental management committees, and the ward 
land councils), while others involve community actors enforcing formal rules (e.g. village water 
committee). Other institutions are made up purely of governmental actors (e.g. improved land use) 
who oversee compliance with the rules. In the next section, I will analyse conflicts that emerge in 
the use of natural resources in agricultural production and the conflict resolution mechanisms.
5.6 Conflict and conflict resolution
Conflicts can harm participatory natural resource management. It is impossible to create strategies 
for minimising conflicts, and therefore for increasing the potential for attaining natural resource 
management objectives, without first understanding those conflicts. This section will analyse 
conflicts that emerge in the use of natural resources in agricultural production and the mechanisms, 
actors and institutions used in resolving them.
5.6.1 Conflicts in natural resource management and mediation practises
Conflicts inherent in the use of natural resources in agricultural production at Lake Jipe area are 
land conflicts, categorised as farm boundaries conflicts (28%), land/farm confiscation (36%), and 
water conflicts between upstream and downstream farmers (35.7%), and among downstream 
farmers (31%) (Figure 5.8). Land is a competitive resource at Lake Jipe due to the presence of 
many users from various localities upstream and downstream conducting various activities. In 
the upstream area, there is limited arable land for food production. In this area, much of the land 
has been converted to permanent crop production, and some of the remaining land in the valleys 
is engaged in irrigation agriculture.
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Figure 5.8. Conflicts types and involved actors in natural resource management at Lake Jipe (n=80).
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5.6.2 Conflict resolution and mediating actors
Conflict resolution in the use of natural resources in agricultural production at Lake Jipe occurs 
through the direct involvement of governmental and community actors and institutions, and 
the indirect influence of a non-governmental agency. Direct resolution of conflicts involves the 
use of formal, informal, and customary institutions (Figure 5.9). The percentages in Figure 5.9 
represent respondents’ general ideas regarding the type of conflicts that occur along with natural 
resources use and management and the actors involved in resolving them. The respondents are 
not necessarily involved in these conflicts.
Customary institutions are the most commonly used in mediating land confiscation conflicts 
(59%), water use conflicts (55%), and farm boundaries conflicts (50%) at Lake Jipe. The government 
at the village and ward levels also participates in resolving natural resource use conflicts at Lake Jipe. 
The interviewees indicate that government participation in resolving these conflicts is relatively 
more common in land confiscation (41%), followed by water use (35%) and is low in conflicts 
related to farm boundaries (20%). Some institutions partake in resolving conflicts pertaining 
to one type of the resource due to their specialisation in issues related to this specific resource. 
Whereas some respondents (30%) indicated that Ward and Village Land Councils are involved in 
resolving conflicts related to farm boundaries encroachment, others (45%) responded that furrow 
committees mediate water use conflicts in the irrigation practises.
Generally, customary institutions are the institutions most commonly used in resolving 
conflicts pertaining to resource use at Lake Jipe. This use of customary institutions is due to the 
confinement of some natural resources issues into customary regimes. Due to the complexity and 
dynamic nature of customary management regimes and institutions in Tanzania (the country has 
more than 120 ethnic groups), the land law, as stipulated in the Village Land Act of 1999, has given 
power to customary land institutions to address land issues in the areas under their jurisdictions. 
The prevalence of customary institutions in resolving conflicts is also due to confidence people 
place in customary institutions, implying that they feel the elders give them a just result in the 
mediation process. Most problems that come to village governments go through customary actors 
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Figure 5.9. Institutions and actors involved in the mediation of resource use conflicts based on the 
experience of the respondents (n=80).
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first and only advance to the government domains when they cannot be resolved at that level. 
However, there are areas in which the power of customary institutions is limited. Such is the case, 
for example, when conflicts emerge because of contradictory land allocation by village government. 
In such a case, the issue is under the direct jurisdiction of the government. In addition, even 
within customary arrangements, sometimes an accused person does not want to comply with 
the customary arrangements, and the mediators (elders) cannot force them to comply. Therefore, 
although the customary rules are applied under such circumstances, the government assists by 
exerting coercive mechanisms for the accused to comply.
Informal institutions also play a part in resolving natural resources use conflicts. Conflicts 
emerging in the use of water for irrigation activities at Lake Jipe are addressed using informal 
regulations governed by furrow committees. These address conflicts both within a single locality 
and between different localities (i.e. upstream and downstream areas). As mentioned above, 
conflicts occur within a locality when some farmers violate agreed-upon regulations, requiring 
them to observe irrigation schedules and arrangements. The violators are fined by elders or leaders 
of respective furrow organisations, but if they do not comply, they are reported to the village 
government or ward tribunal. These governmental bodies are able to enforce the regulations through 
the imposition of fines. For example, when unauthorised individuals use improved furrows, a fine 
of TZS 10,000 is imposed. A case can end with elders mediating between the conflicting parties, 
but if the accused do not comply, the case is reported to village and ward government to enforce 
compliance. Furrow committees also address conflicts between users of different localities, as well 
as within a single locality. These conflicts are resolved through negotiation with the elders of both 
localities. Similar to cases within a locality, if the farmers from one locality do not comply, the case 
is reported to the government at the village and ward level for coercive enforcement. The most 
common solution reached when water cannot flow to both localities at the same time, especially 
in severe dry seasons, is to schedule arrangements on a weekly basis.
Beyond the community level, the following government institutions partake in resolving 
conflicts: the Village Land Council, the ward tribunal and the district court. These institutions 
resolve conflicts among resource users, enforce and maintain peace and order among resource 
users, and protect the interests of user groups.
The Village Land Council, an institution appointed through the village assembly to administer 
land conflicts in the village, operates through an integration of formal land laws (as stipulated in 
Village Land Act of 1999) and informal rules governed by customary arrangements. The nature 
of conflicts determines which institutional mechanisms will be applied. For conflicts over land 
acquired through village governmental allocation, formal land rules are applied, whereas for land 
under customary land ownership, customary arrangements are applied. Since there are no written 
regulations for customary arrangements, clan elders are involved in the resolution processes while 
the land council may facilitate the process. Common conflicts of this type involve competition 
for the same land by descendants of same clan/family after their ancestors/parents have died, 
farm boundary conflicts, and encroachment on customary ritual areas for cultivation purposes.
The ward tribunal mediates resource use conflicts and enforces order and the conservation 
of natural resources in agricultural production. It also sanctions violations of the rules and 
regulations established among farmers and between farmers and other institutional actors in the 
management of natural resources in agricultural production. Sometimes farmers, in addition 
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to violating environmental by-laws, threaten the security of enforcing actors, and this has to be 
dealt with by the ward tribunal when other institutions fail to contain the conflicts. If the conflicts 
occur on land under customary management, the tribunal resolves them in accordance with the 
customary rules. Sometimes, however, the ward tribunal may not have the power to resolve some 
issues. In this case, the district court is involved.
The district court addresses issues pertaining to land use, which cannot be resolved by the 
ward and village land instruments. For example, when customary land is encroached upon and the 
encroachers do not comply with the sanctions proposed under customary arrangements or with 
those applied at the ward level, the district court intervenes. However, although these conflicts 
are dealt with at the district governmental level, customary institutions still apply. Though the 
customary institutions are informal, there are provisions in the land law (Land Dispute Settlement 
Act of 2002) that provides for resolving land and other resource use conflicts under customary 
management systems.
The resolution of conflicts emerging in the management of natural resources in agricultural 
production is therefore the shared jurisdiction of the government and community institutions 
around Lake Jipe. Government intervention is necessary when community-level institutions, 
such as the farmers’ irrigation institutions and other customary institutions, have failed to contain 
resource use conflicts. In most cases, however, conflicts are resolved at the community level 
involving traditional actors (the elders) and informal actors (irrigation committees).
Some conflicts are resolved using traditional rules because it would be difficult to resolve them 
using a formal rules framework. For resource use conflicts emerging under customary ownership 
systems, for example, even if the case is taken to the ward tribunal or district court, reference 
is made to customary rules in its resolution. Formal government regulations thus reinforce the 
customary rules. The latter are weak in that, for them to be enforced, they require the compliance 
of the accused person; otherwise, they do not have power to force individuals comply as the 
government does. While formal rules alone cannot resolve conflicts occurring in customary 
resource management systems, the customary systems do not have the power to enforce their own 
rules. This demonstrates that the government and the customary institutions are interdependent 
in resolving land use conflicts under customary tenure arrangements at Lake Jipe.
One actor who is neither a part of the government nor the community partakes indirectly in 
managing resource use conflicts at Lake Jipe. This actor is the non-governmental organization 
MIFIPRO. Conflicts in natural resource management within and between the upstream and 
downstream users may occur when the unsound use of natural resources at some locations 
cause the degradation of resources such as water and land, thereby creating a water shortage 
and pollution of water resources at other locations. Although the communities upstream and 
downstream of Lake Jipe recognise MIFIPRO as a capacity-building organisation, the role of 
MIFIPRO in improving farming practises in both locations may improve the use and availability 
of competitive resources (i.e. water) and reduce water degradation and pollution. These improved 
natural resource management methods indirectly reduce conflicts among natural resources users 
because when individual users in one area use natural resources appropriately, the resources are 
made available for other users in another area. Therefore, MIFIPRO plays an indirect but important 
role in mediating conflicts among resource users through improving their farming practises, which 
may in turn improve resource availability.
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5.7 Co-management arrangement
In the co-management arrangement for the use of natural resources for agricultural production 
at Lake Jipe, there exist three types of institutions; namely, co-management institutions, informal 
institutions, and formal institutions.
There are three co-management institutions: the Village Land Council, the Ward Land Council, 
and the environmental committee. While the two land co-management institutions are narrow in 
their focus (i.e. they focus on land conflicts alone), the environmental co-management institution 
is wider in its focus because it covers multiple natural resources, including water and land, and 
works to enforce sustainable management rules in general.
The Village Land Council/co-management institution resolves conflicts occurring in the use 
and management of land at the village level. This co-management institution consists of customary 
and formal rules and informal actors (the villagers). While some actors are appointed through 
formal rules through the village assembly, others represent customary management systems in their 
specific clans as heads of these management systems. The village land co-management institution, 
therefore, mediates conflicts in land use by integrating formal and informal/customary rules.
In some cases, however, the Village Land Council is unable to resolve conflicts in land use. This 
is especially the case when violators or the conflicting parties do not comply with this institution. 
In this case, the issue is forwarded to another co-management institution, specifically, the Ward 
Land Council. The Ward Land Council involves formal and informal rules and integrates both 
governmental and customary actors. While the governmental actors are appointed through a 
formal Ward Development Committee (WDC) meeting, customary actors (elders) represent 
their clans. Both governmental and customary actors represent various villages in their wards. 
At this level therefore, there is an integration of formal and informal rules and governmental and 
community actors involved in resolving land use conflicts in the agricultural co-management 
arrangement.
The environmental co-management institution operates at the village level. This institution 
integrates governmental and community actors who are governed by formal rules. This institution 
governs and enforces the sustainable use of natural resources in the villages. The formulation of 
rules that govern the actors in the management process was influenced by the district government. 
However, following the rules formulation, the district government did not provide training to 
build the capacity of the actors in enforcing compliance with the rules within the community. 
Actors within this organisation do not have the ability to adequately enforce the sustainable 
management rules.
Another actor, the Mixing Farming Improvement Project (MFIPRO), fills this gap by training 
the actors who enforce compliance with environmental management rules. In this way, MIFIPRO 
builds the capacity of this co-management institution to make it function properly. The improved 
capacity of these actors to enforce sustainable management practises affects, among other practises, 
agricultural production. Therefore, MIFIPRO not only assists actors at the community level, 
but also builds the capacity of the environmental co-management institution. Without capacity 
building, the co-management institution would not be in a position to adequately govern 
sustainable resource use practises. This NGO is, therefore, not only a partner of the government 
in empowering community actors, but empowers the government as well because environmental 
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committees integrate government and community actors. By empowering these co-management 
institutions, it consolidates vertical collaboration between the community and the government.
In the co-management arrangement in agricultural production at Lake Jipe, informal institutions 
also exist that govern the resource-use practises of community resources users and mediate their 
resource sharing and allocation relations. These institutions are resource-specific. They focus on 
water allocation, though water conservation may be indirectly facilitated in the process. Leaders 
in various users groups facilitate collaborations among informal institutional actors in a single 
location. Institutional collaborations also occur that involve actors implementing similar practises 
and linked by natural resources (water and land) but at different locations. These collaborations 
are facilitated by informal institutional actors who reside in one location but farm in another. 
Sometimes, negotiations among actors within the same locality and between actors of different 
localities under informal institutional arrangements do not yield desirable outcomes. Informal 
actors who assume leadership positions seek the assistance of governmental actors in both localities 
who have the power to enforce compliance with informal institutional mechanisms and decisions. 
In one specific case, such an action resulted in irrigation schedules between farmers upstream and 
downstream, especially for seasons when water was inadequate. Although the primary purpose 
of these negotiations is the allocation of water resources for irrigation activities, the constant 
monitoring of the water-use practises of the farmers upstream by the farmers downstream also 
results in the enforcement of sustainable water use practises upstream.
Another institutional collaboration of farming institutions in two geographically separated 
areas, and which focuses on water and land resources, occurs through the facilitation of MIFIPRO. 
MIFIPRO empowers community actors involved in the use of natural resources in agricultural 
production at the upstream and downstream localities. MIFIPRO improves farming practises by 
training the farmers to conserve the environment at Lake Jipe Since the sustainable management 
of Lake Jipe requires that farming practises should be sustainable both upstream and downstream, 
MIFIPRO bridges the two areas through improved farming practises. In this sense, MIFIPRO 
considers that sustainable management of Lake Jipe can be achieved only if a systemic approach 
that integrates the upstream and downstream localities is adopted. The NGO thus facilitates 
the resolution of environmental problems at Lake Jipe in terms of the two separate localities 
and their relationship, which make up different spatial levels of intervention. It bridges the 
two localities, which are isolated administratively and geographically, but connected by water 
and land. Through improving natural resource management practises, MIFIPRO indirectly 
resolves conflicts among users of natural resources, especially when natural resources availability 
is improved. However, although MIFIPRO provides training on sustainable management practises, 
successful implementation of these improved techniques and methods, even when the willingness 
is present, is a function of the capacity, in terms of resources (e.g. financial and labour), of farmers 
to sustainably practise them.
The present co-management arrangement in agricultural production at Lake Jipe indicates 
that three types of institutions - co-management institutions, formal institutions, and informal 
institutions - exist in this co-management arrangement. While some co-management institutions 
focus on one resource (the ward and village councils) and involve the use of both formal and 
informal rules to mediate one institutional dimension issue (conflict mediation in land use), 
others focus on multiple resources (environmental committee) and involve formal rules to enforce 
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a different institutional dimension issue (environmental conservation). Some co-management 
institutions (Ward Land Council and environmental committee) are overseen by governmental 
and community actors, whereas others (Village Land Council) are overseen by the community 
actors alone. Informal institutions (irrigation farming institution) entail norms, customs, and 
traditions that govern resource use practises and relations and sanction non-compliance. Informal 
leaders appointed by users oversee these institutions.
The existence of resource management institutions confined to individual resources, the 
occurrence of resource degradation at various locations, and the existence of conservation 
institutions with a low capacity to enforce resource conservation has led to NGO intervention. 
Whereas governmental and community co-management institutions specialise in specific resources 
(i.e. some co-management institutions focus on mediating land use conflicts, while another co-
management institutions focus on mediating and negotiating water use among the users), the 
NGO links the two natural resource management systems and builds the capacity of actors at the 
institutional level. In other words, the NGO builds the capacity of actors on issues related with land 
management and water management at different spatial levels, and intervenes at the institutional 
level by building the capacity of the co-management institution (village environmental committee). 
The NGO takes on different roles depending on the context. By linking arming practises in 
both locations and raising awareness of the environmental regulations among governmental 
and community actors, the NGO intervention strengthens horizontal community management 
and vertical government-community collaboration. However, MIFIPRO is attached to formal 
institutions, practises and mechanisms in its capacity-building activities with community and 
governmental co-management institutions. It is rarely attached to informal and customary 
institutions, mechanisms, and practises. This may imply that MIFIPRO places more trust in 
scientific knowledge than in traditional resource management knowledge, perhaps because it 
observes that in this area, traditional resource management systems do not seem to significantly 
control unsustainable resource management practises.
Although the present co-management arrangement establishes and strengthens linkages among 
resource users, and between users and the government, it does not reflect ethnic relationships 
between resource user groups or culturally-based interactions with natural resources. In practise, 
there is commonly more than one culturally differentiated user group in the same natural 
resource environment. These groups interact permanently or on a seasonal basis, depending on 
the geographic distribution and availability of the natural resource. At Lake Jipe, this situation 
exists in livestock keeping, whereby there are two categories of ethnic livestock keepers. So far, 
the present co-management arrangement in agricultural production has not reflected ethnic 
heterogeneity because it has not been understood to be a major issue in management conflicts. 
Similarly, although the co-management arrangement in fisheries acknowledges the existence of 
different user groups based on their localities (residents and non-residents), no formal or informal 
arrangements have been designed specifically to mediate the use of natural resources by different 
groups. The next chapter therefore will analyse the management of natural resources in livestock 
production, which involves two ethnic groups; the Pare and the Maasai. The chapter will discuss 
the ways in which these ethnic groups interact with each other and with the government in the 
management of natural resources in livestock production.
Chapter 6.  
Management of natural resources in livestock production at 
Lake Jipe in Tanzania
6.1 Introduction
Raising livestock in the Jipe area involves a diversity of actors: the community and non-
governmental and governmental actors. Three community groups exist that are geographically 
and spatially distributed but linked by livestock-related transactions: the Pare livestock keepers 
in the upstream areas, the Pare downstream livestock keepers, and the Maasai people in the 
downstream area. Thus, there are two livestock-related ethnic groups. The Pare ethnic groups in 
the downstream and upstream areas are related through kinship, and the livestock keepers in the 
upstream area entrust their livestock to the Pare people in the downstream region due to a lack of 
open grazing land in the upstream area. Therefore, while they live in the upstream area, their ethnic 
social network with the downstream Pare has enabled the upstream people to exploit rangeland 
resources in the downstream areas. Whereas livestock are managed downstream, nonetheless, 
decision-making regarding the livestock flows from upstream to downstream, while the entrusted 
provides information on the status of livestock to the owner upstream. Entrustment also exists 
between the affluent livestock keepers downstream and less affluent livestock keepers, as well as 
between non-livestock keepers downstream. Maasai livestock keepers are another livestock-raising 
group and unlike the Pare, they practice nomadic herding – that is, they move from one place to 
another based on the availability of pastures.
The government actors include ward and village governments and the district government. 
Specifically, the district actors include the District Agricultural and Livestock Department, the 
District Natural Resources Department and the District Commissioners’ office. A non-government 
actor (MIFIPRO) also influences livestock and natural resource management practices at Jipe by 
partaking in some technical activities.
The relationships and interactions among the mentioned networks, institutions and actors 
in the use and management of natural resources in livestock production determine whether the 
management of natural resources in the Jipe area is sustainable or unsustainable. This chapter aims 
to analyse the interplay of various actors and institutions – governmental, non-governmental and 
community – in the management of natural resources for livestock production in the Jipe area. In 
particular, the study first looks at local institutional networks and the organisational practices of the 
livestock keepers at Jipe in exploiting natural resources. Second, it looks at strategies for improving 
the use and management of natural resources in livestock production. Third, it analyses how the 
government and the community actors interact in enforcing sustainable management institutions 
and practices in livestock production. Fourth, it considers how the two domains (the government 
and the community) interact in addressing disputes related to livestock and natural resource 
management. Fifth, the chapter identifies and evaluates the existing co-management arrangements. 
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As a start, an overview is provided of areas where the management of natural resources in livestock 
production is practiced, including problems and challenges as well as existing rights.
6.2 Grazing areas, challenges and existing rights
Livestock grazing at Lake Jipe occurs on communal grazing land along the Lake Jipe shore, in the 
mountainous forest areas, and in farm plots after crop harvest (Table 6.1).
6.2.1 Communal grazing land
Communal grazing land is the land recognised by village governments as legitimate for herders to 
use to graze their livestock in their respective villages. It is the land allocated for livestock grazing. 
This land is owned by village government (a trustee) but is under the use and management of 
livestock keepers within specific villages. The livestock keepers hold the use rights to the land. 
Every livestock keeper in the village is entitled to access grazing land for grazing purposes.
In the Lake Jipe area, nevertheless, this tenure arrangement currently exists informally, and 
its boundaries are unclear. Because of this ambiguity, the common grazing land is, in practice, 
viewed as a land reserve that can be shifted to other uses when need arises. There are cases in 
some villages where this land has been given to other user groups: for example, in the Butu village, 
where the livestock keepers complain that the district government gave part of their grazing 
land to upland inhabitants who wanted to begin farming crops in the area. The livestock keepers 
resultantly express negative attitudes toward the district government, as the following response 
from an interviewee shows:
Table 6.1. Areas where livestock keepers residing in the downstream areas graze their livestock (n=80) 
(source: field survey, 2007).
Grazing	area Respondent	(%) Season Reason
Communal land 100 During and after the 
rainy season
There is pasture at that time
The slopes of the 
mountains
100 During the dry season There is no pasture for the livestock 
as part of the common land
The shore of Lake 
Jipe
100 During the dry season There is no pasture as part of the 
common grazing land
Farm plots 43 After the crops are 
harvested
There is straw from maize and beans 
that is fed to livestock
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The government does not do us justice. It looks down upon the livestock keepers. We 
are also not adequately involved in decision-making. It is easier to bring in people 
from upstream areas to carry out farming practices and take us off our land on the 
basis that they are going to produce food crops. We don’t have a solution because the 
government is powerful; otherwise, we would not allow people to simply come to our 
villages and take our land (Salehe Mfinanga, Butu Village, 13/6/07).
The re-appropriation of communal grazing land is easy because of unclear grazing land boundaries. 
The above example of a district government’s decision regarding grazing land in the village 
contradicts decentralisation policy because it is not clear who owns this land. Is the owner 
the village government or the district government, the latter of which made this decision? The 
ambiguous land tenure arrangements result in conflicts between the livestock keepers and other 
users, particularly farmers. Presently, however, the formalisation of the grazing land in Tanzania, 
including the Jipe area, is occurring, whereby village land is surveyed and boundaries are marked 
for various land uses to avoid such ambiguity. The district government land department engineers 
this process.
The Jipe area is part of a region frequently stricken by drought, especially during dry seasons. 
Then, the communal grazing land includes scarce pastoral resources. This has led to strategies 
on the part of livestock keepers for grazing their herds in other areas, as we see in the following 
sub-sections.
6.2.2 Grazing on the mountains and forest land
Grazing in mountainous and forest areas is one of the ways that livestock keepers cope with a 
shortage of pastures in the communal grazing land during dry seasons. Forest resources in the 
mountains are under the district forest authority. The use of these areas, however, is a violation of 
forest by-laws. Although this land is under government control, the land appears like open access 
management regimes because encroachment occurs for both livestock grazing and farming.3 The 
government (district forest authority) has failed to protect these areas, likely because of limited 
staff and inadequate financial resources. Along with grazing, livestock keepers set fires to eradicate 
tsetse flies and promote the regeneration of fresh pasture. Fires, nonetheless, affect forest and water 
resources by degrading the vegetation cover and drying water sources. Besides, the movement of 
large herds of livestock in these areas also makes land vulnerable to soil erosion, and the eroded 
soil pollutes water sources. When it rains, the eroded soil is washed downstream to the Lake Jipe 
wetlands, contributing to siltation of the lake.
The failure of the district forest authority to protect the forest perhaps calls for the cooperative 
management of the forest resources in this area. The village community can be involved in this 
suggested regime. However, this would probably require justification as to how the villagers would 
benefit from participation in the regime; otherwise, the regime could hardly be successful.
3 Researcher’s personal field observation.
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6.2.3 Grazing along the Lake Jipe shore
The presence of pastures on the shores of Lake Jipe attracts livestock keepers to graze their 
herds, especially during dry seasons, when pastures in the common grazing land are limited. The 
institutions, nonetheless, prohibit livestock grazing in these areas. The non-compliance with by-
laws is attributed to the lack of adequate pastures due to drought spells. Livestock grazing practices 
on the shore of the lake, however, are associated with practices detrimental to the environment 
and resources. As in the mountainous areas, livestock grazing practices along the lakeshore are 
associated with fires used to encourage the regeneration of new pastures and eradicate the presence 
of tsetse flies. Likewise, the soil is eroded and compacted, and cow dung is deposited into the 
lake. This might be contributing to the flourishing of waterweeds due to an increase in nutrients 
deposited into the lake.
Although there are by-laws for environmental conservation in the villages, in practice, 
operationalisation is less effective in the Jipe area. This is probably due to the government’s 
failure to provide livestock infrastructures in the area. The District Agricultural and Livestock 
Department had promised to construct livestock watering points and dipping facilities, as well 
as to demarcate and develop the pastoral land in the area. From the perspective of the livestock 
keepers, there are intense expectations for the government regarding the installation of livestock 
infrastructure so that unhealthy practices of grazing and watering livestock at Lake Jipe can stop. 
Not only do the villagers hold such expectations, but even the village leaders believe that the 
implementation of the environmental by-laws will be possible after livestock infrastructures are 
in place.4 The village leaders sympathise with the lack of adequate infrastructures and resources 
for the livestock in their areas, and they excuse themselves for their ineffectiveness in enforcing 
environmental by-laws.
Other livestock keepers’ practices, however, have some inherent merits. Livestock keepers 
burn waterweeds to open areas for livestock watering at some spots along the lake. This small-
scale strategy, nonetheless, offers only a temporary solution and actually promotes the vigorous 
regeneration of the waterweeds. It appears that fire stimulates the growth of waterweeds, though 
further research will be necessary to affirm this. Nonetheless, based on the present case, we can 
learn that when socio-economic interests are interwoven with ecological problems – in other 
words, when a socio-economic problem is simultaneously an ecological problem – an attempt to 
address the former can at the same time assist in addressing the latter, at least on some affordable 
spatial and temporal levels. The livestock keepers at Jipe address environmental problems indirectly, 
though their primary intention is to obtain socio-economic (livelihood) benefits.
Regardless of the small-scale nature of livestock keepers’ initiatives and the temporary nature of 
the solution, this case has some useful implications. It teaches government and decisions-makers 
outside the community that to achieve sustainable resource management, strategies for solving 
ecological problems should be used that rationally address and integrate inherent livelihood 
interests and motivate the community to act.
4 Interview with the member of the village environmental committee.
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6.2.4 Grazing on crop fields
Post-harvest residues are short-term feeds for livestock. This is possible after harvesting agricultural 
crops, usually around August and September. Though this offers a temporary alternative to animal 
feeds, it also means removing organic matter that can decompose to improve land fertility. By 
the same token, livestock trampling in agricultural fields can result in the deterioration of land, 
making it susceptible to wind and water erosion. On the other hand, this practice can result in 
gender-based conflicts between women farmers and livestock keepers. Interviewed women farmers 
complained that some male livestock keepers graze on their fields without their consent. When 
required to stop, the livestock keepers dismiss the farmers’ requests and look down upon them, 
telling them, ‘You are just women; you had better keep quiet’.
6.2.5 Land rights
Looking at the four natural resources areas where livestock grazing at Jipe occurs, as discussed 
above, one can see that there are three types of land property rights involved: integrated rights, 
state rights, and private rights.
Integrated rights are the rights to communal grazing land wherein both the government and 
the livestock keepers have some power. The government owns the grazing land, whereas the 
livestock keepers monitor its status and management because they are the daily users. However, 
as has been introduced, this property rights arrangement is currently insecure on the side of the 
livestock keepers because the government can alienate part of it and give it to other users, such 
as crop farmers. Furthermore, although the village government claims ownership, sometimes 
decisions are imposed on the village at the district level. Although on the side of the livestock 
farmers, dissatisfaction prevails over such decisions, especially when they have to do with grazing 
land, the power to resist is low.
State property rights exist in areas where livestock keepers are not allowed to exploit the 
land. Such areas are the forest area under the district department of natural resources. However, 
in practice, the district department is not able to protect this property rights arrangement, and 
livestock keepers continue to exploit the prohibited areas.
Private land right arrangements occur with individual farm plots. In this sort of arrangement, 
farm owners graze their livestock after crop harvesting season. An individual agro-pastoralist 
grazes his livestock on the farm, or a cooperative of livestock keepers pools its livestock and grazes 
it together on its farms based on informal cooperation.
So far, I have analysed natural resource use in livestock production in this section. In the next 
section, I will uncover and analyse organisational arrangements and pastoral networks existing 
in the use of natural resources in livestock production.
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6.3 Local pastoral networks and organisational practices
Livestock grazed in the Lake Jipe area are the livestock kept on the downstream area and those 
entrusted by the upstream livestock keepers to the downstream inhabitants. This section, therefore, 
will consider pastoral networks at Jipe and their rationale, as well as livestock organisational 
practices in the downstream area where free-range grazing is practised. Understanding these 
networks and organisational arrangements is critical for gaining knowledge regarding who is 
involved in and what methods are used for the sustainable (or unsustainable) management of 
natural resources in livestock management.
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Figure 6.1. Population of upstream and downstream wards around Lake Jipe (source: National 
Census, 2002).
Table 6.2. Livestock keeping methods upstream of Lake Jipe (source: field survey, 2006; NA = not 
applicable; * = for chickens only).
Livestock	grazing	method Respondents	(%),	n=110
Upstream	 Downstream	
Tethering 43.8 NA
Zero grazing 73.4 NA
Free-range grazing 100* 100
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6.3.1 Local pastoral networks
The livestock existing in the Lake Jipe area is the combination of livestock moved from upstream 
and owned by downstream inhabitants. A large human population upstream (Figure 6.1) has 
resulted in land’s being converted for the cultivation of permanent food (banana) and cash crops 
(coffee, cardamom).
This trend has resulted in a lack of land for practicing free-range grazing, and thus, indigenous 
livestock initially freely grazed the upstream has either had to be sold or had to be moved 
downstream. In turn, the upstream inhabitants have instituted improved zero-grazing, tethering 
livestock management systems (Table 6.2) and had to keep few improved dairy cows and goats 
and few sheep (Figure 6.2).
The relocated livestock from upstream are entrusted to inhabitants of the downstream areas 
where free-range livestock management practices are possible. Whereas some livestock keepers 
moved downstream and established settlements there, others remained upstream but entrusted 
their livestock to residents of the downstream area. In an entrustment, an agreement is made based 
on which when livestock increase, an entrusted person is paid in kind, usually with a kid or a calf at 
the third parturition per unit of livestock. Not only does entrustment exist between upstream and 
downstream people, but this arrangement also exists among inhabitants of the downstream area.
Entrustment involves livestock owners and people with few or no livestock. They are informal 
agreements between two parties; one (the entrusted party) invests his labour and time to keep 
and care for another person’s livestock, and the other (the owner) pays in kind as the number of 
livestock increases. Again, there is an added advantage for the entrusted party. He enjoys other 
benefits such as milk and manure. There are opportunity costs to this arrangement, however. The 
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Figure 6.2. Average livestock per household between upstream and downstream of Lake Jipe (source: 
this field survey; n=110 households).
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entrusted person (always a man) has limited time to participate in other livelihood activities, such 
as agricultural activities, and thus often become a burden to a woman (his wife).
There are some prerequisites for entrustment arrangements. The entrustee must be a Pare 
inhabitant of the downstream area with permanent residence in the area, and the owner must 
trust him. The livestock owner monitors the reproductive status and increase of the livestock every 
year by paying visits to the entrustee and through information received from neighbours. Usually 
those with large livestock herds (more than 200) entrust their livestock to several individuals. 
Entrustment arrangements mainly involve rich livestock keepers, poor livestock keepers and 
those with no livestock at all. This classification of livestock keepers is based on the villagers’ 
categorisation. Besides rich and poor livestock keepers, there are also average livestock keepers.
The rich livestock keepers are people with a large number of livestock, 100 to 200 or more 
(or 300-400 in the case of goats). Other people keep their livestock, and the owners pay them in 
kind with a kid or calf, based on the increase of the livestock. Characteristically, the rich livestock 
keepers have a prestigious reputation. They have formed networks with village and ward leaders 
that help the leaders in addressing urgent situations. For example, when one district leader visited 
the Jipe village (during my field research), the village entertainment fund was empty. Village leaders 
approached a rich livestock keeper who gave them a goat, which was slaughtered for the lunch for 
the district leader and his delegates. Rich livestock keepers also form livelihood networks with 
poor people (who do not have livestock) in the village to take care of their livestock and then be 
paid in kind when the number of livestock increases.
The prestige of rich livestock keepers, however, can have an impact on the natural environment. 
These owners inherently enjoying seeing their livestock increase without selling them. Extension 
officers’ advice regarding reductions in the number of livestock seems irrational to them.5 They 
can only sell their livestock during emergencies, such as famine, to buy food. To them, therefore, 
livestock is a security or a safety net. It is not easy for them, under normal circumstances, to sell 
or slaughter their livestock.
The second group of livestock keepers, based on the villagers’ classification, are average livestock 
owners. The term average (according to the Jipe villagers’ classification) refers to livestock keepers 
with livestock numbering from 20-50 cows or from 50-100 goats. This is actually the major group at 
Jipe.6 The management of livestock is in most cases done through by hiring a caretaker who is paid 
TZS 8,000 to TZS 25,000 on a monthly basis. The third group consists of poor livestock keepers. 
The definition of ‘poor’ in the context of the livestock keepers at Lake Jipe is that a person owns 
less than 10 cows and less than 20 goats. Those with large herds of livestock (rich livestock keepers) 
may still entrust their livestock to individuals in this category based on a mutual agreement that 
those individuals will be paid in kind when the number of livestock increases.
While entrustment constitutes a livelihood network among the involved parties, it is also a 
strategy for distributing risk, justifying the use of different communal lands in different villages, 
and relieving communal land in a particular area from over-exploitation. Here, distributing risk 
means lowering the probability of the whole herd’s being infected or killed by potential disease 
epidemics. The use of different communal lands in different villages is an advantage that the owner 
5 Village and ward extension officers.
6 The village environmental committee member, Mr. Hatibu.
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of the livestock can enjoy through the entrustment arrangement. In essence, every villager, in any 
particular village, is entitled to use communal grazing land in that village. The entrusted livestock, 
thus, can have access to various communal lands that can act as a buffer during critical dry seasons. 
While land in one village may experience a pasture shortage, land in another village may be in a 
relatively better state. Significantly, the entrustment arrangement can be environmentally friendly. 
The distribution of livestock to individuals in different villages reduces the large concentration 
of livestock in one area. Thus, the entrustment arrangement, besides being socio-economically 
important, can also contribute to the sustainable utilisation of pastoral and land resources. This 
may only be the case, however, when the livestock are entrusted to individuals residing in different 
villages. In contrast, if the entrusted individuals reside in the same village, there is the potential 
for a large concentration of livestock in the same village. This concentration may cause land 
degradation in a specific common grazing area.
Because the livestock kept downstream are from both upstream and downstream, any 
programme for the sustainable management of livestock production (e.g. promoting the reduction 
of the number of livestock in relation to the available land and pastoral resources) at Jipe needs 
to reflect the relationship between the livestock keepers upstream and downstream. While the 
livestock are kept and grazed downstream (entrustment), decision-making regarding the adoption 
and operationalisation of such a programme may be in the hands of livestock owners upstream 
or downstream. In addition, because the entrusted people downstream acquire livestock through 
entrustment, they may not even inform the owners of the sustainable livestock management 
programme when they perceive a threat to their livelihood.
6.3.2 Grazing organisational practices
Several grazing organisational practices exist in the Jipe area, namely individual organisation, 
cooperative organisation, caretaker hiring, and migratory practices.
Individual and cooperative grazing and hiring a caretaker
Individual organisation is when a caretaker (hired, entrusted, or an owner) takes care of the livestock 
herd of an individual owner. Commonly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness, this organisational 
structure is used with entrustment and self-grazing in most cases because hiring a person might 
be expensive for an individual person. Cooperative grazing is when a caretaker (hired, entrusted, 
or in a by-turns arrangement) takes care of livestock from two or more owners who pool their 
livestock together and pool financial resources to pay the caretaker. With this arrangement, 
besides financial payments, the caretaker is provided with food from the livestock owners. That 
is, the owners informally agree on a schedule on which they will provide food to the caretaker. 
Cooperative grazing organisation is cost-effective in that the owners share the cost, which makes 
this strategy cheaper than if each hired an independent caretaker. Hiring a caretaker is especially 
prevalent with households involved in agriculture and without children who can take care of 
livestock, either because the children are attending school or because they are older children and 
have moved to towns to look for jobs. Remuneration for the caretaker ranges from TZS 8,000 
to TZS 25,000 per month based on the number of livestock he takes care of and the negotiation 
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process between him and the owners involved.7 The hired persons are not inhabitants of the Jipe 
area, but they mostly come from livestock-keeping agro-ecological areas, including the Singida, 
Dodoma, and Arusha regions.
Migratory livestock practices
The availability of open grazing land enables free-range grazing in the downstream areas. During 
some seasons, however, herders experience pasture scarcity. Among the strategies used to cope 
with this situation is migratory grazing. Migratory livestock grazing strategies, as one way to 
cope with a deficiency of pasture during dry spells, releases some areas that have been under 
utilisation at least for some time to encourage the restoration of the pasture. A temporal shift is 
commonly practiced among Maasai livestock keepers, though Pare livestock keepers sometimes 
practice the same. A temporal shift occurs to other areas in search of good pastures for livestock, 
or based on previous experience livestock keepers have with pasture availability in some areas at 
such moments. As the population has spread throughout the Jipe area, nonetheless, the movement 
has created diverse interactions among different natural resource users, such as farmers and other 
agro-pastoral livestock keepers. These movements have been a source of conflicts with settled 
farmers and livestock keepers. The emergence of these conflicts is due to competition for grazing 
resources (water and land) and sometimes to migrating livestock’s grazing on the crops of settled 
farming communities. Along with these conflicts, at dry spells the livestock might be concentrated 
around small pastoral resources and water sources, which might result in the degradation of water 
and land resources as the carrying capacity of a given land is exceeded. The livestock keepers also 
have a tradition of setting fires in areas where livestock have passed to control tsetse flies and 
encourage the regeneration of fresh pasture. This further intensifies the degradation of water, 
natural vegetation, and land resources.
One of the ways the government has tried to intervene in shaping the Maasai’s culture of 
moving from one area to another in search of pastures is through the enforcement of Maasai 
children’s attendance at school, as well as through compelling herders to introduce crops farming 
along with livestock keeping. Traditionally, the Maasai give their children informal cattle herding 
education starting early, when the children are at the age of four to five years (usually the age 
for elementary education in Tanzania). At this stage, elders train children in the job of herding 
cattle by assigning them to look after young lambs and calves. At the age of six to seven years 
(the beginning of primary education in Tanzania), the children look after old cattle and can 
accompany adult livestock keepers, whereas later they can take the livestock long distances on 
their own (Phillips & Bhavnagri, 2002). This has been a legacy perpetuated from one generation 
to another. Apart from children’s not attending schools, it has not been possible for the Maasai 
to have access to livestock extension and other social services, as they stay in the wilderness and 
continue to migrate from one point to another with their cattle. The government’s intervention 
is based on the rationale that, first, the Maasai movement disseminates cattle diseases, deprives 
their children of the right to access to education, and deprives vulnerable groups such as women 
and children of important social and health services. Additionally, they degrade environmental 
7 Applies for 2006/2007, the rate might have changed presently.
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resources, such as forests and water resources in areas they move to, and fifth, the migration causes 
conflicts between the Maasai and other user groups such as settled livestock keepers and crop 
farmers (MLD, 2006). Since the government assumes that providing formal education to Maasai 
herders’ children will make the Maasai settle, the Mwanga district livestock authority considers 
the training of livestock keepers to be important for the sustainable management of livestock and 
natural resources. This is thought to be useful for herders to collaborate with the government in 
the provision of livestock services in their communities, as the government is limited, in terms 
of human and financial resources, to service all livestock keepers adequately.
Although a strategy to settle the livestock keepers can be important for reliably accessing them, 
when the need arises, and settling conflicts among resource users, it needs to be considered with 
care. The Maasai keep large herds of livestock. Migratory tendencies in such a situation can relieve 
pressure on environmental resources in specific areas compared to large herds being concentrated 
in one area. Since the Maasai are not used to keeping livestock in one area, the government must 
strive to empower the herders to sustainably use natural resources in the settled areas so as to 
avoid the degradation of natural resources.
So far, I have analysed pastoral networks and organisational arrangements by livestock keepers 
in the use of natural resources in livestock production. Already some introduction has been 
given on how the government intervenes in finding solutions to situations that endanger the 
Table 6.3. Part of district strategies for development of livestock production at Mwanga district for 
2006 to 2009 (source: Mwanga district, 2007).
Strategy Cost	(TZS)	 Source	of	funds
Community	 District	
council	
Central	
government	
Donors
• Improvement of the livestock veterinary 
services 
2,000,000 √ √ √
• Rehabilitation and increase of livestock 
dipping trough 
75,000,000 √ √
• Restoration and increase of livestock 
charcos 
270,000,000 √ √
• Training of livestock experts from the 
livestock communities
5,600,000 √ √ √
• Allocation and development of grazing 
areas
38,475,000 √ √
• Consolidation and formation of 
livestock keepers groups
530,000 √ √
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management of sustainable natural resources. In the coming section, further analysis is given 
regarding government strategies to improve the use of natural resources in livestock production.
6.4 Strategies to improve use of natural resources in livestock production
Strategic planning is an important aspect in natural resource management. It may be used to 
improve socio-economic and environmental interests. Well-prepared plans may appropriately 
combine human and financial resources to improve livestock infrastructures and services and, 
in turn, alleviate negative impacts to the environment due to the lack of important livestock 
infrastructures and services. The Mwanga district livestock strategic plan realises that the provision 
of improved veterinary technical services, livestock infrastructure, the allocation and development 
of pastoral areas, and the formation and consolidation of livestock keepers groups (Table 6.3) are 
critical for development of livestock management.
6.4.1 Improvement of veterinary services
As for other areas in Tanzania, extension services have to be shared among providers and 
beneficiaries at Jipe. Capacity is low, though, as both sides are deficient in one way or another. While 
livestock keepers are not organised as a community to support one another in maintaining and 
procuring prerequisite facilities and inputs for the technical services to be offered, the government 
lacks sufficient extension staff. The livestock keepers are not unified, to the extent that some 
livestock facilities and arrangements, which were provided and initiated by the Mixed Farming 
Improvement Project (MIFIPRO), could not be sustained. Rich, average and poor livestock keepers 
would not agree on the amounts of money to donate for veterinary services because some of 
them were said to seek free rides by contributing less money despite having many livestock. The 
government, on the other side, is constrained by staff inadequacy. At the country level, there is 
great discrepancy between available and demanded extension workers (Figure 6.3).
At the local level, the Mwanga district is deficient of livestock extension workers by 61% 
(Figure 6.4), and the Jipe area does not have livestock extension officers at the ward and village 
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of currently available and demanded extension workers in agricultural and 
livestock sector in Tanzania (source: MLD, 2008).
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levels (Table 6.4). Livestock jurisdictions are taken care of by agricultural extension officers, whose 
competencies in livestock aspects are limited.
6.4.2 Training of livestock experts from livestock communities
In response to inadequate livestock technical staff, the government has devised a strategy to 
empower the livestock community to assume the roles of livestock service provision in collaboration 
with a few government technical staff (Table 6.4). This is important because in some areas there 
are no livestock experts. To achieve this, the government plans to train individuals from livestock 
keeping communities. This requires collaboration between the central government (the Ministry 
of Livestock Development and Fisheries), the Mwanga District Council, and the livestock keepers 
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Figure 6.4. Extension workers present and additionally demanded at Mwanga district (source: 
Mwanga District, 2007).
Table 6.4. Extension workers at the Jipe ward (source: Mwanga district office, 2007; √ = available; 
x = not available).
Ward/villages Agricultural	extension	officer	 Livestock	extension	officer
1) Jipe Ward √ X
2) Villages
K/Simba √ X
Kwanyange √ X
Kivisini √ X
Butu X X
Jipe X X
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themselves as well as training institutes. However, for some livestock-keeping communities, such 
as the Maasai, the community has no formal education instrument for training, which makes it 
difficult to train them. For such communities, children are taught to keep cattle even from the 
elementary level onwards, by elders. Whereas they have practical knowledge on cattle keeping, 
gained from their experience in livestock keeping, they are short of formal education, a prerequisite 
for livestock training at the livestock training institutes. As a result, the government has recently 
declared that it is compulsory for migratory livestock keeping communities, including the Maasai 
communities, to take their children to school (TEN, 2007).
6.4.3 Improvement and instalment of livestock infrastructure
As has been mentioned above, in the provision of extension services, the government is deficient 
in extension experts and is financially limited in some areas. The failure to implement some 
services, nonetheless, can be attributed to not adhering to established work plans at the district 
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level. For example, an Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) through the District 
Agricultural and Livestock Development (DALD) invests in development of infrastructures among 
livestock communities (Figure 6.5). Specifically, the investment is for the rehabilitation of livestock 
watering dams, dips and charcos or the establishment of these infrastructures where they do not 
exist. The investment capital is made available to the district by the central government’s Ministry 
of Livestock Development and Fisheries. Although the programme started in the Mwanga district 
in 2005, to date no livestock infrastructural development has been done at Jipe ward. The main 
reason for this lack of development given by the Mwanga District Livestock Officer is the scarcity 
of funds, which reduces the chance of serving many wards or villages at the same time. However, 
this excuse is somewhat controversial.
The comparison of budgeted funds to granted amounts shows that the granted amount was 
39% higher than the budgeted amount (Figure 6.6). Although Mwanga district had applied for 
TZS 681.78 Million (for 2005/06 – June 2009) for livestock development activities, it was granted 
TZS 950 Million. It is likely that the established plans were not implemented. On the other side, 
livestock keepers continue to wait for the materialisation of a promise. They had been informed 
that the government would install livestock infrastructures (watering ponds and charcos) at Jipe. 
This fact was mentioned in interviews with livestock keepers and by the Makuyuni sub-village 
chairperson.
Whereas on the one hand, the inability to fulfil the promise creates mistrust of the government 
by the livestock keepers, on the other hand, the latter can use this weakness as an excuse to continue 
to exploit vulnerable areas for livestock practices. In participatory natural resource management, 
therefore, it requires the commitment to implement stipulated plans, not making promises that 
cannot be fulfilled, and when promises are made, there should be a dedication to fulfil them. When 
such promises are not fulfilled, it might hinder the other side, in the collaborative management 
initiatives, to implement its jurisdiction.
6.4.4 Formation and consolidation of livestock groups
Capacity building may need the formation or strengthening of local organisations among livestock 
farmers for drawing on and mobilising skills, especially when such organisations do not exist 
or are weak. These organisations become early adopters of innovations, and, as a cooperative, 
farmers can help one another in comprehending and disseminating skills among themselves 
and to other livestock keepers within and outside their area. The organisations can be especially 
important where there is poor community organisation for promoting and sustaining natural 
resource management technologies from the government or non-governmental organisations. 
At Jipe, the district agricultural and livestock department promotes the establishment of these 
groups. After the formation, they are imparted with relevant skills through training seminars and 
excursions to other areas where such activities are carried out. This is followed by the provision 
of property capital (e.g. goats) or financial capital for the groups to initiate participatory micro-
projects and apply the skills and experience they have gained. A goat group already exist at Jipe. 
Although goats have been, and are still being, kept in the area, the government’s intervention 
improves locally available goats through crossbreeding with improved billy goats. The district 
driven farmers’ organisation at Jipe, however, puts much concentration on socio-economic benefits 
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while the environmental concern is forgotten. The establishment of the livestock keepers group 
has not considered how the environment will be impacted along with the improvement of the 
indigenous goats. In most cases, the knowledge that the livestock keepers have is on keeping the 
goats and sharing of billy goats among themselves. Additionally, there is an overlooking and/or low 
involvement of technical people in the implementation processes of these projects. For example, 
the Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project (PADEP) at the District 
may advance directly to livestock keepers and implement some activities without going through 
technical and administrative levels at the village.
6.4.5 Improvement of the livestock welfare
Livestock welfare is important for the enhancement of the production and productivity of the 
livestock. Among important aspects for consideration in improving livestock welfare are protection 
against diseases and the improvement of the livestock pastures. The majority of respondents at 
Jipe (80%) highlighted that diseases affect the welfare of their livestock (Table 6.5).
The economically important diseases in the area include East Cost Fever (ECF), foot and 
mouth disease, eye disease, and fowl typhoid. Ticks are common vectors of the livestock diseases 
(53%). Diseases are controlled using both traditional and modern veterinary medicines. Medicinal 
plants such as Azadirachta indica (neem tree) are used in a traditional way. For the modern ways, 
the government through technical personnel imparts skills and offers technical services to the 
livestock keepers for the proper management of the livestock so as to improve livestock quality and 
health. For this method, livestock farmers have to cooperate with the government in improving 
livestock services. Whereas the livestock keepers are offered technical and veterinary advice 
regarding livestock, they have to purchase livestock medicine. The government is also responsible 
for offering extension infrastructures such as dip services, watering infrastructures, and charcos. 
This is an arrangement under the currently implemented Agricultural Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP) in Tanzania.
In addition to the agricultural activities outlined in Chapter five, MIFIPRO is also active in 
improving livestock welfare along with the government. It initially operated as a project but is 
now a Trust Fund. During the project time (1984-1994), MIFIPRO established a ward station 
for livestock services. It offered services including dipping, vaccination and treatment, and it 
established the ward livestock station. However, this station is presently not operational. After 
the end of the MIFIPRO project, village governments and livestock keepers within the ward were 
Table 6.5. Problems associated with livestock keeping (source: field survey, 2007).
Problem Household	(%);	n=80
Livestock diseases 80
Tick and tsetse flies 53
Wildlife attack 49
6. Management of natural resources in livestock production at Lake Jipe in Tanzania 141
required to establish an organisation and prepare mechanisms for sharing veterinary medicines and 
operating costs for services for the livestock inputs and services to be locally available, as was the 
case during the project’s tenure. Though the arrangement was established, it could no longer thrive.
Government and the livestock keepers accuse each other of failing to sustain the ward livestock 
station initiated by MIFIPRO. Whereas the village leaders claim that livestock keepers wanted 
the services free of charge, the livestock keepers assert that the ward and village leaders could 
not facilitate equitable organisation of cost-sharing arrangements among the livestock keepers. 
According to the village leaders, when the veterinary services were provided free of charge, the 
livestock keepers brought their livestock to the station. When they were required to contribute some 
money, they would not agree, and they stopped bringing their livestock for dipping, vaccination 
and treatment, and this led to the disoperation of the livestock station due to financial crisis. On the 
other side, the livestock keepers claim that their leaders contributed to the collapse of the livestock 
station. This group complains that the ward and village leaders did not rationally differentiate cost 
sharing among the livestock keepers. Livestock keepers with large herds of livestock were to pay 
the same amount as those with small number of livestock, and this resulted in conflicts between 
these groups of livestock keepers.
6.4.6 Improvement of grazing land
The improvement of pasture is critical for livestock keeping at Jipe area. A main problem faced 
during livestock keeping at Jipe surrounds the lack of adequate pasture for livestock, and this is the 
critical problem during dry seasons. There is even variability in pasture availability for consecutive 
dry seasons. For some dry seasons, the situation even leads to dying of the livestock. Such was the 
case in 2005. The Jipe area is recurrently stricken by drought situation. This is the main reason 
for livestock keepers’ encroachment of fragile areas, such as forests and a shore of Lake Jipe. The 
Mwanga District Livestock Department understands this problem. Although among its objectives 
is to develop pastoral areas, it has not come out clearly how pasture improvement in practice will 
be done for the Jipe area. One of the ways the central government attempts to work to reduce 
deficiency of pasture in the rangelands is through the introduction of established pasture seeds 
in the rangelands (MLD, 2006). However, for this to be effective, rain is needed, so this might be 
effective during the wet season, but the same problem will persist during dry seasons. It appears 
that research on pastoral seeds has not been effective in developing pastoral seeds that withstand 
drought situations and can be prolific during dry seasons so as to reduce the movement of the 
livestock to other areas during these critical times.
The government, at least at the planning and advisory level, and to a limited extent at the 
practical level, collaborates with livestock keepers to improve the management of natural resources 
in livestock production. However, some issues exist between the government and the livestock 
keepers, which constrain, and may continue to constrain, the sustainable use of natural resources 
in livestock production. In the coming section, these issues will be examined.
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6.5 Contrasting strategies between the government and livestock keepers
There is commonly an ecological concern, in areas where livestock are managed, on the relationship 
between the number of livestock and the amount of land or natural resources existing within a 
given physical environment (Fritz & Duncan, 1994; Scarnecchia, 1990). There is a discrepancy 
in the contemplation and way of thinking in this respect between the district livestock technical 
department and livestock keepers at Jipe. Whereas the district government relevant authorities 
uncover that the livestock population at Jipe is larger than a carrying capacity of the area - though 
they base their argument on theoretical grounds, as no study on livestock versus land area has been 
conducted in this area - the livestock keepers attach intricate socio-economic and socio-cultural 
reasons. These reasons motivate them to keep large herds of livestock.
The livestock experts at the district level claim that the livestock keepers do not take their 
advice of keeping herds in relation with the available natural resources. There seems, however, less 
understanding among the district technocrats of the rationale for the reluctance of the livestock 
keepers to follow the technical advice. I argue that unless socio-cultural and socio-economic 
environments nested in livestock keepers’ decisions are understood clearly, strategies for improving 
the livestock and environmental nexus cannot be relevant and effective.
Among the Pare people, the livestock acts as a bank, as security assets, or as a cushion for times 
of hardship. During extreme droughts, for example, the livestock keepers sell some of their livestock 
in order to buy food. Likewise, they sell livestock when they encounter socio-economic problems, 
such as health complications of relatives, in order to address the situation. To the livestock keepers, 
first, the livestock act as shock absorbers, and as a cushion for these uncertainties. Second, at Jipe, 
as has previously been underscored, social livelihood networks exist between poor persons and 
rich livestock owners. Due to the lack of - or the limited number of - other options regarding 
livelihood, the poor who engage in these networks aim at procuring their own livestock along with 
increase in livestock number for owners. This is possible only when the number of the livestock 
increase, as their payments (a calf or a kid) are made on this basis. The villagers to whom the 
livestock are entrusted do not accept to reduce the livestock number, as this interferes with their 
livelihood objectives. As Maembe (2004) argues, the community at Jipe is not ready to embark 
on, or think about, environmental management while its members’ livelihood needs are not met. 
This logic has to be properly understood before suggesting the reduction of livestock numbers. It 
is necessary to underscore the webs and chains of livelihood strategies and relationships within 
the livestock keepers’ community so that feasible strategies can be suggested.
Aside from livelihood, socio-cultural function is another aspect of the necessity of the livestock 
among Jipe people. Livestock is used for mediating incompliance to some informal regulations. 
Likewise, it is used for an obligatory donation in a traditional arrangement where an individual 
during emergency is assisted by traditional social networks. The failure to comply with these 
traditional arrangements excludes an individual from the traditional social support networks. 
One such social network is Ukunga.
Ukunga is an informal institution under a traditional leader, who is usually an elderly person. 
One role of Ukunga is to facilitate and govern a social network of helping one another in case of 
emergencies. When the emergency occurs, the leader blows a whistle to alert people, after being 
informed about this situation by victims or associates. When the whistle is blown, every youth 
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postpones what he is then engaged in and goes to the source of the whistle in order to receive a 
message over a prevailing incident. Traditionally, after the event, a household of the supported 
has to pay a goat, which will be consumed by all those who participated in resolving or attempting 
to resolve the emergency.
These networks have compulsive power to enforce actors to comply with their traditional 
arrangements. For example, one day during my field research, a group of youth, a sub-village 
chairperson, and the traditional leader came to the office of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) with 
a young man. The young man was accused of a wish to commit suicide, by poisoning himself. He 
then disappeared into a forest to die there. The victim’s mother yelled, which made the traditional 
leader blow his whistle to gather the youth to search for him. At this time, the victim was considered 
to have committed suicide. However, he was found alive. The victim’s mother was required to pay 
a goat to those who participated in searching for him. However, the victim’s mother could not 
pay the goat, saying that she did not have one. This violation of locally agreed institutions made 
the involved people present this case to the sub-village chairperson, who, nonetheless, could not 
resolve it. Therefore, the case was presented to the WEO, who listened to their claims. Since there 
were no provisions in the formal government institutions, the WEO advised them to go back and 
resolve the case using their traditional institutions. The traditional leader and his team declared 
that if the woman would not comply with their institutions, she would alienate herself from such 
support the next time she encountered such a problem.
The case above indicates that, the Jipe people attach not only livelihood and socio-economic 
implications to the livestock but also socio-cultural meanings. Social exclusion results from the 
failure to comply with culturally legitimised arrangements. The way that local people legitimatise 
such intricate socio-economic and socio-cultural issues implies that it is necessary to understand 
such issues before an outsider intervenes and suggests strategies for balancing livestock and pastoral 
land resource linkages in a particular environment. The livestock technocrats at the district level 
thus need to understand these relationships before they advise so that they can avoid providing 
simplistic solutions or advice with an uncertain likelihood of being adopted.
I have, up to this juncture, discussed livestock keepers’ and government’s strategies for the 
management of natural resources in livestock production. The discussion has unveiled areas where 
the two domains partake and contrast in the use and management of natural resources. In practice, 
the management of natural resources, besides comprising strategies and plans, is governed by 
rules and institutions, which direct how these strategies and plans should be implemented. The 
coming section turns to the enforcement of natural resource management.
6.6 Institutions governing use of natural resources in livestock production
The management of natural resources in livestock production occurs through formal and informal 
regulations, mechanisms and institutions. Some of these institutions are written down (formalised) 
under existing legal and institutional frameworks, whereas some emanate in the activities of the 
users as a way of defending, fighting for or securing their needs and interests. In the coming 
subsection, an analysis will be given on how various actors, the government and the community, 
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participate in formulating the institutions (hereby meaning rules, by-laws, regulations, etc.), and 
how they participate in enforcing these institutions for sustainable natural resource management 
practices.
Some institutions emanate informally and others obligatorily emanate as a requirement from 
the existing institutional and legal frameworks of the country. The relevant institutions for the 
management of natural resources in livestock production at Jipe include environmental by-laws, 
forest by-laws, water regulations, and land formalisation regulations. Government and community 
interactions in the implementation of the environmental by-laws and water regulations have been 
discussed in section 5.5 encompassing all livelihood sectors, as the environmental regulations 
are multidisciplinary.
Forest regulations
Forest regulations fall into two categories. The first category of regulations is implemented by the 
District Natural Resources Department (DNRD) because they are applied for the protection of 
natural forest reserves that despite being within local areas (Jipe area) are under jurisdiction of the 
district. According to these institutions, it is not allowed to undertake grazing activities in these 
forest resources. Contrary to the currently promoted participatory natural resource management 
approach, though, the DNRD has not clearly stated how communities have to be involved, and 
the top-down approach continues to be maintained in managing these forests. Due to financial 
and technical staff limitations, nonetheless, the encroachment of these areas for grazing activities 
is not uncommon. Despite the fact that the district government enforces the protection of these 
areas, through awareness creation approaches such as the instalment of posters, the management 
is not working effectively.
Although approaches to joint forestry resource management have been in place in Tanzania 
since late 1990s (Kajembe, Nduwamungu, & Luoga, 2006), at Jipe the government continues to 
monopolise the management of the natural forest, which neighbours private lands. The forest 
department at the district seems to lack trust as to whether villagers can manage the forest, though 
at the same time, it has failed to enforce conservation of this resource using its top-down approach. 
On the other hand, monopolisation can be due to the fear of losing power and authority when 
these institutions would be shared with the community.
The second category of forest regulations applies to areas within village forests. These regulations 
are part of mainstream environmental by-laws and are currently planned to plant trees to combat 
degraded land areas in villages due to unsustainable farming practices. According to the village 
forest regulations, it is forbidden to graze on village forests. A violator of these regulations is fined 
TZS 50,000 (€ 28) or two years’ imprisonment, according to the a member of environmental 
committee at Jipe. Due to the close monitoring of the forests at the village level, for the last three 
years, only two livestock keepers have violated this regulation; they had to pay the prescribed 
fine of TZS 50,000.
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Land formalisation
One of the main reasons for land formalisation regulations at rural areas arises from the desire of 
the government to control for potential conflicts between farmers and livestock keepers, which 
have been commonly occurring in many parts of Tanzania (MLD, 2006). Currently, countrywide, 
there is an ongoing national programme of translocating the livestock keepers from one place 
to another so to control conflictual interactions between the livestock keepers and the farmers. 
The government has already moved some livestock keepers and livestock from regions, such as 
Morogoro (Kilosa district), Mbeya and other areas, to western Tanzania e.g. the Rukwa region and 
coastal regions of Lindi and Coast. This process has already caused a lot of havoc, both ecologically 
and socio-economically. Whereas the government, for example, states that the host areas would be 
improved with important social services, such as water, health, and education, much has not been 
implemented in practice. Again, socio-economically, the livestock keepers have incurred livestock 
deaths, loss of livestock, corruption and threats from enforcers of the translocation arrangement 
in the process (Mwarabu, 2007). Additionally, instead of alleviating conflicts, there is evidence 
of dissemination of the conflicts, whereby the livestock keepers in recipient areas compete with 
residents for natural resources exploitation (especially water and land) (MLD, 2006). Some farming 
communities already claim that the newcomers (livestock keepers) graze on their crops8. Instead 
of providing solutions for conflict experiences, as is common in the use of natural resources for 
livestock and agricultural production, the government-disorganised arrangement disseminates 
and escalates conflicts. It appears that there is poor planning in enforcing these regulations.
The Mwanga district participates in the countrywide campaign of demarcating livestock grazing 
areas from crop-farming areas. In the Kirya area, for example, the practice of demarcating livestock 
from agricultural (crops) land is underway. Contrary to Kirya area, nonetheless, for the Jipe area, 
the livestock keepers are not moved from one area to another. This is because a large percentage 
of livestock keepers at Jipe are also farmers (agro-pastoralists). Even the Maasai herders have 
started, though at a reduced scale, to incorporate farming activities in their livelihood strategies. 
For areas surrounding Lake Jipe, therefore, the formalisation of informally existing arrangement 
is practically what takes place. The formalisation of land use in this area aims at reducing conflicts 
among users and facilitating the sustainable use of natural resources.
Although the plan sounds good, it is yet disputable as to whether formalisation by itself is a 
solution to the dual problems of the unsustainable use of land resources and conflicts among users. 
Apart from the potential of formalisation processes to protect communal grazing land, the livestock 
keepers’ encroachment of other areas, especially during the critical dry seasons, is likely to persist 
if pasture and water scarcity problems are not effectively addressed. This needs to be meditated 
among the government implementers on how the grazing land can be appropriately developed 
following the demarcation process so that the pastoral resources are made both sustainable and 
socio-ecologically feasible.
The budget constraint is an important factor that delays allocation and demarcation plans as 
well as the development of the grazing land. The local government and the community implement 
this programme by depending on funds from the central government, which is untimely allocated, 
8 http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/radio1/2008/05/07/113911.html.
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and this has delayed implementation (Table 6.6). For example, whereas the idea of improved land 
use has trickled down to the villages, and already villages have started formulating by-laws for 
enforcing its operationalisation, up to 2008, when this research was being conducted, land surveys 
of the area had not started.
6.6.1 Enforcement of regulations/institutions
The government, the non-governmental actor (MIFIPRO), and the livestock keepers/community 
participate in enforcing the sustainable management of natural resources in livestock production in 
the Jipe area in one way or another. Formal and informal mechanisms interact in the enforcement 
process.
The informal organisation of livestock keepers as represented by a livestock keepers’ committee 
aims at mainly defending their interests against other land users (especially protecting communal 
grazing land). Livestock keepers defend the communal grazing land from being encroached for 
farming activities. Through informing and convening meetings with village government and 
other actors (e.g. farmers), in case some interference occurs, they negotiate their interests and 
thus protect the grazing land.
Restricting the number of livestock from outside the village allowed to graze in communal 
grazing land during abundant pasture seasons (when other areas are short of pasture) is another 
informal way of regulating the use of communal grazing land. Although the government usually 
influences and intercedes on behalf of outside users, the decision regarding the allowable livestock 
Table 6.6. Strategic plan for environmental conservation at Mwanga for July 2006 to June 2009 
(source: Mwanga district, 2007).
Strategy Activity Cost	(TZS).
To	be	met	by	
Mwanga	District
Provide environmental 
education and enforce by 
laws against degradation 
and fire setting
• Train leaders at the village and district levels
• Print and install awareness posts at the boundaries 
of forests
• Prepare and disseminate brochures cautioning fire 
hazards to the forests
• Sue the violators
3,850,000
To conserve water sources 
and enforce environmental 
by-laws
• Survey all water sources
• Mark the boundaries
• Plant trees
• Sue violators of environmental by-laws
5,500,000
Total 9,350,000
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number (from outside the village) into the communal grazing land is made by the livestock 
committee, based on the condition (as the livestock keepers assess) of their grazing land.
Shifting grazing during critical dry seasons is another informal arrangement that allows pasture 
regeneration for the communal grazing land. However, this institution creates land degradation 
vulnerability to other areas where the livestock are grazed, during these times (e.g. along the shore 
of Lake Jipe, on the mountainous areas, and long-distance shifts of the livestock).
Formal institutional mechanisms also enforce management practices of sustainable natural 
resources in livestock production at Jipe. These, as already introduced above, include environmental 
by-laws, forest by-laws, and land formalisation regulations. The government and local community 
enforce some of these instruments, whereas the government actor alone enforces others. The 
multidisciplinary committee (agriculture, livestock, and government), which integrates the 
community and government actors, enforces the environmental by-laws. On the other side, the 
water committee at Jipe comprises entrusted villagers alone, and its role is narrow, to enforce 
the conservation of water sources used for domestic consumption against encroachment and 
pollution by livestock. The forest by-laws (at the village level) enforce the conservation of forest 
resources. The forest by-laws are integrated within the mainstream village environmental by-laws. 
For forests under the district forest authority, nonetheless, the environmental by-laws do not 
apply, but regulations imposed by the district forest authority do apply and are enforced (though 
inadequately) by the District Natural Resources Office.
The District Natural Resources Department (DNRD), through its Forest Authority Section, 
made a plan to address the degradation of natural forests under its authority (Table 6.6). Its strategies 
include the provision of environmental education to leaders and communities, including livestock 
keepers. In addition, the demarcation of boundaries of water sources and forest resources is 
another strategy the district authority undertakes to combat forest degradation. The dissemination 
of brochures with precautions on fire hazards, and the impacts of the unsustainable use of the 
forest resources, as well as the attachment of awareness posters and signs at the boundaries of the 
forests, are other strategies to make people aware of these boundaries. If the villagers (livestock 
keepers inclusive) do not comply with these regulations, the plan states that punitive measures 
will apply, though it does not categorically state the type of punishments for incompliance. In 
the implementation of this plan, the DNRD understands that enforcement constraints exist, 
including the lack of adequate extension workers and the lack of adequate knowledge on how to 
make the by-laws.
Nonetheless, one can wonder whether the encroachment of the forest resources for livestock-
keeping practices is because the community lacks awareness regarding the impacts of livestock 
keeping, setting fires on these resources, and the boundaries of the state forest resources vis-à-vis 
private property resources. Is this also because of their not comprehending the importance and 
role of the forests in providing environmental benefits and buffering hazards? Although up to 
the completion of this field research, (i.e. in 2008) the district government had not implemented 
a system of forest education for the community, the problem of encroachment of the forests for 
livestock grazing, and fire setting appears more attributed to the struggle to achieve social and 
economic benefits.
There is a discrepancy in the purposes and objectives between the district forest authority and 
the local livestock keepers. Whereas livestock keepers’ objectives give first priority to securing 
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livelihood benefits, the DNRD emphasises the implementation of the by-laws while externalising 
local people’s interests. Since the DNRD cannot enforce its plans due to the deficiency, as earlier 
mentioned, of financial and technical human resources, the livestock keepers use this chance to 
obtain their livelihoods. The livestock keepers graze their livestock in or around the forest areas 
during dry seasons. This plainly indicates that at this time, the problem motivating the livestock 
keeper to graze the livestock in the forest is the inadequacy of pasture within the common grazing 
areas. I argue that the enforcement of the forest regulations by the DNRD has limited room for 
success unless reasons for setting fires and grazing on the forest areas are considered and alternative 
ways are discussed among the forest department and the local people. Such an approach can lead 
to the development of a feasible strategy and result in a decline in the encroachment of the forest. 
The integration of the government and livestock keepers’ concerns can result in two benefits. 
First, the monitoring of the forest resources can be collaborative, which means that transaction 
and monitoring costs can be reduced. The second virtue is that the community can be provided 
with alternative and sustainable ways of meeting their livelihoods along with the conservation 
of the natural resources.
Along the enforcement of conservation institutions, socio-economic interests have to be 
integrated so as to increase the chance of successful conservation. This thinking has already 
entered the minds of district forest officers. The district has recently begun consideration of some 
incentive mechanisms to motivate villagers, including livestock keepers, to conserve the forests.
Enforcement through incentives
The Mwanga district’s natural resources department appears to recognise that carrot motivation 
is imperative to incite the communities in the district including the Jipe area to participate in 
environmental conservation. Table 6.7 substantiates this argument. The district has initiated a 
contest for its rural and township areas to participate in tree nursery management and planting.
The tree-planting contest is relevant to the livestock keepers. The livestock keepers are users 
of the forest resources, although this is not legally allowed, on the argument that grazing in the 
forest degrades forest and water resources therein. Additionally, livestock grazing in the forest is 
Table 6.7. Tree nursery management and planting contest at Mwanga district (source: Mwanga 
District Council, 2007).
Activity Specific	tasks Funds	required	(TZS) Sources	of	funds
Establish-ment of 
the tree nursery 
and tree planting
• Stakeholders seminar
• Provision of quality tree seeds
• Campaigning for tree planting in the 
villages
• Assessment and awarding the 
winners TZS 500,000
• 200,000 for seminar
• 6,000,000 for tree 
seeds and polythene 
bags
• 500,000 for award
• The vice 
president 
environmental 
office
• The Mwanga 
district council
6. Management of natural resources in livestock production at Lake Jipe in Tanzania 149
associated with the setting of fires to kill livestock parasites, i.e. tsetse flies and ticks. The inclusion 
of the livestock keepers in this contest assumes that their awareness will be raised with regard to 
the importance of trees, and this might alleviate their negative practices within the forests.
The district underlies the following assumptions for initiating a tree nursery and planting 
contest: if tree planting is organised in the format of a contest, many actors will show up; there will 
be many tree nurseries and seedlings; the community will be motivated. So, in essence, according 
to the district’ natural resource authorities, this implies that tree planting and conservation will 
be successful with the contest approach, whereby the winner is awarded TZS 500,000.
Whereas in the short-term this approach might be uneasy to dispute, in the long-term there are 
some uncertainties. For the participation of the people to be sustainable, the incentive arrangements 
have to be sustainable too, and not necessarily in financial terms. In the present case, if this 
incentive stops at some time, it is likely that the local people’s attitude towards tree planting and 
nursery management will also shift. It will not be surprising to witness an impasse with regard to 
tree planting in the future when the present incentive system ends. Certainly, the mobilisation of 
the local people for conserving the environment is important, but perhaps it is also important to 
consider some types of sustainable incentives. In the context of the present financial incentive, the 
following questions are probably not easy to answer: will the government be providing finances of 
this kind on a sustainable basis? What is the implication of the incentive to perform environmental 
management in the long run, and what if the government offers an incentive only for a short 
period and then stops?
The awarding of tree-planting activity is an indication that the government is trying to use 
the carrot motivation approach, and on the other side, it implies that the stick approach is at 
least to some extent failing. However, there is no clear mention of the long-term planning of this 
arrangement. There is no clear analysis of the likely impacts of the incentive in environmental 
management, either. Thinking from a sustainability point of view, there can be uncertainty in the 
future as regards the participation of local people in the management of natural resources. The 
provision of short-term incentives might result in the abandonment of long-term strategies (Hellin 
& Schrader, 2003; IFAD 1996; Pretty & Shaxon, 1998). Under such situations, the empowerment 
of the community might not be emphasised, and this might affect the achievement and sustenance 
of long-term benefits after the end of the projects, which in this case are the awards (Giger, 1999; 
Hellin & Schrader, 2003). Positive responses that local people may show can be attributed to the 
urgency they feel to win the award. If this is the case, it is likely that they will cease to participate 
when the award arrangements stop. I argue that for people to participate continually in natural 
resource management, an incentive system should be well-constructed and devised based on 
considerations of sustainability. In other words, the environmental conservation objectives and 
incentive mechanisms should be mutually supportive. Otherwise, the response of the people can 
be temporarily positive just because of an existing incentive at a particular time, the lack of which 
can lead to poor or no participation later.
The source of funds for the contest and award is another aspect that requires consideration. 
For the operationalisation of the tree planting, the district natural resources office depends on 
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financial aid from the Vice President’s Office as one of the sponsors of the programme (contest). It 
is questionable as to whether this support is going to be sustained. Although incentive mechanisms 
can be an necessary tool for promoting participatory environmental management, it requires 
checks and balances between achieving short-term and long-term environmental benefits and 
sustainable livelihoods. A sustainable incentive system can build upon the livestock keepers’ 
livelihoods. An example would be, along with tree planting, the integration of pasture development 
for ensuring that the livestock will get pasture for extended periods throughout the year and thus 
ensuring that fragile natural environments are protected from unsustainable exploitation.
In the Jipe area, a tree-planting contest has been held with the government at village levels, 
appointing some small groups to manage tree nurseries on behalf of the community. The village 
community will thus participate in tree planting exercises when the seedlings will be ready for 
planting. While the incentives can mobilise people to do certain tasks, especially after perceiving 
possible gains from the tasks, it might result not in understanding the necessity of environmental 
management but rather in the struggle to gain the incentives that have been offered to participants.
In the above section, I have analysed the institutions for enforcing sustainable natural resource 
management in livestock production in the Jipe area. There is an interaction of formal and informal 
institutions in the enforcement of sustainable management practices in livestock production at 
Jipe. Authoritative and carrot enforcement mechanisms exist. Authoritative enforcement requires 
that livestock keepers fulfil certain responsibilities, as required by the formal institutions, whereas 
the carrot approach is attractive when incentives are used to incite livestock keepers’ willingness 
to participate. I have argued that, although socio-economic interests have to be considered along 
with environmental interests, care should be taken to check and balance the long-term and short-
term environmental and socio-economic interests for the sustainability of these mechanisms.
Table 6.8. Conflicts between livestock keepers and other actors due to contrasting interests over 
natural resources.
Conflict	type	 Conflicting	actors	 Resolving/mediating	actors	
Competition for pastoral 
resources
Livestock keepers (Pare versus Maasai) Village government
Crops destruction Livestock keepers versus farmers Elders
Village and ward government
District government
Land alienation Livestock keepers versus district 
government
None 
Wildlife attack Wildlife versus livestock keepers Villagers hunt and kill the wildlife
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6.7 Dispute resolution
In the use of natural resources where users have contrasting or similar but competitive interests 
over these resources, conflicts are inevitable. At Lake Jipe, in the management of natural resources 
for livestock production, conflicts emerge in the competition for pastoral land for grazing livestock, 
for grazing versus food production, in land alienation, and between the livestock and wildlife 
(Table 6.8).
6.7.1 Competition for pastoral resources
Disputes emanate in the use of rangeland in the Jipe area. At critical seasons of pasture deficiency, 
the seasonal migration of livestock occurs along Lake Jipe between villages and areas. Although 
seasonal movement is not unique for Maasai livestock keepers, the Pare livestock keepers treat one 
another differently from the way they treat the Maasai herders. The Pare people apply reciprocity 
institutions among themselves for hosting one another during critical pasture seasons. In other 
words, they use the ‘host me today then I will host you tomorrow’ approach. The Maasai keepers 
conduct things differently. The Maasai livestock keepers move as far as the Jipe village from 
Toroha, Ndea Mgagau villages where they usually camp. Since other groups of users (the Pare 
farmers and livestock keepers) occupy areas that Maasai pastoralists move to, conflicts emerge 
between these two ethnic groups. Conflicts occur when the Maasai livestock either graze on food 
crops fields or browse on communal grazing land under other livestock keepers. Also, the Pare 
accuse the Maasai of stealing their cattle. The village, ward and district authorities address these 
conflicts. Conflict resolution arrangements start at lower government (village) levels, and when 
they fail, upper levels intervene. Because of the conflicts, some strategies endogenously develop 
to facilitate the harmonious use of natural resources for livestock production between the two 
ethnic user groups.
Legitimising the use of natural resources by a formerly excluded social group is one way of 
attaining the harmonious use of resources among different ethnic users. At the Jipe village, for 
example, the village government has informally developed a mechanism for legitimising the 
use of communal grazing land by the Maasai during seasonal movements from their camps to 
other areas. One such arrangement is the informal purchase of grazing rights depending on the 
number of days spent at the communal grazing land of another village. For example, for three 
months, the Maasai pay up to TZS 50,000 as a use rights fee. The payments are not charged based 
on the number of the livestock or on the area covered by the livestock but rather on the number 
of days spent at Jipe. Then, the government negotiates with Pare livestock keepers to allow the 
Maasai to graze on the communal grazing land with the argument that the Maasai contribute to 
development activities at the village.
The integrated government herders’ property rights regime for the communal grazing land 
gives the government some power and influence over resident Pare livestock keepers. Although 
the livestock keepers use this land communally, they do not own it, as it is under the government 
(entrustee). The government can thus influence and recommend use by outsiders. The Maasai 
use the money to purchase grazing rights. Besides purchasing the grazing rights, when at Jipe 
village, they are also involved in fundraising programmes for participatory development activities 
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(e.g. construction of schools). This was evident in an interview with a member of the village 
government, who asserted that:
The Maasai follow our regulations, they present their applications for being allowed 
to graze in our village land, and they pay for their application to the village council 
based on the number of months they are going to spend. They also contribute to 
development activities in the village. However, the livestock keepers determine how 
many livestock have to be allowed in the communal grazing land based on pastoral 
land condition. Sometimes when we ask them to host the Maasai, they respond that 
it is not possible because our grazing land is in poor condition. (Hatibu, Makuyuni 
Subvillage Chairperson, 27/6/07).
Although the village government intercedes for the Maasai, nonetheless, after receiving a use 
rights fee, the Pare livestock keepers through their committee (informal organisation) decide on 
the number of livestock from the outside to graze on the common pastoral land, as evidenced in 
the sub-village leader’s statement above.
Financial benefits attract the government to support the use of grazing land by outside users. 
The livestock keepers express dissatisfaction with the government’s statement that the Maasai 
contribute to the development of the Jipe village. One of the livestock keepers in the area claimed 
that he does not know whether the use rights fee the Maasai pay goes to the development activities 
in the village or whether it is shared among village leaders. The lack of transparency on how the 
collected fee is used prompts queries among the Pare livestock keepers.
The Maasai and Pare, even though they are found around the Lake Jipe area, hardly intermix. 
The weak association between the two results from a lack of trust. A lack of trust can negatively 
affect a relationship between actors. This situation can occur when the characteristics and behaviour 
of one or several actors in the institutional framework create a sense of insecurity among or 
endanger the interests of other actors. The Pare livestock keepers at Jipe distrust the Maasai 
herders because of the latter’s tendency to raid livestock. Traditionally, according to the Maasai’s 
culture, cattle belong to them while other tribes who keep cattle were in the past given the cattle 
to keep them temporarily, so the Maasai have the right to take them back (Mbanile).9,10 Because 
of this tradition, even in villages where both ethnic groups live, they do not mix, due to this 
uncertainty and fear among the Pare. The Maasai stay in their own camps, and the Pare stay in 
theirs. Likewise, for areas to which the Maasai seasonally relocate, especially during critical pasture 
deficit periods, they are socially excluded from coming and staying in the midst of the host Pare 
community because of this fear.
6.7.2 Destruction of other users’ property
Conflicts are unavoidable when the resource use practices of one actor or several actors disrupt 
interests of another natural resource user. At Jipe, Maasai herders during their movements along 
9 http://fga.freac.fsu.edu/resources/academy/pdf/tribal_fact_sheets.pdf.
10 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/reportfromafrica12.pdf#page=16.
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Lake Jipe area, in search of fresh pasture, graze on food crop fields of settled farming communities. 
This results in disputes between the Maasai herders and the farmers. In 2005, for example, disputes 
between the two groups were so intense that the ward and village governments could not resolve 
them, and consequently the Pare villagers confiscated the Maasai cattle. For such conflicts, when 
lower governmental levels have failed to reach a resolution, the district government intervenes. 
The district commissioners’ office had to intervene and mediate between the two ethnic users of 
natural resources at Jipe, and the cattle were given back to the Maasai. In this category, conflicts 
also sometimes exist between the Pare livestock keepers and farmers. The browsing of food crops 
by the livestock is a reason for this. These conflicts hardly come to the government but are mostly 
resolved by elders in the Pare community. This indicates that intra-ethnic conflicts are within the 
reach of respective ethnic groups and that solutions to these problems can be obtained within 
ethnic boundaries by using instruments the community itself regards legitimate.
6.7.3 Land alienation
Scarcity and the ambiguous property rights of a competitive resource can result in resource use 
conflicts. At Jipe, as elaborated under subsection 6.5.1, the alienation of grazing land by the district 
government results in the hatred of the district government by the livestock keepers. This land is 
given to farmers from the upstream area because land is scarce in the area. Though the livestock 
keepers disapprove the alienation of grazing land, they do not have the power to prevent the 
government from doing so. The type of property rights for the grazing land limits the livestock 
keepers from resisting the government because the grazing land boundaries are ambiguous. 
Additionally, the government holds ownership of the grazing land, whereas the livestock keepers 
have use rights. This makes it difficult for livestock keepers to prevent the government from making 
the decision make grazing land exclusive for other uses. The district government thus uses its power 
to provide land to upstream farmers who do not have enough cultivation land on the upstream.
6.7.4 Invasion by the wildlife
In areas where the livestock-keeping community lives closer to national parks, conflicts between 
livestock and wildlife are difficult to avoid (Bangs & Shivik, 2001; Jackson & Wangchuk, 2001). 
At Jipe, this occurs during dry seasons, when water in the lake has declined. In the past, elders 
uncover, the Jipe area had many wildlife including lions, elephants, buffalo, and hippopotami. 
Elders highlight how in those days they fought lions as they grazed their livestock. The attack 
of livestock by lions was frequent. Some areas are named after this historic phenomenon. One 
of the villages in the Jipe area, for example, is called Kambi ya simba, literally meaning ‘lion 
camp’. Settlement distribution in the area has displaced the wildlife. Since on the Kenyan side 
of the Tanzania-Kenya border there is the Tsavo National Park, the wildlife moved to this park. 
Nonetheless, the wildlife occasionally move into the Jipe area. The most common threat to the 
livestock keepers are lions. This problem is critical when water in the lake is low, as the lions move 
around, probably in search of drinking water. In 2005, when the lake encountered a severe drought, 
for example, the Jipe area experienced frequent livestock attacks by lions, especially at night. The 
livestock keepers encountered loss of their livestock. Mr. Mustafa, a sub-village leader, for example, 
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lost seven cows in one night when the lions attacked his livestock enclosure. However, the existing 
solution is presently to hunt and kill the lions. There exists no formal collaborative arrangement 
in place to control this problem. Nonetheless, when it is critical the district’s natural resources 
department assists in protecting local people and livestock against lion attacks by hunting the lions.
The experience of conflicts between the livestock community and wildlife has socio-economic 
and environmental connotations. Whereas people’s lives and property are endangered by wildlife 
attacks, human interference in the environment contributes to this problem. The critical drying 
of Lake Jipe in 2005 was due to the abstraction of water at tributary rivers that discharge water 
into Lake Jipe for large-scale agricultural production. Such rivers include Kirurumo from the Pare 
Mountains, and Lumi, which enters Lake Jipe through Taveta, Kenya, although it originates from 
Mount Kilimanjaro on the Tanzanian side. The cost of degrading the environment can result in 
a sense of both environmental and socio-economic insecurity.
6.8 Co-management arrangement
The co-management arrangement in natural resource management for livestock production at 
Jipe is built on ethnicity (Figure 6.7). Relationships between the two ethnic groups, the Pare and 
the Maasai, are determined by spatial and temporal variations in the availability of pastures on 
the pastoral land. At seasons when pastures are adequate, the two ethnic herders become spatially 
distributed around the Lake Jipe area. While during scarce pastoral seasons some livestock actors 
move from one area to another in search of pasture and water, they meet and interact with other 
herders settled in some particular areas. Based on pastoral availability and scarcity, some ethnic-
based local institutions have evolved among the users, whereby they recognise one another based 
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Figure 6.7. Interactions among ethnic and governmental institutions in the use of pastoral land at Jipe.
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on these ethnic differences, and even the treatment of individual livestock keepers at some areas 
follows these ethnic rails. Reciprocity institutions, for example, exist among Pare herders where, 
based on their homogenous ethnicity, herders in one village are allowed to graze in another village, 
on the grounds that the assisted today may assist others tomorrow or in the future. This acts as 
social capital and as a network for them. While reciprocal institutions exist among the Pare, they 
distrust the Maasai herders, based on the perception that the latter are cattle raiders. The mutual 
temporal use of grazing land for the two is thus facilitated through government-driven formal 
institutional interactions.
Formal property rights arrangements influence the interactions among social actors in the 
use of pastoral land at Jipe. Formal institutional arrangements for the pastoral land recognise this 
resource as state-owned, whereby, within administrative village boundaries, the government acts 
as a trustee of the pastoral land, whereas the herders have the right to use it. Decision making over 
the pastoral land, therefore, is a shared jurisdiction of the government and the livestock keepers. 
This institutional arrangement, existing between informal local institutions and governmental 
formal institutions, indicates that although the Pare herders have the right to use pastoral resources, 
the government holds the decision-making power that can influence the inclusion of other users, 
the Maasai in the present case, in the use of the resource.
On the other side, the Maasai herders have some influence that catalyzes the interactions. 
Whereas the government uses its power as the owner or trustee of the village pastoral land at Jipe 
to intercede for the Maasai, the latter have power in the form of financial resources, which make 
the government actively intercede on their behalf. As has been explained before, the Maasai are 
required to pay a fee (about TZS 16,500 per month) to be allowed to graze their livestock on the 
communal pastoral land at Jipe villages to Pare villagers and government administration. Thus, 
it can be argued that the governments of Pare villages benefit from this intermediary work and 
that this is at least one of the reasons motivating the government to intercede on behalf of the 
Maasai herders.
The new spatiotemporal co-management interactions among the Pare, Maasai and governmental 
institutional actors are thus facilitated by some factors that affect power relations among these 
actors. These factors are resources, rights and persuasive power (Figure 6.7). The government 
has rights as the owner of pastoral resources, and it uses this right to persuade the Pare livestock 
keepers to allow the Maasai herders to use the pastoral land. This persuasive power, however, 
is likely exercised because of financial resources the Maasai herders pay, which motivate the 
governmental actors to intercede on their behalf. Despite this resource-based motivation, however, 
the interactions among the herders’ ethnic groups and the government indicate an important 
position that governmental actors can play in mediating interactions among multiple local resource 
users, especially when there are multiple ethnic groups involved. This co-management arrangement 
alleviates conflictive experiences between the two ethnic groups and enables the mutual use 
of pastoral land resources by the two ethnic groups, especially at the time when the physical 
environment has spatial scarcity of pastoral resources.
This case shows that in one institutional arrangement, with formal and informal institutions, 
there is a tension between culturally diverse informal institutions governing the use of natural 
resources by different user groups. Since the ethnic actors are in tension, in order to enable the 
collaborative use of natural resources, it requires a linking and mediating role of other kinds of 
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institutions, that is, the formal (government-based) institutions. However, some ethnic users of 
the natural resources use (financial) resources to cultivate the mediating role of the government 
institutions by influencing an authoritative actor (government) to intervene and act in their favour.
Although co-management arrangements in the use of natural resources in livestock production 
has recognised the existence of ethnic groups and has attempted to harmonise the mutual use 
of land resources among them, the continued collaborative use of pastoral resources by these 
two ethnic groups depends on continued government intervention. However, the government 
intervenes because of the benefits that it gets from one of the ethnic users. This arouses uncertainty 
as to whether the government would favourably act for this actor in the event that the actor lacks 
the resources to influence the government. This indicates how difficult it might be to practice the 
collaborative and sustainable use and management of natural resources in light of social-cultural 
diversities. For the sustainable co-management of the pastoral resources, facilitation between 
the two ethnic resource users, rather than the current government intervention, is necessary. 
Although this may be hard to achieve, based on the fact that the government benefits from its 
intervention, sustainability inevitably requires users themselves to negotiate mechanisms for 
the mutual use of natural resources between the ethnic users’ categories, while the government 
facilitates the negotiation process.
Up to this point, the three empirical chapters have been discussed independently of one 
another. In practice, the three co-management arrangements occur within the one socio-
ecological environment, which is Lake Jipe. These co-management arrangements, institutions and 
actors interact and influence one other in various ways and as a whole influence the sustainable 
management of Jipe’s socio-ecological system. In the concluding chapter the three co-management 
arrangements will be compared.
Chapter 7.  
Conclusion: co-management of social-ecological systems
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has investigated the emergence of co-management arrangements for sustainable 
management of fisheries, agriculture and livestock at the Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania. The results 
have highlighted the often overlooked dimension of intra and inter-sectoral linkages by making 
‘legible’ (cf. Scott, 1998) the linkages within and between these sectors at different spatial and 
temporal scales, through a complex set of formal and informal institutions. As such, the thesis 
contributes to co-management theory by focusing attention on the dynamic interaction between 
what are termed co-management arrangements, institutions and actors. In doing the thesis has built 
on the existing work of, among others, Adger et al. (2005), Berkes (2000), Wilson et al. (2006), and 
Cash et al. (2006), in providing a clearer framework for analysing cross-scale and cross-sectoral 
networks of co-management that moves beyond community-government relations and highlight 
to complex governance arrangements in complex social-ecological systems.
The preceding chapters also provide an important empirical analysis through the case of 
Lake Jipe, which demonstrates the contemporary challenges of natural resource management 
in Tanzania, and East Africa more broadly. Like many natural resources in Tanzania, Lake Jipe 
wetland has been subject to centralized management. As outlined in Chapter 2, the limited 
capacity in human and financial resources of the government of Tanzania to sustain centralized 
top-down natural resources management regimes and the continued deterioration of natural 
resources at Jipe and other socio-ecological systems has led to the introduction of decentralisation 
and participatory natural resources management regimes since the mid 1990s (Kajembe et al., 
2006). This decentralisation process, of which co-management is one expression, has directly 
and indirectly (re)distributed responsibilities for management along government-community 
lines. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, co-management is comprised of multiple 
management arrangements within a complex social-ecological setting such as Lake Jipe. Making 
these arrangements legible, through the institutions and actors that both comprise and link them, 
provides a clearer understanding of the transition in Tanzanian natural resource management 
and a starting point for more informed policy.
In this final chapter a better understanding of co-management is addressed by answering the 
key research questions of the thesis. First, how do government and community institutions and 
actors interact in the management of natural resources in agriculture and livestock production and 
in fisheries management, and what is their relevance for sustainable management of the Lake Jipe 
social ecological system? Second, what co-management arrangements emerge from interactions 
involving governmental and community institutions and actors around livestock, agriculture and 
fisheries? And third, how are the three sectoral co-management arrangements related with respect 
to sustainable management of the Lake Jipe social-ecological system?
These questions are addressed in four stages. Section 7.2 summarizes the key characteristics 
and challenges faced by institutions and actors within the fisheries, agriculture and livestock co-
management arrangements presented in the preceding chapters. Section 7.3 then reflects on the 
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intra- and inter-sectoral linkages between what emerge as multiple cross-scale co-management 
arrangements and their relevance to natural resource management in Tanzania. Section 7.4 then 
broadens the findings of the thesis to discuss the theoretical implications of this thesis for co-
management and the governance of complex social-ecological systems before the final section 
turns to the conclusions and recommendations.
7.2 Institutions and actors in three co-management arrangements
Multiple lines of conflict and resolution characterise the shifting relations between and among 
resource users and management actors around Lake Jipe. Co-management arrangements within 
each of the three sectors clearly highlight the source of conflict and the degree to which both 
new and existing institutions and actors mediate or enhance collaboration in the stewardship 
of shared natural resources, similar to what Singleton (2000), Sowman et al. (1998), Castro and 
Neilsen (2001) and Pomeroy et al. (2004) argue with reference to various natural resources in 
North America, South and Southeast Asia. The following builds on these studies by identifying 
the key characteristics and challenges of institutions and actors involved in intra-sectoral fisheries, 
livestock and agricultural co-management arrangements and the degree to which they dealt with 
resource use related conflict.
7.2.1 Fisheries co-management
Fisheries at Lake Jipe comprise diverse groups of fishers differentiated by geographic origin. Some 
are residents to the area whereas others, migratory fishers, come from southern Tanzania and other 
nearby regions. The inadequacy of the government and fishing communities to independently 
manage fisheries resources at a sustainable level around Lake Jipe led to the instigation of 
collaborative forms of fisheries management. In resolving the complex conflicts that ensue between 
these groups of fishers, formal and informal institutions have the potential to collaborate within 
and between independent geographic areas (cf. Jentoft, 1999). In particular, cross-scale interactions 
and collaborations have evolved entailing community and district governmental actors. Likewise 
cross-scale collaborations occur between informal community institutions and actors and formal 
authoritative governmental institutions.
A key example are the village fisheries committees around Lake Jipe. The various communities 
around the lake have been instructed by formal authorities to appoint fisheries committees to 
enforce fisheries laws. The fisheries committees, as co-management institutions, have encountered 
a series of challenges in enforcing fisheries regulations from both fishers and some government 
leaders who are responsible for unsustainable fishing practices and have allied with fishers using 
illicit practices. The poor leadership deprives the fisheries committee institutional support by 
siding with the illicit fishers in addition to degrading the fishery resources. These institutional 
failures, similar to the findings of Pomeroy et al. (2001), Neilsen et al. (2004) and Isaac et al. (1998), 
are exacerbated by the geographic distinction of those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the committees 
jurisdiction around Jipe, and have led to threats of violence against the committee members.
Conflict between resident and non-resident fishers has also ensued, especially in relation to 
competition for prime, but limited fishing areas. Conflicts between resident and non-resident 
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fishers are resolved with the aid of governmental authoritative institutions and actors because 
informal institutions – though legitimate in the eyes of the local community – do not have 
coercive power to enforce non-resident actors to comply. However, the informal institutions play 
an important, though sometimes small, role to channel information to government authorities on 
conflictive interactions between resident and non-resident fishers. Connections between formal 
and informal institutions facilitated by the fishery co-management arrangement have, as argued 
elsewhere by Lebel et al., (2006), created new informational linkages which empower resource 
users. In addition, a degree of empowerment is developed whereby fishers are able to flexibly 
react (cf. Raik, 2002) to conflict by either internalizing negotiations, or when lacking the requisite 
capacity to resolve disagreements, turn to government authorities.
7.2.2 Agriculture co-management arrangement
The existence of multiple and diverse institutions and actors is a characteristic of the agricultural 
co-management arrangement around Lake Jipe. This is what other scholars (e.g. Blair, 2001; 
Benjamin, 2004) call ‘institutional pluralism’ wherein multiple state, NGO and community actors 
interact and collaborate in decision making processes and the state is more or less a broker or 
a referee to ensure that rules of the game are observed by multiple actors in their interactions. 
Actors and institutions within agricultural co-management arrangement have developed novel 
ways of collaborating and interacting in addressing the management and sustainable use of the 
diverse and dynamic natural resources (cf. Armitage, 2008). A key feature of natural resource 
use in agriculture around Lake Jipe is a geographical upstream and downstream divide, creating 
a disjuncture between the source and site of resource degradation. To overcome this divide the 
institutions and actors around the Lake have developed the capacity to fulfil multiple roles within 
diverse spatial and temporal socio-ecological interactions of resources and resource users, by 
locating themselves across a diverse range of agricultural practices, resource flows and property 
regimes.
Three types of institutions – namely co-management institutions, informal community 
institutions and formal governmental institutions – collaborate and interact in the management 
of natural resources for agricultural production. The agricultural co-management institutions that 
have emerged around Lake Jipe (e.g. land councils) are hybrids of formal and customary rules 
aimed to mediate resource use conflicts when formal and informal rules independently fail to 
address the conflicts adequately. Similar to what Naguran (2002) and Carter (2008) have found 
elsewhere, the informal institutions covering agricultural resources around Jipe have evolved from 
often implicit informal community organizations and practices which entail mechanisms to handle 
user conflicts on competition for scarce resources. The co-management institutions governing 
resources around Lake Jipe have made these informal practices more explicit or legible to formal 
institutions, such as formal laws, rules, regulations, and principles formulated by governmental 
authorities and used to govern the use of specific natural resources (e.g. land, water, forests).
Apart from governmental and community actors, the agricultural co-management 
arrangements around Lake Jipe has been facilitated and supported by MIFIPRO, an NGO (actor) 
who, not restricted by political and geographic boundaries, has been able to play various roles 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales. The role of MIFIPRO at Lake Jipe supports the wider 
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understanding of the catalytic role of NGOs in the development of co-management arrangements, 
including capacity building, creating new partnerships and advocating the rights of marginalised 
groups (cf. McConney et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 1999; Umar & Kankiya, 2004). MIFIPRO 
in particular has brought much needed flexibility to the co-management of agriculture around 
Lake Jipe. At one moment the NGO indirectly resolves conflicts between and among resource 
users separated by different spatial and geographic positions by assisting with improved and more 
efficient exploitation and management of natural resources. At other, the NGO forges cross-scale 
linkages between governmental and community actors at different levels through building their 
capacity in comprehending and enforcing sustainable resource management rules. MIFIPRO 
therefore both links and empowers community and the governmental actors for sustainable 
management of land and water resources for agricultural production, and fulfils a crucial role in 
the establishment and function of cross-scale environmental co-management institutions.
7.2.3 Livestock co-management arrangement
Pastoral land is a competitive resource that is scarce and spatially distributed, but also socially and 
politically distributed among villages at Lake Jipe social-ecological system. Two groups of users, 
Pare and Maasai herders, with different behaviours and cultural backgrounds compete for this 
resource. The Pare regards themselves as pioneers in opening up the land around Lake Jipe for 
pastoral grazing while regarding the Maasai as intruders, with no right to access and use the area. 
These two groups are governed by diverse and mutually hostile informal institutions. Whereas 
the Pare ethnic group is governed by informal reciprocal norms and traditions, the Maasai ethnic 
group is governed by nomadic norms. However, the temporal and spatial scarcity of pastoral land 
in the wider region around Jipe has brought these two ethnic groups together in their search for 
the better-off pasture conditions.
The conflicting claims to pastoral rights around Lake Jipe illustrate similar patterns of conflict 
to fisheries and agricultural. However, similar to what Kanyongolo (2005) notes with reference to 
Eastern Africa, the renegotiation of communal access rights to resources can transform the social 
setting into an arena of conflict between the haves and have-nots. Because of a range of ethnic 
politics and the formalization of resource boundaries the two pastoral groups around Lake Jipe 
have increasing come into conflict. The grazing of nomadic Maasai herders, unable to formalize 
their claims over the land in and around Pare villages has resulted in tensions and violent clashes 
between the two ethnic herder groups. What were once dynamic seasonal and spatial claims over 
land, negotiated through equally dynamic social relations (Cornwall, 2000), have been gradually 
fossilized thereby excluding nomadic claims.
The emergence of livestock co-management arrangements, combining formal and informal 
actors and institutions has been instrumental in addressing the conflicts between the two ethnic 
groups. Interventions by governmental actors using the authoritative power of formal institutions, 
such as property rights, has contributed to resolving conflicts by enforcing mutual grazing rights 
of livestock for the two groups within the same spatial extent within designated time periods. 
Nevertheless, the government indirectly empowers the Pare, by asking the Maasai to pay a user 
fee when grazing around the Lake (cf. Sekhar, 2004). The choice of a fee reifies control by the Pare 
over the Maasai and indicates the continued challenges of seeking what Kideghesho and Mtoni 
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(2008) refer to social cohesion in resource management, the lack of which dilutes attempts to create 
durable institutions and, ultimately, co-management arrangements. To overcome this challenge 
of mediating tensions between the two groups of pastoralists, the government has enrolled the 
assistance of the (informal) elders who use their normative legitimacy, especially within the Pare 
community, to ensure that any conflict does not escalate. At the same time, the elders have become 
an important institution by facilitating information flows to the district government when conflicts 
emerge between two herder groups.
7.3 Complexity in analysing co-management arrangements
It has been conventional in co-management studies to analyze social-ecological systems 
monolithically (e.g. Berkes & Folke, 1998; Carlsson & Berkes, 2003), or to analyze one resource 
component of these systems (e.g. Nielsen et al., 2004; Thomson & Gray, 2009). But social-
ecological systems are often comprised of multiple and diverse but interdependent natural resource 
management systems. Hence such monolithic analyses overlook the internal complexities and 
interactions within individual natural resources management systems, and inter- and cross-scale 
interactions and complexities within one social-ecological system. These internal complexities and 
interactions influence individual natural resources management systems and the management of 
the social-ecological system as a whole. Thus viewing a social-ecological system as monolithic (in 
whatever way) conceals how one natural resources management institution or system imposes 
conditions on and/or receives incentives from other natural resources management institutions and 
systems existing within the same social-ecological system. This section reflects on the intra- and 
inter-sectoral linkages of multiple co-management arrangements and their relevance to natural 
resource management in Tanzania. As such it integrates on a higher level the findings of the three 
– partly monolithic – case studies performed at Lake Jipe socio-ecological system.
7.3.1 Adding complexity I: unpacking scales and actors
Through the analysis of emerging co-management at the Lake Jipe socio-ecological system it has 
become clear that a full understanding of these decentralized and participatory co-management 
practices do not readily allow for reductionism. Recognizing this allows us to move beyond an 
understanding of co-management as the vertical interplay between government and community. 
The Lake Jipe case study clearly demonstrates that both government and community have to be 
unpacked in at least two ways to really understand the nature of co-management and its wider 
potential.
First, following Adger et al. (2005), Berkes and Seixas (2004) and Cash et al. (2006), the notion 
of scale has to be further elaborated. Co-management involves multiple scales of actors and 
institutions and cannot be reduced to an analysis of local natural resource intrusions and the local 
mechanisms that aim to manage those intrusions. Governmental actors and institutions of multiple 
scales were involved in the analysis, from local village levels, via district and national levels to cross 
border interactions and actors. This was also the case to a lesser extent with community actors 
and institutions, where non-resident fisherman and migrating herders use local natural resources.
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Secondly and partly related to the former issue of multiple scales, the categories of government 
and community need to be unpacked. Multiple actors perform formal and informal or hybrid co-
management functions. It is unrealistic to lump these actors into just two categories: community 
and government. As many studies have emphasized (e.g. Armitage et al., 2008; Berkes, 2002), 
within the community actors are not one but differentiated based on diverse cultural backgrounds, 
spatial origins (residents and non-residents), and different geographical positions (upstream and 
downstream resource users), different interests (herders versus agricultural farmers) etc. Similarly, 
governmental actors are differentiated based on their sectoral specialization into actors that 
enforce compliance with fisheries, land, and water regulations. And, of course, across multiple 
scales governmental actors differ in their abilities to govern, their interests and their involvement 
in institutions. Lumping together these actors as one community and one governmental actor 
conceals (and therefore ignores) not only internal horizontal politics and intra-scale and cross-
sectoral interactions, but also vertical cross scale interactions and politics existing among and 
between multiple formal/governmental actors and multiple informal/community actors.
This unpacking has direct consequences for the analysis of natural resource co-management. 
It contributes to new insights, and a new conceptualization, emphasizing the co-existence of 
multiple institutions, within which different actors can be involved in multiple natural resource 
management institutions of different kinds: formal, informal and co-management (Figure 7.1). This 
thesis therefore opens up new conceptual space by distinguishing institutions and arrangements 
in co-management.
The existence of multiple, diverse and interacting actors and institutions imply the complex 
characteristic of the Jipe social-ecological system. This complexity manifests itself as the dynamic 
heterogeneous participation of actors and institutions in multiple and diverse roles of harmonizing 
resource use in a system with multiple rights and entitlements, and in mediating relational 
interactions among the respective actors. Whereas congruency of ideas, values and expectations 
emerge in some cases, in other cases tensions emerge and therefore institutions and actors adopt 
mediating roles. Both direct and indirect mechanisms are used in mediating these conflicts. 
Whereas direct mechanisms entail negotiation, deliberation, sanctioning and application of rules 
that enforce entitlements and rights of various users, indirect mechanisms include empowerment of 
actors through improvement of their livelihood practices in keeping with efficient and sustainable 
natural resources management. The hope of doing so is to improve the availability and accessibility 
of environmental resources and services among competing resource users.
However, some complex co-management arrangements of Jipe social-ecological system have 
shortcomings. As earlier revealed, sometime formal actors use their authoritative resources illicitly 
to play contrary to the rules of game to which they should be held accountable and which they 
should comply with. This implies that recognition as formal actor does not guarantee abidance to 
formal rules of the game, and other incentive mechanisms are then necessary to ensure that formal 
actors abide to formal rules of the game. The present co-management arrangements, nonetheless, 
lack such formal incentive mechanisms for these state actors. Unless such mechanisms are in 
place, there is a danger of continuing acting against the rules by state actors, while they pretend 
to abide to the rules.
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7.3.2 Adding complexity II: cross-sectoral analyses
Partly in line with the monolithic view of social-ecological systems, this thesis has disaggregated 
the Lake Jipe social-ecological system into three different natural resources management systems, 
referred to as co-management arrangements, i.e. fisheries, agriculture and livestock co-management 
arrangements. In each of these arrangements we have analyzed the interplay of governmental and 
community actors and of formal and informal institutions (Figure 7.1). Like much of the literature 
on social-ecological systems (Adger et al., 2005; Berkes, 2003; Berkes & Seixas, 2004; Carlsson & 
Berkes, 2003; Kendrick, 2003), we see that the three co-management arrangements are different. 
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Figure 7.1. Overlapping and layering of institutions and actors in the three co-management 
arrangements at Lake Jipe social-ecological system.
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However, the interrelations between these arrangements occur at a sectoral level, thereby allowing 
us to better analyse the complexity inherent in social-ecological systems.
Throughout the analysis multiple reasons for relating these three co-management arrangements 
have emerged. For one, there are various natural resource interdependencies in Lake Jipe social-
ecological system. The practices of actors in one arrangement at one spatial locality (e.g. improper 
farming practices on the upstream area) and temporal space for example, have implications and/
or can undermine practices and sustainability of another arrangement in another spatial locality 
at the same or different temporal space. For example, siltation of the Lake negatively influences 
(future) fisheries productivity. And livestock and agricultural farmers compete for similar natural 
resources at similar spatial and temporal settings. Complexities are further added in terms of the 
presence of water as a mobile natural resource flowing from markedly different (upstream and 
downstream) ecosystems, with multiple actors at multiple locations depending on this flowing 
natural resource. This does not only have ecological impacts, but also involves socio-institutional 
linkages at different locations within the catchment of Lake Jipe. It illustrates that disturbances 
imposed in one spatial position(s) may result in disharmony, disturbance, disruption and/or 
destabilisation of an entire co-management arrangement or even a socio-ecological system (beyond 
that sectoral arrangement). These natural resource interdependencies force us to analyse not just 
internal interactions, linkages and conflicts within single natural resources management systems at 
one place, but also to compare and contrast inter- and cross-sectoral complexities and interactions 
at multiple locations among the institutions and actors in comprising these three natural resources 
management systems at Lake Jipe social-ecological system.
Secondly, the actors and institutions involved in sectoral co-management arrangements cross 
borders. Lake Jipe social-ecological system comprises multiple arrangements, institutions and 
actors. Some community, governmental and resource use actors are limited to one co-management 
arrangement, but several others are not. Similarly, some of the (governmental or community based) 
institutions in the three co-management arrangements are confined to specific sectoral boundaries, 
whereas other institutions operate simultaneously at intra- and cross-sectoral levels, beyond the 
sectoral boundaries. These trans-sectoral boundary institutions govern similar functions within 
the three distinguished co-management arrangements, and bridge and mediate actors at the 
interface of these different co-management arrangements. For example, informal institutions (e.g. 
customary norms) govern the mediation of conflicts among farmers or among livestock keepers, 
but also conflicts between farmers and livestock keepers when interests of the first resource user 
group are compromised by the practices and interests of the other resource user group. Hence, 
institutions – whether formal, informal or co-management – are often not restricted to one sectoral 
co-management arrangement.
By making the social and ecological interrelations around Lake Jipe legible neither the hierarchy 
nor the effectiveness of the institutions in governing the practices of actors in the management 
process have been determined. Rather, I have identified formal and informal institutions that 
interact and collaborate in the management of natural resources for the three co-management 
arrangements in Jipe social-ecological system. In doing so this thesis highlights the ‘layering’ of 
co-management (Figure 7.1). Using this geographical metaphor, it is possible to structure the 
interactions between actors, institutions and arrangements in natural resources co-management 
in a socio-ecological system. However, as already noted, these layers are not hierarchical but 
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instead networked, composed of actors, institutions and arrangements that created relational 
inter-dependencies. This layering concept adds new understanding on the existing theory on 
co-management of social-ecological system, which as noted above has tended to become too 
monolithic (in various ways).
Therefore, this thesis adds to the existing theory with the argument that governmental-
community linkages are not simplistic (or monolithic) but are a complex layering of multiple 
governmental-community entities and institutions in multiple co-management arrangements. This 
challenges and adds to the current concept of the existence of one co-management arrangement in 
one social-ecological environment (Pinkerton, 1994; Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy et al., 1995; Pinto 
da Silva, 2004; Singleton, 2000). I propose to label this perspective (as it is far too early to call it 
a theory) the complex layering of co-management.
7.3.3 Relevance for natural resources management in Tanzania and East Africa
This thesis has unveiled the shift from classic to populist natural resources management regimes 
in Tanzania. The centralized natural resources management regimes have come to the point that 
they cannot address the challenges of mitigating the degradation of natural resources due, in part, 
to the government’s incapacity in terms of human and financial resources to monitor and control 
unsustainable natural resources management regimes and practices. Recognising the potential for 
intra and inter sectoral interrelations and dependencies, co-management offers a new opportunity 
for governmental and community institutions and actors to collaborate in the management of 
natural resources in complex social-ecological systems such as Lake Jipe. However, similar to 
the findings of Pomeroy et al. (2001) and others, a key reason for the ongoing success of such 
these –co-management arrangements may also be the space left for independent community and 
governmental institutions. Hence, for co-management in Lake Jipe and Tanzania to continue, both 
formal legal systems with their authoritative enforcement and informal community institutions 
such as elders need to co-exist, both contributing to natural resource management in a wider set 
of co-management arrangements.
Successful co-management arrangements also require the formal integration of the community 
actors and institutions in the management of natural resources in Tanzania. Such integration is 
not a new phenomenon. As has been noted in chapter 3, during the colonial times the colonial 
government integrated chiefdom-based institutions in the management of natural resources in 
Tanzania (then Tanganyika). During that time, the local chiefs were given authority to enforce 
compliance with governmental rules over the sustainable use and management of natural resources. 
The integration of the local people in the management of natural resources nonetheless was 
undermined and disrupted during the independence and post-independence era during which 
the Tanzanian government, like other governments in East Africa, terminated the participation 
of the local institutions. This thesis has demonstrated that the reintegration of local institutions 
in the management of natural resources at Lake Jipe by the Tanzanian government is evident and 
shows promise for the sustainable natural resource management.
Despite the recognition given to vertically integrating formal and informal natural resources 
management institutions in Tanzania less attention has been given to understanding sectoral 
cross-linkages. In other words, management (and research) has been largely confined to the 
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intra-sectoral relationships, ignoring inter- and cross-sectoral interactions of natural resources 
management systems. As the case of Lake Jipe clearly illustrates, natural resources management 
systems in Tanzania are comprised of complex physical and institutional inter-relationships and 
inter-dependences. The results from Lake Jipe therefore indicate the restoration or revival of local 
institutions in the management of natural resources, as well as demonstrating that multiple natural 
resources in one social-ecological environment are interdependent and actors and institutions 
governing them cross sectoral natural resource boundaries.
7.4 Recommendations
In this section the thesis question ‘what possibility is there for the government and the community 
to sustainably co-manage Lake Jipe wetland in Tanzania’ is answered. As there exist co-management 
arrangements comprised of governmental and local community actors, within multiple formal 
and informal institutions, the basic conditions for strengthening co-management of Lake Jipe 
wetland are present.
For sustainable co-management of the Lake Jipe social-ecological system, the following 
challenges or weaknesses need to be resolved. First, there are deficient capacity building 
mechanisms. Presently, although some empowerment initiatives are given to the local stakeholders, 
such programmes are limited to a few local actors, while the majority is not served. For example, 
although fishers are generally accused of engaging unsustainable fishing tools in fishing, the 
government has given training on sustainable fishing practices to some fishers who are members in 
fisheries committees. But those outside the committees and especially non-resident fisherman have 
been deprived of such trainings. By the same token, although the government promotes formation 
of co-management institutions for sustainable environmental management, it was through the 
Non-Governmental Organisation MIFIPRO that these institutions were relatively empowered 
because of among others the alleged financial inadequacy of the government. Hence there is a 
need for governmental authorities to increase their contribution in preparing communities and 
natural resource users to become involved in co-management.
Second, although some cross-sectoral informal institutions are linked to different forms of 
co-management, there is a limited support to ensure that resource user-groups are motivated to 
comply with these informal institutions. While for some cases there has been formal governmental 
support to enforce the compliance with informal institutional mechanisms, for other cases such 
mechanisms are missing. The compliance with significant informal institutions could be enhanced 
through the enforcement wherein the government would, for example, raise the sanctions for non-
compliance when violators are referred to the government. This would encourage and enhance 
mediation at the community level and would imply less involvement of the government as a 
mediator/facilitator.
Third, some alternative ways of securing socio-economic interests are imperative for sustainable 
natural resources management at Lake Jipe socio-ecological system. Presently there is a high 
tension between livelihoods and environmental interests. This pressure exacerbates with increasing 
uncertainties of meeting socio-economic needs. Unless new alternative ways of meeting such 
needs are integrated and/or the existing ones are improved there will be a limited possibility for 
maintaining sustainable co-management of Lake Jipe social-ecological system.
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Finally, based on the wider and diverse nature of social-ecological systems socio-economically, 
culturally and ecologically in Tanzanian and East African context, further analysis on institutional 
and actors interplay entailing the community and governmental levels or even including other 
levels beyond the government and the community is recommended. One potential area for 
further analysis can be on the effectiveness of the various informal, formal and co-management 
institutions of the studied multiple co-management arrangements for sustainable management 
of social-ecological systems, in order to provide concrete conclusions and recommendations 
on the co-management of complex social-ecological systems in Tanzania and East Africa. One 
can expect that a number of the findings of this study on Lake Jipe will have relevance for other 
wetlands in Tanzania (and other East African countries) and even for other socio-ecological 
systems within the country, further research needs to prove that. The road to better understanding 
co-management is still being sought; but the conceptual contributions made in this thesis provide 
a step in the right direction.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Questions to farmers/livestock keepers/fishers at Lake Jipe
A: Personal Information
Name of household head:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Name of the wife of the household head:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age of the wife of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Education of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Education of the wife of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Occupation of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Occupation of the wife of household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tribe of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tribe of the wife of the household head: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Village: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B: Questions for farmers
1. What ways and methods do you use in farming?
a. Flat cultivation
b. Ridges
c. Countour
d. Crop rotation
e. Intercropping
f. Agroforestry
g. Others (mention)
2. Why do you use these ways or methods?
a. Improve soil fertility
b. Control soil erosion
c. Inherited from my parents
d. Do not have alternative ways
e. Other ways mention them
3. How big is your farm/what is the size of your farm?
4. How do you improve your farm?
a. Apply manure (how often)
b. Apply fertilizer (tell how much per season)
c. Use pesticides (which, how often)
d. Burn stalks
e. I don’t improve (why)
f. Other ways/methods (mention them)
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5. How do you prepare your farm?
a. Slash and burn
b. Mulching
c. Set fires
d. Make ridges
e. Others (mention)
6. What imputs do you use in your farming?
a. Hand hoe
b. Tractor
c. Plough
d. Industrial fertilizers
e. Insecticides
f. Other (mention)
7. Where do you cultivate/practice farming?
a. On the hills
b. On the lowland
c. Other places (mention them)
8. Why do you cultivate on the hills/sloping mountainous areas?
a. Do not have farm plot elsewhere
b. It is more fertile over there
c. Easy to get water
d. Other (mention)
C: Questions for livestock keepers
9. If you keep livestock, What ways or methods do you use in livestock keeping?
a. Grazing
b. Zero grazing
c. Other (specify)
10. Why do you use these ways?
a. Inherited
b. Pasture shortage/unavailability
c. Other reasons (specify)
11. What kind of livestock do you keep and how many are they for each category?
12. Are all these livestock yours or others belong to some other person?
a. All mine
b. Other person has entrusted his livestock to me
c. Some are mine others belong to another person(s)
d. Another answer (specify)
13. Where do you graze your livestock?
a. On the mountains
b. On the lowland
c. Other areas (specify)
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14. Why you graze your livestock in this area?
a. Availability of pasture
b. Water easily available
c. Other reasons (specify)
15. What livestock keeping problems do you encounter?
a. Livestock diseases
b. Lack of water
c. Low production
d. Lack of markets for livestock and livestock products
e. Fierce wildife
f. Shortage of pastures
g. Conflicts (mention them)
h. Other problems (specify)
16. How do you solve the problems?
a. Trap fierce wildlife
b. Dig watering ponds
c. Hunt fierce wildlife
d. Plant pasture
e. Purchase livestock medicines (veterinary medicines)
f. Traditional veterinary (elaborate)
g. Other techniques (specify)
17. If you keep livestock, what do you currently observe in livestock keeping?
a. Shortage of water
b. Declined production
c. No changes
d. Shortage of pastures
e. Others (specify)
18. If you produce milk, how much do you produce?
a. Less than 5 litres
b. 5-10 litres
c. 15-20 litres
d. More than 20 litres
e. Another amount
D: Questions for fishers
19. If you practice fishing, what ways do you use for fishing?
a. Fishnets (what sizes)
b. Traditional fish basket (Mgono)
c. Hooks
d. Other (mention)
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20. Why do you use these ways/methods?
a. To get abundant fish
b. Inherited from my parents
c. No alternative way
d. Other (specify)
21. How many fish do you fish on average?
22. What other tools do you use apart from fishnets?
23. What problems do you face in fishing.
a. Fierce wildlife
b. Distortion of fishnets
c. Limited fish (elaborate)
d. Poor fish markets
e. Others (specify)
24. How do you resolve these problems.
25. What changes do you notice in fisheries?
26. How is the availability of fish today when compared with past years?
a. Increasing today (how) and why?
b. Declining today (how) and why?
c. No difference
d. Other answer (specify).
27. What kinds of fish are available in the lake?
E: General questions for the three sectors.
28. How do your farming/livestock keeping/fisheries practices observe sustainable management 
of natural resources?
29. What seasons do you cultivate/fish/graze livestock on this area?
a. Dry seasons
b. Rain seasons
c. Throghout the year
d. Other times (mention it)
30. What problems do you face in farming?
a. Insects pests
b. Soil erosion
c. Low production
d. Lack of reliable markets
e. Animal pests
f. Others (mention)
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31. How do you solve these problems?
a. Traping the animal pests
b. Use fertilizers
c. Plant leguminous crops
d. Hunt animal pests
e. Other techniques (mention them)
32. Do you observe any changes in farming/fishing/livestock keeping?
33. What do you think are reasons for these changes?
34. How do you think negative changes, if any, can be alleviated or avoided?
35. How is the production in fisheries/livestock keeping/farming today as compared to the past 
years?
a. Increased (mention scales)
b. Decreased (substantiate)
c. There is no difference
d. Other answers (explain)
36. What conflicts do you encounter in your farming/livestock keeping/fisheries activities?
a. Water conflicts
b. Livestock destruction of crops
c. Shortage of land
d. Farm boundary encroachment
e. Pollution of water
f. Other (mention)
37. How is land tenure/ownership in your area?
a. Traditional or custormary ownership
b. Government ownership
c. Other (mention)
38. What is the purpose of your farming/fishing/livestock keeping activities?
a. Food
b. Income/commercial
c. Both
d. Children school needs
e. Other (mention)
39. How are the markets for your produce from farming/livestock keeping/fisheries activities?
a. Good (how?)
b. Poor (how?)
c. Average (how?)
40. Where are the markets of your produce?
a. Towns/urban areas
b. In the village
c. Other areas
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41. How does the government support you in farming/livestock keeping/fisheries activities?
a. Inputs
b. Expertise
c. Training
d. Markets
e. Others (mention)
42. When did you start farming/fishing/livestock keeping in this area?
a. More than past 20 yrs
b. Past 10-20 years
c. 5 -10 years ago
d. Less than 5 years ago
e. Other (mention)
43. If you are a crops farmer, do you practice irrigation farming?
a. Yes
b. No
44. If you practice irrigation farming, where did you learn about it?
a. Inherited from my parents
b. From technical people (mention them)
c. Others (mention)
45. Is the food you produce in the present years sufficient, increasing or decreasing? Please support 
your answer by giving esimations in comparison with the past years.
a. Sufficient
b. Increasing
c. Decreasing
46. How much do you produce today?
a. 5 -10 bags per acre (bags of what size)
b. 10-20 bags per acre (of what size)
c. More than 20 bags per acre
d. Other amount (mention)
47. If you practice crops farming, what crops do you cultivate?
48. What other practices or activities do you do?
a. Livestock keeping
b. Fishing
c. Technician
d. Farming
e. Other (mention)
49. If you practice fishing, how much fish do you catch today, and how do you compare the present 
catch with past catches? (please give estimations of catches based on your experience).
50. If you keep livestock, how is the status of production and productivity of the livestock? Is it 
increasing or decreasing?
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51. In your opinions what should be done to improve farming/livestock keeping/fishing?
a. Micro-credits to farmers/livestock keepers/fishers
b. Training farmers/livestock keepers/fishers (on what)
c. Improvement of inputs availability (what inputs)
d. Other (mention them)
52. What are the realtionships between you and other resource users (e.g. farmers, livestock keepers 
and fishers)?
53. Are there any conflicts among users (livestock keepers, farmers and fishers)?
a. Livestock browsing on crops
b. Water pollution by the livestock
c. Competing for water
d. Competing for fishing space?
e. Other (mention)
54. How do you resolve these conflicts?
a. No solution
b. Involve the village government
c. Involve elders committees
d. Press charges in legal courts
e. Other ways (mention them)
55. What actors are involved in the resolution of the conflicts within, among and between sectoral 
resource users?
a. Village government
b. District government, farmers, livestock keepers and village government
c. Farmers, livestock keepers and fishers
d. Other actors (mention them)
56. How do these conflicts impact on the sustainable management of lake Jipe?
a. Lack of participatory strategy for the management of the lake
b. No impact
c. Other impacts (mention them)
57. What are your opinions as regards the ways to do away with these conflicts?
58. Have the conflict brought only negative influences or they have lead to positive influences as 
well?
a. Positive influences only (mention them)
b. Negative and positive influences (mention them)
c. Negative influences only (mention them)
59. How does the government assist you in the resolution of these problems and conflicts?
60. What traditional/customary ways are used in the management of natural resources and the 
resolution of the conflicts among the resources users at Jipe?
a. Rituals (elaborate)
b. Traditional rules (elaborate them)
c. Avoid water pollution (how)
d. Other regulations and rules
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61. When did these arrangements and regulations start, and are they useful, and what benefits do 
you realize from the use of these traditional arrangements?
62. What are the strength and weaknesses of the rational institutions?
63. How are they in the present years in comparison with the past years?
64. What about their powers in comparison with the government regulations?
a. Decreased
b. Inceresed
c. Other answer (elaborate)
65. Do you think the traditional regulations are still required today? And why you think so?
66. Do you think there are any land related problems in your fields or this area? If yes what 
problems?
a. Soil erosion
b. Declined fertility
c. Shortage of land
d. Other (mention)
67. What is the cause of these problems?
68. What do you think are the impacts of these problems?
69. What can be done to avoid these problems?
70. What problems are there as regards environmental degradation at lake Jipe?
a. Siltation
b. Water drying/drought
c. Water weeds
d. Decline of fishery
e. Other (mention)
71. What are the causes of these problems?
a. Poor farming practices
b. Illicit or poor fishing practices
c. Poor livestock keeping/grazing practices
d. Drought
e. Other (mention)
72. What impacts do the environmental problems have on the human beings and water and 
biodiversity and how?
73. You think these problems can be avoided? If yes, how? And if no, how?
How do you collaborate with the government to solve or alleviate environmental problems at Jipe 
area? How does the government support your efforts?
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Appendix 2: Questions for focus groups discussions with various committees at 
Lake Jipe area
1. What is the name of your committee?
2. When did this committee start and what were the reasons for starting it?
3. How is the membership of this committee and how are the members appointed?
4. What are the roles and responsibilities of this committee?
5. What challenges, constraints and problems do you face in the implementation of your 
jurisdictions as a committee?
6. How do you resolve the challenges, problems and constraints you experience?
7. How do you link and cooperate with the government and users of natural resources?
8. What do you think should be done to improve the current situation?
9. How is the natural resources situation in this area? Is there any change in natural resources 
situation in the present days compared with the past years?
10. If you notice any change, which is it and what are the reasons for the emergence of this change?
11. What you think can be done to manage the change in the productive way for sustainability of 
the natural resources in the area?
12. How did you learn how to implement your responsibilities and activities? Where did you 
learn?
13. What do you think the government has to do in order to improve the situation of natural 
resources in this area?
14. Are there any other institutions you collaborate with in managing and enforcing sound natural 
resources management practices? If yes which are they, and how effective do you think this 
collaboration is?
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Appendix 3a: Interview questions to the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security 
and Cooperatives, and Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries in 
Tanzania
1. What programmes/policies/strategies related to livestock keeping/agriculture/fisheries/water 
conservation do you have in your ministry?
2. When were these programmes/policies/strategies started, by whom and for what purposes?
3. Before these programmes/policies/strategies what other strategies/programmes and policies 
existed and why did you abandon or modify them?
4. What actors participated or participate in the formulation/modification of these programmes, 
and why involve these actors?
5. What achievements do you observe in the implementation of these arrangements/policies/
strategies/laws?
6. What constraints and problems do you face in the establishment, enforcement, and 
implementation of these arrangements or programmes?
7. What constraints, problems, assistance, and support do these policies, programmes, strategies 
of your sectors face or receive from other sectors? What are those that relate your sector with 
other sectors of water, fisheries, agriculture and livestock?
8. How does your plans/strategies/policies etc. help in conserving natural resources such as 
water, land? do you have any provisions for conserving other natural resources along the 
implementation of your sectoral activities? If not why, and if yes what are they about?
9. Do you think these plans/strategies/laws etc. need modification or revision? if yes, what and 
why?
10. What are the contradicting areas of your sectoral programmes and strategies as compared 
to those of other sectors? what are the effects or impacts of these contradictions in the 
implementation of your arrangements and programmes?
11. How do the international programmes and arrangements impact on formulation and 
implementation of your arrangements, strategies, and plans?
12. How did you involve the local governments in the formulation of your plans and strategies 
and programmes.
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Appendix 3b: Interview questions for the fisheries, livestock and agricultural 
departments at Mwanga District in Tanzania
1. What programmes, policies and strategies related to livestock keeping/fisheries/water/
agriculture do you get from the central government and which you are required to implement 
at the local level?
2. What programmes related with question (1) above do you formulate on your owns at the level 
of the local government?
3. How does the central government involve you in the formulation of the various sectoral 
strategies and policies and laws?
4. What support and assistances do you receive from the central government for the implementation 
of these policies, strategies and laws from the central government?
5. What are the institutions, mechanisms and laws do you formulate or design on your own to 
enable you in the implementation of the programmes and policies from the central government? 
How do these laws and mechanisms help you in the conservation of water and other natural 
resources and environment at lake Jipe?
6. Among the strategies and the programmes you have mentioned which are implemented at 
lake Jipe and along lake Jipe? how so these plans, strategies and arrangements relate with 
conservation od natural resources at lake Jipe area?
7. Since environmental and water conservation at lake Jipe depends on intersectoral collaborations, 
are there any intersectoral arrangements among these sectors at your level? What do they do? 
If they do not exist can you tell me why you do not have such arrangements?
8. What problems do you face or experience in the implementation of the arrangements from 
the central government?
9. Are there any conflicts, misunderstanding or contradictions and tensions among various 
sectors at your local government levels in the implementation of your sectoral programmes 
and policies and strategies? Please mention them and tell me what the sources of these tensions 
are?
10. What do you do in the resolution of these conflicts? Are there any participatory/cross-sectoral 
water and environmental management arrangements and of resolving the emerging tensions 
and conflicts among different sectors?
11. How do the various departments at the local level deal with or address the issue of environmental 
management at lake Jipe?
12. How do these tensions impact on sustainable environmental management at lake Jipe?
13. How do the various departments at the local government level collaborate to ensure that 
conflicts emerging in the management of lake Jipe are resolved?
14. How do you interact and communicate with community at lake Jipe in the implementation 
and enforcement of the arrangements related with natural resources management (fisheries 
management, livestock management and agricultural management). What approaches do you 
employ?
15. What problems and constraints do you encounter in your communication and interactions 
with the local community at Lake Jipe? and how do you solve these problems?
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16. What issues are outside your rich you think if improved can improve the effectiveness of 
communication and enforcement as well as implementation of your plans, strategies and 
institutions within the community along Lake Jipe?
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Appendix 3c: Interview questions for the village and ward government levels at 
Jipe
1. What are the strategies/plans/institutions regarding agriculture/livestock/fisheries come to 
the village community in this village?
2. How do the district departments involve you in the understanding and implementation of 
these programmes and plans in your villages?
3. How does the departments at the district level support and assist you in the implementation 
of these arrangements and plans in your communities?
4. What arrangements and laws do you make on your own so that to improve the effectiveness 
of the implementation of these plans and strategies and laws?
5. Who are involved in the formulation of these mechanisms or arrangements and why?
6. What are your opinions as regards the participation, compliance and response of the community 
in the implementation of these arrangements and plans?
7. If there is no good response or participation what do you think are the reasons? What you 
think has to be done so that to improve the community response?
8. Do you think the above mentioned plans and programmes are useful in improving socio-
economic conditions of the people and in conserving the environment at Lake Jipe?
9. Who participate actively in the enforcement and implementation of these arrangements and 
plans and why you think is so?
10. What problems do you face in the introduction and implementation of these plans and strategies 
in the midist of the community? And how do you resolve these issues and problems?
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Appendix 4: The list of the interviewed key informants at the Local government 
and central government level in Tanzania
Name	 Department/Organizations	 Designation	
Mr. Gabriel Mramboa Mwanga Natural Resources Department District Natural Resources Office
Mr. James Tarimo Natural Resources Department District Fisheries Officer
Mr. Abdallah Munga Agricultural and Livestock Departement Ag District Agricultural and District 
Livestock Officer
Antony Dadu Ministry of Livestock Development and 
Fisheries
Fisheries Officer
Ministry of Livestock Development and 
and Fisheries
Policy planning officers
Mr G.R. Lyatuu Jipe Ward Jipe Ward Agricultural Extension Officer 
(WAEO)
Mr. A. Awadhi Jipe
Jipe village
Village Agricultural Extension Officer 
(VAEO)
Mr.G. Madundo MIFIPRO Trust Fund The MIFIPRO Coordinator
Mr. R. Kidundi Jipe Ward Ward Executive Officer (WEO)
T.M. Kidaya Jipe Ward Ward Councillor
Mrs F. Wignessy Jipe village Village Executive Officer (VEO)
Mrs I. Mkamba Kilimanjaro Region Regional Agricultural Advisor (RAA)
Mr. M.I. Mziray Environmental committee (Jipe) Chairperson
A. Said Butu village Village Executive Officer (VEO)
Summary
Inadequate performance of natural resource management systems under the state monopolization 
has led to the evolution of collaborative natural resources management regimes in Tanzania. In 
past, since this country got independence in 1961 to late 1980s, natural resource management 
was under conventional state monopolized management regimes. Under these management 
systems, the community was regarded as a threat to the attainment of sustainable natural resource 
management. The government acted as a police ensuring that the community followed regulations, 
orders and institutional arrangements that were instigated by governmental authoritative agencies. 
The position of the community in these management regimes, therefore, was to obey the orders and 
directions from the government and when they did not comply they were eligible for punishment. 
However, because of its deficiency in terms of human and financial resources, the government 
could not appropriately and effectively control, monitor, and surveillance the vast natural resources 
systems whose degradation enhanced over time.
Continued degradation of natural resource under the state control, led to the change in 
governmental/national institutional arrangements and the introduction of regimes that involve 
the community adjacent to natural resources systems in their management. Lake Jipe is one of 
the natural resources in Tanzania in which the top-down management legacy dominated at post 
independent era. As other natural resources in Tanzania the deterioration of this lake has forced 
the government to change its approach and to accommodate the participatory natural resources 
management regimes. It is hypothesized that through the involvement of the local people in the 
proximity of these natural resources, the degraded resources can be restored, revitalized and 
sustainably managed.
Although various natural resource management institutional arrangements (e.g. legislation, 
policies, and Acts) provide for the involvement of the community in natural resources management, 
no research knowledge exists on how these collaborations occur and influence management of 
natural resource at lake Jipe social-ecological system in particular. This thesis investigated the 
possibility of the government and the local community for co-management of Lake Jipe social-
ecological system in Tanzania. The main objective of this thesis was to determine collaboration 
between government and the community in the management of Lake Jipe social-ecological 
systems. Specific objectives entailed the determination of the collaborations between multiple 
governmental and community entities in the co-management of the multiple natural resources 
systems at Lake Jipe social-ecological system.
Social-ecological system, in the context of this study, is the system that comprises geographically 
connected upstream and downstream areas and which has multiple natural resources system. 
Contrary to conventional perspective of social-ecological studies in the co-management literature, 
which regarded social-ecological system as one natural resource system or a monolithic system, 
in this thesis social-ecological system is viewed as entailing multiple natural resources systems 
that though are different are interrelated.
In order to properly understand the complexities and processes of co-management of these 
multiple natural resource systems at Jipe social-ecological system, three concepts or vocabularies 
were used in this thesis. These concepts are co-management arrangements, institutions and 
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actors. By co-management arrangements it implies sectoral natural resource management systems 
comprising community and governmental actors and institutions. The three arrangements which 
are a focus of this study are fisheries management system, use of natural resources in agriculture, 
and use of natural resources in livestock production. In these three co-management arrangements, 
collaborations among and between state/formal and community/informal as well as the bridging/
co-management institutions were investigated on how they interact and govern the practices and 
decision making of community and governmental actors.
The methodological approach employed in the current study entailed the use of the geographic 
approach whereby upstream and downstream areas connected by flowing water and land resource 
were integrated in the investigation and multiple methods of data collection (triangulation) were 
used in the collection of data from multiple natural resources systems in these geographic localities. 
This approach enabled the use of multiple methods entailing observation, focus group discussion, 
household survey, participant observations and interviews with key informants. Lake Jipe in 
this thesis is viewed a case, from whose analysis generalization can be made for co-management 
arrangements of other social-ecological systems in Tanzania or elsewhere in the world.
The three co-management arrangements have depicted something different. In fisheries 
co-management arrangement, we see the existence of conflict between the resident fishers and 
non-resident fishers in their competition for spatial positions which are conceivably believed 
to have easy accessibility to the fish compared to other spatial positions. We have also found 
existence of conflicts between fisheries co-management institution and promoters of unsustainable 
fisheries practices (fishers) on the one hand and with governmental leaders on the other hand who 
seem to form alliances with illicit fishers in order to obtain illicit gains from these illicit fishers. 
The research has also uncovered the evolution and prevalence of cross-scale linkages between 
informal institutions (e.g. elders) and formal institutions (governmental regulations and actors) to 
combat illicit fishing practices. Also such cross-scale linkages have emerged entailing fisheries co-
management institution (fisheries committee) and district fisheries authorities and administrators 
for combating unsustainable fisheries practices and mediating conflicts among resource users 
and between resource users and enforcers of the regulations. Generally it is observed in fisheries 
management that co-management initiatives have evolved because of complexities of problems in 
fisheries management and enforcement of sustainable fishing practices that could not be resolved 
by one institutional actor (i.e. the government alone or the community alone).
In the agriculture co-management arrangement the research uncovered the existence of 
complexities of issues and collaboration entailing governmental, non-governmental and 
community institutions and actors. Some of collaboration and linkages focus on specific resources 
whereas others focused on multiple natural resources in this co-management arrangement. Some 
co-management institution have evolved because some actors and institutions within specific 
boundaries of their operationing have not been able to address specific social conflictive problem 
that has traversed their capacity and therefore have formed alliance (co-management) with other 
institutions and actors in order to contain these challenges. This is the case in conflict resolution 
process for conflicts that occur in land under customary tenure management system. While 
the customary institution could not address these issues on its own, the government likewise 
could not do the same, and therefore efforts and capacities of the government and community 
(customary conflict managers) integrated into one co-management institution to assist each other 
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to contain these challenges. In this arrangement also exist some informal ways for managing 
competitive resources (e.g. water) and mediating social relations among the resource users that 
links resources and social actors in geographically separated areas and in this the way trigger 
governmental actors to collaborate in the community initiated interactions. Besides, in this 
arrangement, there is an actor (MIFIPRO NGO) that enables and forges horizontal scale linkages 
among the community actors at two geographic areas (upstream and downstream) by improving 
their resource management practices, and at the vertical scale linkages between the governmental 
actors and community actors. This actor at the vertical scale enables effective operationing of 
government-community co-management institution (the environmental committee) by building 
the capacity of this institution through training awareness to enhance an understanding of actors 
over the governing rules they are supposed to oversee.
In livestock co-management arrangement we see the existence of heterogeneous ethnic actors 
depicting spatial and temporal co-existence and independent existence in various positions of the 
social-ecological system. Harmonious co-existence of these different ethnic groups at one spatial 
position is governmental-facilitated, and occurs when one spatial locality is deficient of pasture 
and therefore enforcing some ethnic actors to shift to other spatial positions where they encounter 
other settled actors. The two ethnic actors are the Maasai and the Pare tribes who exist at various 
spatial positions of the social-ecological system at some time when pasture is available on these 
different spatial positions but meet at some temporal space because as a result of pasture shortage 
the Maasai exercise nomadic livestock herding. Although in essence the two ethnic groups repulse 
each other, the intervention of authoritative governmental institutions facilitates their co-existence 
at the same temporal space of the year.
At the social-ecological system level, the research has identified institutions that play multiple 
positions and roles. Norms overseen by the elders in the Pare society for example mediate conflicts 
across the three co-management arrangements. Yet some institutions are specific in that they 
perform certain specific roles within sectoral boundaries. Fisheries co-management institution 
for example applies for fisheries co-management arrangement alone while reciprocity applies 
for livestock co-management arrangement alone likewise. In the integrated management of the 
social-ecological system the institutions that play cross-scale roles are important and therefore 
would need to be supported in order to enhance these important roles.
Overall the thesis concludes that there is no one co-management arrangement in Jipe social-
ecological system but multiple co-management arrangements, at least three in the present thesis. 
The Jipe social-ecological system therefore cannot be understood properly when monolithic 
analytical approach is adopted because such an approach conceals inter and cross-scale interactions 
and diversities that exist in the system comprehension of which need disaggregating the system 
into diverse and multiple co-management arrangements.
It is recommended that further study is required to replicate the studied co-management 
arrangements and use of concepts of arrangements, institutions, and actors (elsewhere) in order 
to concretely understand institutional and ecological complexities that exist among these co-
management arrangements and how they affect social-ecological system. It is further recommended 
that besides replicating this study in other different environments, the arrangements scope may be 
widened so that to analyze more than the three co-management arrangements and their influence 
on co-management of social-ecological system. Besides, further study is recommended on the 
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effectiveness of institutions in order to under which or the institutions have positive impacts 
and which have negative impacts. This will enable us to capitalize the positive impacts and to 
strategize and plan on turning negative impacts to positive influences so that to improve sustainable 
management of social-ecological systems in Tanzania and elsewhere around the global.
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Falend natuurbeheer van de overheid heeft in Tanzania geleid tot de opkomst van participatief 
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Sinds de onafhankelijkheid in 1960 tot eind jaren tachtig was 
natuurbeheer een monopolie van de overheid. Onder dit beheersregime werden de belangen van 
lokale gemeenschappen vooral gezien als een bedreiging voor succesvol natuurbeheer. De overheid 
gebruikte met name top-down benaderingen. Een systeem van strafmaatregelen werd toegepast om 
ervoor te zorgen dat regels, eisen en institutionele arrangementen werden opgevolgd. De positie 
van lokale bevolkingsgroepen werd als ondergeschikt beschouwd. Door een tekort aan sociaal 
kapitaal en financiële hulpmiddelen ontstond gebrekkige controle van de beheersmaatregelen en 
werd het moeilijk de verder degraderende natuurlijke hulpbronnen te beschermen.
Een belangrijke verandering in het management regime is dat er nu een system is ontstaan 
waar lokale gemeenschappen worden betrokken bij het natuurbeheer. Lake Jipe is een van de 
gebieden met meerdere natuurlijke hulpbronnen in Tanzania, waarbij de erfenis van het top-down 
management tot in het post-onafhankelijkheid tijdperk heeft gedomineerd. De achteruitgang van 
de natuurlijke kwaliteit van Lake Jipe heeft de overheid ertoe gedwongen haar aanpak te veranderen 
en ruimte te maken voor participatieve management regimes. De hypothese die ten grondslag 
ligt aan deze participatieve benaderingen is dat door het betrekken van de lokale gemeenschap, 
aangetaste hulpbronnen kunnen worden hersteld, gerevitaliseerd en duurzaam worden beheerd.
Ondanks dat er verschillende institutionele arrangementen zijn rondom het beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen (bv. regelgeving, beleid en wetten) welke voorzien in de participatie 
van de lokale gemeenschap, is er geen kennis over hoe en waar deze verschillende participatieve 
samenwerkingsvormen voorkomen en hoe zij het beleid en beheer beïnvloeden. Deze thesis 
onderzoekt de mogelijkheden voor co-management tussen de overheid en de lokale gemeenschap 
in het sociaal-ecologische systeem Lake Jipe in Tanzania. Het belangrijkste doel van deze thesis 
was het identificeren van samenwerking tussen overheid en de lokale gemeenschap in het beheren 
van het sociaal-ecologische systeem Lake Jipe.
In de context van deze studie, bestaat een sociaal-ecologisch system uit geografisch aangesloten 
stroomopwaarts en stroomafwaarts gelegen gebieden. Dit systeem omvat meerdere ecologische 
deelsystemen van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en relevante sociale actoren en instituties (bijvoorbeeld 
rond land, water, vis, etc.). In tegenstelling tot conventionele perspectieven in de literatuur 
over co-mangement, die een sociaalecologisch systeem zien als één (natuurlijk) systeem of een 
monolithisch system, wordt in deze thesis een sociaal-ecologisch systeem gezien als een systeem 
waarbij meerdere deelsystemen (rondom meerdere natuurlijke hulpbronnen) aan elkaar gekoppeld 
zijn, en – ondanks de verschillen – met elkaar zijn verbonden.
Voor het begrijpen van de complexiteit en processen van co-management in deze veelvoud aan 
systemen in het sociaal-ecologische systeem Lake Jipe, wordt in deze thesis gebruik gemaakt van 
drie concepten. Deze concepten zijn co-management arrangementen, instituties en actoren. Co-
management arrangementen impliceren een sectoraal beheerssysteem van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
dat de gemeenschap, actoren uit de overheid, en instituties omvat. De drie arrangementen waar 
deze studie zich op richt zijn het management systeem rondom visserij, het management systeem 
rondom landbouw, en het management systeem rondom veehouderij. In deze drie co-management 
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arrangementen komen verschillende institutionele vormen van samenwerking tussen actoren 
voor: staat/formele instituties, gemeenschap/informele instituties en co-management instituties. 
Deze vormen van samenwerking zijn onderzocht op manieren waarop de verschillende actoren 
met elkaar samenwerken en de wijze waarop zij specifieke praktijken en besluitvorming sturen.
De methodologische aanpak in deze studie bestaat uit een geografische. Hierbij zijn 
stroomopwaarts en stroomafwaarts gelegen gebieden met elkaar verbonden door middel van 
stromend water en landgebruik. Deze gebieden zijn hierdoor geïntegreerd in het onderzoek. 
Hierbij is gebruik gemaakt van een veelvoud aan methoden voor data verzameling: observatie, 
focusgroep discussies, enquêtes onder huishoudens, participerende observatie en interviews 
met sleutelinformanten. Lake Jipe wordt in deze thesis gezien als een casus, waarbij de analyse 
gegeneraliseerd kan worden naar andere co-management arrangementen in wetlands in Tanzania.
De drie co-management arrangementen laten elk iets anders zien. Het arrangement rondom 
het co-management van de visserij laat het bestaan zien van een conflict tussen vissers woonachtig 
in het gebied versus vissers van buiten het gebied. Dit conflict richt zich op een competitie 
over ruimtelijk gunstige posities; de plekken met een goede visvangst in vergelijking tot andere 
ruimtelijke posities. Ook bestaan er conflicten tussen het co-management systeem tussen 
verschillende groepen vissers en met leiders van de overheid. Laatstgenoemden lijken allianties 
te vormen met illegale vissers om zo mee te kunnen profiteren van illegaal verworven winsten. Het 
onderzoek laat tevens zien dat er cross-scale verbanden bestaan tussen informele instituties (zoals 
ouderlingen) en formele instituties (zoals regels en beslissingen van overheidsfunctionarissen), 
waarbij het doel is om praktijken van illegale visserij tegen te gaan. Tevens zijn er cross-scale 
verbanden ontstaan tussen het co-management systeem (visserijcommissies) en de lokale visserij 
autoriteiten en beheerders om niet-duurzame visserij tegen te gaan, en om te onderhandelen in 
conflicten tussen verschillende hulpbrongebruikers, en tussen hulpbrongebruikers en handhavers. 
Over het algemeen kan opgemerkt worden dat co-management systemen ontstaan door de 
complexiteit van problemen in zowel visserijbeheer als in de handhaving van duurzame visserij. 
Het blijkt dat deze problemen niet opgelost kunnen worden door één institutionele actor (bv. 
enkel de overheid, of enkel de gemeenschap).
Het landbouwarrangement laat het bestaan zien van complexe conflicten en samenwerking 
tussen overheid, niet-gouvernementele organisaties, lokale instituties en actoren uit de gemeenschap. 
Sommige van deze samenwerkingsvormen en verbanden richten zich op specifieke hulpbronnen, 
terwijl anderen zich richten op een veelvoud aan hulpbronnen. Sommige co-management 
systemen zijn ontstaan doordat actoren en instituties niet zelf in staat zijn om specifieke sociale 
en conflicterende problemen op de kaart te zetten. Om dit doel toch te bereiken is samenwerking 
aangegaan met andere instituties en actoren. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval in het proces van 
conflictoplossing bij land dat valt onder het “traditionele eigendomsrecht systeem”. Het lukte zowel 
de informele instituties als de overheid niet om dit probleem op de kaart te zetten, en oplossingen 
aan te dragen. Inspanningen en mogelijkheden van de overheid en van de gemeenschap zijn 
hierdoor geïntegreerd in een co-management systeem. In dit arrangement bestaan ook informele 
manieren voor het beheren van concurrerende hulpbronnen (zoals water), en voor het bemiddelen 
in sociale relaties tussen hulpbron gebruikers en sociale actoren in geografisch gescheiden gebieden. 
Op deze manier wordt de overheid uitgenodigd om samen te werken in interacties geïnitieerd door 
de gemeenschap. Daarnaast is er in dit arrangement één speler (MIFIPRO NGO) die horizontale 
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verbanden legt tussen actoren uit geografisch gespreide gemeenschappen (zowel bovenstrooms als 
benedenstrooms) door het verbeteren van beheerspraktijken rondom natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
Daarnaast legt deze speler verticale verbanden tussen actoren uit de overheid en uit de lokale 
gemeenschap. Deze inspanningen hebben geleid tot een effectieve co-management institutie, 
waarbij de overheid en de lokale gemeenschap zijn betrokken (de milieucommissie). Dit is bereikt 
door het versterken van capaciteit en door trainingen te geven over de regels waarop deze institutie 
toezicht moet houden.
Het veeteeltarrangement wordt gekenmerkt door het samenspel tussen twee etnische stammen: 
de Maasai en de Pare. Deze groepen leven gescheiden van elkaar, maar komen gedurende het 
jaar op tijdelijke basis met elkaar in aanraking. De veelal harmonieuze samenleving van deze 
verschillende etnische groepen wordt door de overheid gefaciliteerd. Als er voldoende goede 
weidegrond beschikbaar is, bevinden de twee groepen zich op verschillende ruimtelijke plekken. 
Echter, als er een tekort aan weidegrond is in een van de gebieden, verplaatst een van de groepen 
zich naar het gebied van de ander. Door dit tijdelijke gebrek aan goede weidegronden beoefenen 
de Maasai nomadische veehouderij uit. De twee groepen wijzen elkaar in essentie af, maar door 
de inmenging van een gezaghebbende overheid, bestaat er nu een harmonieuze co-existentie 
gedurende een tijdelijk moment in het jaar.
Op het niveau van het social-ecologische system, heeft dit onderzoek instituties geïdentificeerd 
die verschillende rollen op zich nemen. Normen waarover ouderlingen van de Pare stam toezicht 
houden, bemiddelen in conflicten die de drie co-management arrangementen overstijgen. Andere 
instituties zijn specifiek voor de verschillende sectoren. Het visserij co-management systeem 
bijvoorbeeld, geldt alleen voor visserij, zoals het arrangement van de veehouderij alleen voor 
veehouders geldt. Voor het integrale beheer van het gehele sociaal-ecologische systeem zijn 
instituties nodig die op een cross-sector en een cross-scale niveau opereren. Deze zullen in hun 
rol gesteund moeten worden, om zo hun belangrijke rol te kunnen behouden.
Dit onderzoek wijst uit dat er niet één, maar meerdere co-management arrangementen 
bestaan in het sociaalecologische systeem Lake Jipe, waarvan er drie zijn uitgewerkt in deze thesis. 
Het sociaal-ecologische systeem Lake Jipe kan daarom niet begrepen worden als bij de analyse 
uitgegaan wordt van een monolithische vorm van management. Een dergelijke aanpak verhuld 
ook inter- en cross-scale interacties en diversiteiten. Om inzicht te verkrijgen in het systeem, 
moeten deze worden gesplitst in diverse co-management arrangementen.
Op basis van dit onderzoek is een eerste aanbeveling dat verder vergelijkend onderzoek 
nodig is naar de bestudeerde co-management arrangementen. Een tweede aanbeveling is dat 
het gebruik van de concepten arrangementen, instituties, en actoren (elders) herhaald moeten 
worden, om zo de institutionele en ecologische complexiteiten die er bestaan in co-management 
arrangementen beter te begrijpen. Verder wordt aanbevolen bij een herhaling van deze studie 
in andere omgevingen, meerdere arrangementen moeten worden geanalyseerd. Een vierde 
aanbeveling is dat verder onderzoek nodig is naar de effectiviteit van verschillende instituties, 
om te begrijpen welke positieve en negatieve impacts hieruit voort komen. Inzicht hierin kan 
helpen om de positieve ervaringen om te zetten in een strategisch plan. Op deze manier kan een 
verbetering aangebracht worden in het duurzaam beheren van sociaal-ecologische systemen in 
Tanzania, en elders ter wereld.
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land resources management and environmental conservation in the fragile Uluguru mountain 
landscape in Tanzania, Workshop on Food Security, Health and Equity, Community 
Development, Industrialization Processes, Policy and Implementation, and Environmental 
Conservation (Uluguru Mountains Tanzania), 12th – 13th November 2007, Nairobi
• Investigation of possibility for co-management between the government and local community 
for sustainable management of Lake Jipe Wetland in Tanzania, Annual Workshop PROVIDE 
Programme of Wageningen University, 7th October 2008, Arusha, Tanzania
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